Вики извештај о неједнакости дохотка у САД

Неједнакост прихода у Сједињеним Америчким Државама

Из Википедије, слободне енциклопедије

Дистрибуција прихода у Сједињеним Државама била је предмет студије научника и институција. Подаци из више извора [1] показују да неједнакост прихода је знатно порастао од раних 1970-их , [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , након неколико деценија стабилности . [7] [8] Иако неједнакост је порасла међу већини развијених земаља, а посебно говори енглески оне, она је највећа у Сједињеним Државама. [9] [10] [11]

Студије указују на извор јаза (понекад се назива Велики дивергенције ) није био неравноправност полова , који је опао у САД у последњих неколико деценија, [12] нити неједнакост између црних и белих Американаца , који је стагнирала током тог времена , [13] нити има јаз између сиромашних и средње класе био главни узрок-мада је порасла. [14] Већина раста је између средње класе и врхунским примањима, са диспаритет постаје екстремно даље један иде горе у расподели дохотка. [15]

2011 Студија ЦБО [16] је утврдио да врх зарађују 1 проценат домаћинстава зарадио око 275% после савезних пореза и трансфера прихода током периода између 1979 и 2007, у односу на добит од само испод 40% за 60 процената у средњи дохотка дистрибуције Америке. [16] Други извори сматрају да је тренд се наставио од тада. [17] Међутим, само 42% Американаца мисли неједнакост порасла у последњих десет година. [18] Неједнакост прихода није уједначен међу државе; мерено Гини коефицијент : после неједнакост пореза на доходак у 2009 био је највећи у Тексасу и најнижа у Мејну . [19]

Научници и други разликују у погледу узрока, решења и значај тренда, [20] [21] који у 2011 помогао запалити "Оццупи" покрет протеста . Образовање и повећана потражња за квалификованом радном снагом се често наводи као узроке, [22] неки су нагласили значај јавне политике; други верују узрок (е) од пораста неједнакости је нису добро разумели. [16] Неједнакост је описан и као ирелевантне у лице економске прилике (или друштвене покретљивости ) у Америци, а као узрок пада ту прилику. [23] [24]

Историја

САД неједнакост од 1913-2008 [25] .

Учешће пре опорезивања дохотка домаћинства примио горњем 1 одсто, 0,1 одсто и топ топ 0,01 одсто, између 1917 и 2005. [26] [27]

Ниво концентрације прихода у Америци није била константна кроз историју. Враћајући се почетком 20. века, када је статистика приходи почели да постане доступан, дошло је до "велика економска лук" из висока неједнакост "на релативне једнакости и назад", по речима економиста, добитник Нобелове награде Пол Кругман . [28] У 1915, доба у коме су Рокфелери и Царнегиес доминације америчку индустрију, најбогатији 1% Американаца зарадио отприлике 18% свих прихода. До 2007, 1 проценат врх рачун за 24% свих прихода. [29] У међувремену, њихов удео је пао испод 10% за три деценије.

Први ера неједнакости трајала отприлике од пост-грађанског рата ере (" позолотила доба ") до негде око 1937. Али од око 1937 до 1947-период који је назван" Велики компресија " [30] -приход неједнакост у Америци пао драматично. Високо прогресивна Нев Деал опорезивање, јачање синдиката, и регулисање рада Националног одбора рат током Другог светског рата подигли приходе сиромашних и радничке класе и спустио да од врхунских зарађују. [31] Овај "средња класа друштво" од релативно низак ниво неједнакости остао прилично стабилан за око три деценије, закључно са почетком 1970, [7] [30] [32] производ релативно високих плата за америчке радничке класе и политичке подршке за изравнавање примањима владине политике.

Плате остала релативно висока због недостатка стране конкуренције за америчку производњу, недостатак неквалификованих радника имиграната, [33] конкурсу за америчке раднике уопште, и - вероватно најважније - снажних синдиката. До 1947 више од трећине не-пољопривредних радника су чланови синдиката, [34] и синдикати и подигао просечне плате за своје чланство, а индиректно и, у мањој мери, подигао плате за раднике у сличним занимањима не заступа синдиката. [35 ] Научници верују политичка подршка за изједначавање политика владе обезбедио је висок одзив бирача од синдикалних гласања дискова, подршку иначе конзервативног југа за Нев Деал, и престижа који масовно мобилизација и победа од Другог светског рата дао владу. [ 36]

Повратак на високе неједнакост-или шта Кругман и новинар Тимоти Ноа су назива и као " Велики дивергенције " [29] -почела у 1970.

Користи од повећане продуктивности у последњих 35 година нису отишли ​​на средњу класу [37]

Студије су открили приход порастао више неједнак готово непрекидно, осим током економске рецесије у 1990-91 , 2001 ( дот-цом балона ), и 2007 суб-приме попрсје . [38] [39]

Велики Одступања се разликује у неким стварима из доба неједнакости пред-депресије. Пре 1937 већи удео Топ Еарнерс прихода долази из капитала (камата, дивиденди, прихода од закупнине, капиталних добитака). Пост 1970, приходи од пореских обвезника са високим приходима долази претежно из "рада", односно накнаду за запошљавање. [40]

До 2011, Велика дивергенција није била главна политичка тема у Америци, иако стагнација прихода средње класе био. У 2009 Барак Обама администрација Бела кућа средње класе радничких породица Радна група се састала да се фокусирају на економским питањима посебно погађају средње развијеним Американце. У 2011, Оццупи покрет скренуо велику пажњу на неједнакости дохотка у земљи.

Најновије статистике

Од 1992 до 2007 топ 400 зарађују у САД видели њихов приход повећати 392% а њихова просечна пореска стопа смањена за 37%. [41] Учешће укупног прихода у Америци иде на врх 1% америчких домаћинстава (такође после савезни порези и трансфери приход) повећан је са 11,3% у 1979 на 20,9% у 2007. [42] Током Велике рецесије 2007-2009, неједнакост је одбио, уз укупан приход иде у доњем 99 одсто Американаца опада од 11,6%, али пада брже (36,3%) за првих 1%. [43] [44] Међутим диспаритет у приходима поново повећао током 2009-2010 опоравка, уз горњем 1% примањима приходима хватање 11,6% прихода и капиталне добитке, а приход другог 99% остао стан, расте од само 0,2%. [45] [46]

Мера

Индикатори

Инфлација прилагођен повећање прихода након опорезивања домаћинства између 1979 и 2005 за првих 1%, а четири од пет петине. [47]

Овај графикон приказује приход од датих перцентила од 1947 до 2010 у 2010 долара. Тхе 2 колоне бројева у десној маргини су кумулативни раст 1970-2010 и годишња стопа раста у том периоду. Вертикална скала је логаритамска, што чини проценат константан раст појављују као праве линије. Од 1947 до 1970, све перцентили расла у суштински истом брзином; светло, праве линије за различите перцентила за тих година сви имају исти нагиб. Од тада, дошло је до значајне разлике, са различитим процентима расподеле дохотка расте по различитим стопама. За средње америчке породице, овај јаз је $ 39,000 годишње (нешто преко $ 100 по дану): Ако економски раст у овом периоду су широко деле као да је од 1947 до 1970, медијана приход домаћинства би била $ 39,000 годишње вишем него што је био у 2010. Ова завера је створена комбиновањем података из Ценсус Буреау [48] и САД Интернал Ревенуе Сервице. [49] Постоје систематских разлика између ова два извора, али разлике су мале у односу на скали од ово својство. [50]

Бројне студије од стране америчког Министарства трговине , Конгресна Канцеларија за буџет (ЦБО), и Пореске управе , су открили да расподела прихода у Сједињеним Америчким Државама - најчешће мерена домаћинству или појединац - постало је све неравноправан од 1970 .

Један од најновијих и свеобухватних студија о промени неједнакости у Америци је 2011 Студија о буџету Канцеларије Конгреса (ЦБО) - "Трендови у расподели дохотка домаћинства између 1979 и 2007". (То је изабрао те две године, јер су обојица претходила економску рецесију и тако обојица су били периоди "сличан укупне економске активности" [51] ). Извештај је утврдио да прави приход домаћинства након савезних пореза и трансфера (укључујући владине исплате из социјалне сигурности , осигурање за случај незапослености , итд [52] [53] ) је порастао за 62%.

Међутим, приход домаћинстава у горњем 1 одсто примањима порастао за 275%, у поређењу са 65% за наредну 19 одсто, само под 40% за наредну 60 одсто, 18% за доње петине домаћинстава. "Као резултат тог неравномерног раста прихода," наводи се у извештају, "удео укупног након опорезивања прихода које је добио 1 одсто становништва у домаћинствима са највећим приходима више него удвостручио између 1979 и 2007, док је удео примио од домаћинства са ниским и средњим примањима одбио ... Учешће прихода добијених од горњем 1 одсто порастао од око 8% у 1979 на преко 17% у 2007. учешће примила од друге 19 одсто домаћинстава у највећим приходима петине ( једна петина становништва као подељена приход) је била прилично равна у истом периоду, до ивица са 35% на 36%. " [54]

Према ЦБО, [55] главни разлог за посматрани пораст неједнаке расподеле прихода након опорезивања била је повећање прихода на тржишту, то је приход домаћинства без пореза и трансфера. Приход тржишта за домаћинства је комбинација прихода од рада (као што су новчане зараде, послодавац-паид давања, послодавац-паид пореза на плате), пословни приход (као што су приходи од предузећа и фарми управљају искључиво њихови власници), капиталних добитака (профита реализован од продаје имовине, стоцк оптионс), приходе од капитала (као што су камате од депозита, дивиденди, приход од закупа), и осталих прихода. Од тога, капитални добици чине 80% повећања тржишног прихода за домаћинства у горњем 20%, у периоду 2000-2007. Чак преко 1991-2000 периоду, према ЦБО, капитални добици чине 45% од прихода на тржишту за првих 20% домаћинстава.

Пионири у употреби ИРС података о примањима да анализира дистрибуцију прихода су Емануел Саез и Томас Пикетти у Паризу Сцхоол оф Ецономицс показала да удео прихода држи горњем 1 одсто био је велики у 2005, као 1928. [5] Други извори који су приметили повећану неједнакост укључен економиста Џенет Иеллен који је изјавио, "раст [у стварном приходу] је јако концентрисан на самом врху врха, који је, врх 1 посто." [56]

Економиста Тимоти Смеединг сумирао тренутни тренд: [57]

Американци имају највећи неједнакости у богатом свету и током протеклих 20-30 година Американци су такође доживели највећи раст неједнакости у приходима између богатих нација. Детаљнији подаци можемо користити да посматрају ову промену, више искривљени промена изгледа да ... већина великих добитака су заиста на врху дистрибуције.

Сједињене Америчке Државе пописа бироа студије о неједнакости дохотка мере оба домаћинства [58] и појединци. [59] Њихови бројеви показују нижи ниво неједнакости [60] , али не садрже податке за домаћинства највишим дохотком где је већина промена у расподели дохотка има дошло. [20] [61] [62] [63]

Подаци Укупан добитак Проценат добитак 2003 2000 1997 1994 1991 1988 1985 1982 1979 1976 1973 1970 1967
20. перцентил $ 3,982 28.4% $ 17.984 $ 19.142 $ 17,601 $ 16.484 $ 16.580 $ 17.006 $ 16.306 $ 15.548 $ 16.457 $ 15.615 $ 15.844 $ 15.126 $ 14.002
Медијана (50.) $ 9,980 29.9% $ 43.318 $ 44.853 $ 42.294 $ 39.613 $ 39.679 $ 40.678 $ 38.510 $ 36.811 $ 38.649 $ 36.155 37.700 $ 35.832 $ 33.338
80. перцентил $ 31.602 57.2% $ 86.867 $ 87.341 $ 81.719 $ 77.154 $ 74,759 $ 75.593 $ 71.433 $ 66.920 $ 68.318 $ 63.247 $ 64,500 $ 60.148 $ 55.265
95. перцентил $ 65.442 73,8% $ 154.120 $ 155.121 $ 144.636 $ 134.835 $ 126.969 $ 127.958 $ 119.459 $ 111.516 $ 111.445 $ 100.839 $ 102.243 $ 95.090 $ 88.678
ИЗВОР: УС Ценсус Буреау, 2004 [64] (Страна 44/45)

Демографски проблеми

Поређења прихода током времена треба да се прилагоди на промене у просечној старости, величине породице, број храниоцима и других карактеристика становништва. Мерење личне приходе игнорише зависну децу, али приход домаћинства такође има проблеме-домаћинство од десет има нижи животни стандард од једног од два народа, иако приход од два домаћинства може бити исти. [65]

Народни зарада имају тенденцију да расте преко њихових радних живота, па "снапсхот мере неједнакости прихода може да завара." [66] Неједнакост недавно дипломирани колеџа и 55-годишњи на врхунцу његове / њене каријере није издати ако дипломирани има исти каријере.

Конзервативне истраживачи и организације су се фокусирали на пропусте прихода домаћинства као меру за животни стандард, како би оповргао тврдње да је неједнакост прихода расте, постају претерано или који представљају проблем за друштво. [67] Према социолог Деннис Гилберта, растућу неједнакост може се делом објаснити растуће учешће жена у радној снази. Високе Зарада домаћинства су више вероватно да ће бити дуал Еарнер домаћинства, [7] А према анализи из 2004 приход Петина података од стране Црне Херитиџ фондације , неједнакост постаје мање када приход домаћинства је прилагођен за величину домаћинства. Укупно учешће прихода држи горњи квинтил (врх зарађују 20 одсто), смањује за 20,3%, када подаци су прилагођени тако да одражавају величину домаћинства. [68]

Међутим Истраживачки центар Пев пронађен приход домаћинства се појавио да опада мање од појединачног прихода у двадесет првом веку, јер они који више нису у стању да приуште властити стамбени простор све више креће у са рођацима, стварајући веће домаћинстава са више примањима у им. [69]

ЦБО студија 2011 "Трендови у расподели дохотка домаћинстава" поменут у овом чланку прилагођава величини домаћинства, тако да његове квантилима садрже једнак број људи, а не једнак броју домаћинстава. [70]

Гледајући на питање колико често радници или домаћинства крећу у вишим или нижим квантилима као свој приход расте или пада током година, [71] ЦБО пронађен расподелу прихода у периоду од више година "скромно" више једнак од годишњег прихода. [ 72] ЦБО студија потврђује раније студије. [47]

Све у свему, према Тимотхи Ноја, исправљање за демографских фактора (данашња популација је старија него што је била пре 33 година, а развод и самохраних родитеља су направили домаћинства мањи), можете наћи да је неједнакост прихода, мада мање екстреман него што показују стандардне мере, је такође расте брже него што показују стандардног мери. [73]

Неједнакост зарада

Према Џенет Л. Иеллен, председник и извршни директор, Федерал Ресерве Банк оф Сан Францисцо,

Реалне зараде по сату ... оних у 90. перцентила-где већина људи имају вишу или напредну степени-порасла за 30% или више ... међу овом топ 10 одсто, раст је у великој мери концентрисана на самом врху врха, који је, Најбољи 1 посто. Ово укључује људе који су зарадили врло највеће плате у америчкој економији, као спорт и забаву звезда, инвестиционих банкара и капиталистичкој привреди, адвокати, директори и. Насупрот томе, на 50. перцентила и испод-где многи људи имају у већини диплому средње школе-реалне зараде порасле за само 5 до 10% - [56]

Лиза Схалетт од Меррилл Линцх Богатство менаџмент, утврдио да, реалне просечне сату зараде у САД "су у суштини стан на доле, са данашње инфлације прилагођен зарада носно о истом нивоу као и да постиже радника у 1970", упркос чињеници да "за последње две деценије и посебно у текућем периоду", продуктивност је "порасла". Корист од продуктивности током овог циклуса је отишао "скоро искључиво корпорација и њихових веома директорима." [74]

Гини индекс

Додатне информације: Гини коефицијент

Гини коефицијент неједнакости сумира у једној броја и један је од најчешће коришћених мера неједнакости прихода. Он користи скалу од 0 до 1 - већи број више неједнакост. 0 представља савршену једнакост (свако има потпуно исти приход), а 1 представља савршену неједнакост (једна особа има сав приход). (Индек резултати су обично помножен са 100 да би их лакше разумеју. [75] ) Гини индекс оцене може да се користи за поређење неједнакости у року (од расе, пола, запошљавање) и између земаља, пре и после пореза. [76] [ 77] [78] [79] Различити извори ће често дају различите вредности Гини за исту земљу или становништва мерена.

Поређења по држави

Ова мапа Гини индекс показује регионалну и округ варијације нивоа у пре опорезивања дохотка неједнакости Гини индекса. 2010 Гини индекс Опсег вредности од 0,207 за Ловинг Цоунти ( Тексас ) да 0.645 до Еаст Царролл Парисх ( Луизијана ). [80]

Приход домаћинства Гини индекс за САД био је 0.468 у 2009, у складу са Ценсус Буреау , [81] иако је значајно варирала између држава . Стања Јута, Вајоминг Аљаске и имају пре опорезивања неједнакости прихода Гини коефицијент који је 10% нижа од просека, док Вашингтон и Порторико 10% већи. После укључујући ефекте федералних и државних пореза, Федералне резерве САД процењује 34 државе у САД имају Гини коефицијент између 0,30 и 0,35, са стањем Мејн најниже. [19] На среских и општинских нивоа, пред- Порез Гини индекс у распону од 0.21 до 0.65 у 2010 широм САД, према проценама Пописне. [80]

ОЕЦД процењује пре опорезивања Гини индекс за САД био је 0,49, а после опорезивања Гини индекс био је 0,38, у 2008-2009. Просечна пре опорезивања Гини индекс за земље ОЕЦД-био је 0,46, док је просечна након опорезивања Гини индекс је био 0.31. [76]

Међународна поређења

УН , ЦИА Ворлд Фацтбоок , [82] и ОЕЦД-а су користили Гини индекс за поређење неједнакости између земаља, а од 2006, Сједињене Државе су имали један од највиших нивоа неједнакости међу сличним развијеним или земљама са високим дохотком , мерено индексом. [9] Иако неједнакост је порасла од 1981 у две трећине ОЕЦД земаља [12] [83] Најразвијеније земље су у доњем, више равноправно, крај спектра, са Гини коефицијента у високим двадесетих до средине тридесетих година. [84]

Гини рејтинг Сједињених Америчких Држава је довољно висока, међутим, да га стави међу мање развијеним земљама. САД рангира изнад (више од неједнак) јужноамеричких земаља попут Гвајана, Никарагва, Венецуела и, а отприлике у линији са Уругваја, Никарагви и Венецуели, у складу са ЦИА-ом. [85] (мада неке развијене земље имају виши Гини оцене пре порези и трансфери. [10] )

Између 1985 и 2008 ОЕЦД-24 земаља са најбржим растом Гини коефицијента-су Шведска, Нови Зеланд, Финска, Израел, Немачка, Луксембург и. [86]

Организација САД Гини
рејтинг
Међународни опсег САД рангирање у
приход једнакост
Година (и) оцењено
Већина једнак
(Најнижа Гини)
Најмање једнак
(Највиши Гини)
УН [87] [88] 0.408 0,168 ( Азербејџан ) 0,743 ( Намибија ) 77. од 146 2000-2010
Ворлд Фацтбоок
(ЦИА) [82]
0.45 0.23 ( Шведска , 2005) 0,707 (Намибија, 2003) 100. од 140 [89] 1994-2009
ОЕЦД [10]
(После пореза и трансфера)
0.378 0,236 ( Словенија ) 0,494 ( Чиле ) 31. од 34
(У ОЕЦД)
"лате 2000с"
ОЕЦД [10]
(Пре пореза и трансфера)
0.486 0.344 ( Јужна Кореја ) 0.534 ( Италија ) 26. од 33
(У ОЕЦД)
"лате 2000с"

Међу 34 "развијеног" земљама ОЕЦД САД Гини ранг у једнакости прихода (27.) је виши порези и пре "трансфери" се мере, [90] а затим после (31.) [91] -тј, САД има мање приходе прерасподела владе од неких других пост-индустријским економијама. Међутим, неке развијене земље, попут Холандије и Грчке, имају мању неједнакост једноставно зато што су приходи једнаки више него у САД и пре пореза. [92]

Неки су тврдили да је неједнакост је већа у другим земљама осим званичне статистике показују због непријављеног прихода. Европске земље имају веће количине богатства у офшор газдинстава. [93] [94] [95] [96]

Нивои прихода

Високи приходи

60% од зарађују у горњем 0,1 одсто су руководиоци, менаџери, супервизори, и финансијски стручњаци. Више од половине њих раде у блиској одржан бизниса. [97] Најбољи 1 проценат се састоји од многих професија, пет најчешћих занимања као менаџери , [98] лекари , администратори , адвокати и финансијски стручњаци. Лекари су чешће него било који други професије да буде у 1 одсто. [99]

Узроци

Неједнакост у целини

Стручност, продуктивности и радно искуство, наслеђе, пол, раса и имају јак утицај на дистрибуцију личних примања [100] [101] у Сједињеним Америчким Државама, као иу другим земљама.

Раце и родне разлике

Нивои прихода варира у зависности од пола и расе са средњим нивоом прихода знатно испод националног медијане за жене у односу на мушкарце са одређеним расним демографију. [102]

Медијана лични доходак по полу и раси у 2005.

Упркос значајном напретку у остваривању родне равноправности и расне, неки социолози атрибут ове разлике у приходима на континуираном дискриминације. [103] Други сматрају да већина јаза у приходима је због избора женске и преференцијама. Жене су више вероватно да ће размотрити факторе осим плате када траже запослење. У просеку, жене су мање вољни да путују или премести, узети више сати ван и раде мање сати, и изабрати колеџ мајора који доводе до мање плаћеним пословима. Жене су такође више вероватно да раде за владе или непрофитне, да плаћају мање него у приватном сектору. [104] [105] Према овој перспективи одређене етничке мањине и жене добијају мање промоције и могућности за занимања и економског напретка од других. У случају жена овај концепт се назива плафон стакло држе жене из пењање професионалну мердевине.

У погледу расе, азијски Американци су далеко више вероватно да ће бити у највишем зарађује 5 одсто од остатка Американаца. [106]

Међутим студије су показале да Афроамериканци су мање вероватно да ће бити ангажовани од европских-Американаца са истим квалификацијама. [107] наставила преваленција традиционалних родних улога и етничких стереотипа може делимично објаснити тренутним нивоима дискриминације. [103] У 2005, медијана били су највиши нивои прихода међу азијским и Белих мушкараца и најнижи међу женама свих раса, посебно оних идентификују као Афроамериканац или хиспано. Упркос затварању род и расне празнине, остају значајне разлике међу расним и родним демографију, чак и на истом степену стручне спреме. [108] Успех азијских Американаца може доћи од како родитељи и деца проводе много дуже на образовање него њихови вршњаци. Азијски Амерички имају знатно већу стопу дипломе од својих вршњака и да су много веће шансе да уђе висок статус занимања. [109]

Средња недељно зарада стално плата и плата радницима, према полу, раси и етничкој припадности, 2009. [110]

Од 1953 јаз у приходима између мушкараца и жена је знатно смањен, али је и даље релативно велика. [111] Жене тренутно зарађују знатно више сараднице, диплому, а магистарске дипломе од мушкараца и скоро онолико докторате. [112] Жене су пројектовани да је прошло мушкарци у доктората зарадио у периоду 2006-2007, и да заради скоро две трећине сарадник је, диплому, а мастер степени до 2016. [113] Упркос томе, неки [ ко? ] даље тврде да мушки радници још увек држе већи степен образовања, као успех жена у академским круговима је релативно нов феномен. [100]

Иако је важно напоменути да је неједнакост у приходима између полова остао потпуно на свим нивоима образовања. [102] Између 1953 и 2005 средње зарада, као и образовни ниво повећан, на далеко већем темпу за жене него за мушкарце. Медијана прихода за жене зарађују мушке зарађују порастао 157,2% у односу на 36,2% за мушкарце, преко четири пута брже. Данас средња мушки радник зарађује око 68,36% више него за девојчицама, у поређењу са 176,25% у 1953. Средњи приход од мушкараца у 2005 био је 2% већи него у 1973 у односу на повећање за 74,6% жена зарађују. [111]

Расне разлике остао потпуно, као и, са највишом зарађују секс-родне демографске старости радника 25 или старији, Азијске мушкараца (који су били повезани са грубо белих мушкараца ) зарађују нешто више од два пута онолико колико су најниже зараде-демографских, хиспанске женки. [114] [115] Као што је већ поменуто, неједнакост између раса и пол упорно на сличним нивоима образовања. [115] [116] Расне разлике су укупни израженији међу мушкарцима него међу женама примањима. У 2009, латино били више него двоструко веће шансе да буду сиромашни него не-Хиспано белци, истраживања показују. [117] Доња просеку Енглески способност, низак ниво образовања, делимично радно време, низак узраст хиспанске носилаца домаћинства, а 2007-09 рецесија су важни фактори који су гурнути горе хиспанске стопе сиромаштва у односу на не-хиспано белаца.

Током раних 1920-их година, средње зарада смањена за оба пола, не значајно повећање све до касних 1990-их. Од 1974 медијане прихода за раднике оба пола повећан за 31,7%, од $ 18,474 до $ 24.325, достижући своју високу тачку у 2000. [118]

Демографски Медијана лични доходак
Укупна Медијана Дипломирани Гимназија Нешто факултета Степен или виша Бечелор Бечелор диплома Мастер Докторат степен
Бео Мушко [119] $ 40.432 $ 33.805 $ 40.427 $ 61.175 $ 55.129 $ 67.903 $ 77.818
Женско [120] $ 26.636 $ 21.306 $ 25.190 $ 40.161 $ 36,076 $ 45.555 $ 56.759
Оба пола [121] $ 32.919 $ 27.291 $ 31.510 $ 49.879 $ 43.841 $ 52.244 $ 71.184
Црн Мушко [122] $ 30.549 $ 25.747 $ 32.758 $ 46.474 $ 41.889 $ 52.488 Н /
Женско [122] $ 25.435 $ 20.366 $ 25.574 $ 42.461 $ 41.263 $ 45.830 Н /
Оба пола [123] $ 27.110 $ 22.328 $ 27.589 $ 44.460 $ 41.565 $ 47.407 $ 61.993
Азијски Мушко [116] $ 42.217 $ 28.486 $ 34.548 $ 61.165 $ 51.448 $ 70.979 $ 81.676
Женско [124] $ 30.332 $ 21.057 $ 23.523 $ 41.442 $ Обавеза 37,057 $ 48.177 $ 53.659
Оба пола [125] $ 36.152 $ 25.285 $ 29.982 $ 51.481 $ 42,466 $ 61.452 $ 69.653
Хиспано Мушко [126] $ 26.162 $ 26.579 $ 33.617 $ 48.282 $ 43.791 $ 60,194 Н /
Женско [127] $ 20.133 $ 18,886 $ 25,088 $ 37.405 $ 34.302 $ 47,052 Н /
Оба пола [128] $ 23.613 $ 22.941 $ 28.698 $ 41.596 $ 37.819 $ 50.901 $ 67.274
Сви расне / етничке демографија Мушко [129] $ 39.403 $ 32.085 $ 39.150 $ 60.493 $ 52.265 $ 67.123 $ 78.324
Женско [130] $ 26.507 $ 21,117 $ 25.185 $ 40.483 $ 36.532 $ 45.730 $ 54.666
Оба пола [131] $ 32.140 $ 26.505 $ 31.054 $ 49.303 $ 43.143 $ 52.390 $ 70.853
НАПОМЕНА: Највећа средња за сваки ниво образовања је истакнут у зелено, најнижи у наранџастом.
ИЗВОР: Биро за попис, 2006

Нивои и добици прихода домаћинства за различите перцентила у 2003 долара. [132]

Образовање и технологија

Медијана лични доходак и домаћинство према различитим нивоима образовања. [131] [133]

Главни чланак: школска спрема у САД

Порез на разлике између различитих нивоа образовања (обично мерен са највишим степеном образовања појединац је завршен) су порасле. Стручност и вештина оверен кроз академски степен преводи у повећану оскудице професионалне квалификације појединца који заузврат доводи до веће економске награде. [134] Као што су Сједињене Државе се развио у пост-индустријском друштву више и више послодаваца захтевају стручност да су урадили пре не генерације, док производни сектор који запослени су многи од оних који немају пост-средње образовање се смањује у величини. [135]

У добијеном тржишту економски посао несклад између прихода радничке класе и професионални са вишим академским звањима, [100] који поседују оскудне количине атестирани стручности, може да се расте.

Домаћинства ароунд квантилима генерално дом више, боље образовани и запослени који раде зарађују доходак, него оних у нижим квантилима. [68] Међу онима у горњој петини, 62% од домаћина били колеџ дипломци, 80% је радио пуно радно време и 76% домаћинстава је имао два или више примањима, у поређењу са националним процентима од 27%, 58% и 42%, респективно. [100] [101] [136] највишег сфера подаци Ценсус Буреау указао да на раду и достигнуће поседовање дефицитарних вештина корелацији са вишим примањима. [136]

Просечне зараде у 2002 за становништво 18 и више година били већи у сваком прогресивно вишим степеном образовања ... Овај однос важи не само за целу популацију, већ и преко већине подгрупа. У оквиру сваког специфичног образовног нивоа, зарада се разликовала по полу и раси. This variation may result from a variety of factors, such as occupation, working full- or part-time, age, or labor force experience. – [100] [137]
Demographic High school graduate Some college Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Master's degree First professional degree Doctorate degree
Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings
(2005)
Both sexes $26,505 −17.5% $31,054 −3.5% $49,303 +53.4% $43,143 +34.2% $52,390 +63.0% $82,473 +156.6% $70,853 +120.4%
Males $32,085 −18.6% $39,150 −0.6% $60,493 +53.5% $52,265 +32.6% $67,123 +70.3% $100,000 +153.8% $78,324 +98.8%
Females $21,117 −20.3% $25,185 −5.0% $40,483 +52.7% $36,532 +37.82% $45,730 +72.5% $66,055 +149.2% $54,666 +106.2%
Both sexes employed full-time $31,539 −19.8% $37,135 −5.6% $56,078 +42.5% $50,944 +29.5% $61,273 +55.8% $100,000 +154.2% $79,401 +101.8%
Households
(2003)
$36,835 −20.5% $45,854 −0.8% $73,446 +58.8% $68,728 +48.6 $78,541 +69.9% $100,000 +116.2% $96,830 +109.4%
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2004/06 [131] [133]

Incentives

Percent of households with 2+ income earners, and full-time workers by income. [136]

In the context of concern over income inequality a number of economists, such as Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernake, have talked about the importance of incentives: “… without the possibility of unequal outcomes tied to differences in effort and skill, the economic incentive for productive behavior would be eliminated, and our market-based economy … would function far less effectively.” [134] [138] Yale economist Arthur Okun argues there is a trade-off between economic growth and economic redistribution. [139] [140]

Since abundant supply decreases market value, the possession of scarce skills considerably increases income. [100] Among the American lower class , the most common source of income was not occupation, but government welfare. [141]

Taxation

Average tax rate percentages for the highest-income US taxpayers, 1945-2009

Another factor in income inequality/equality is the effective rate at which income is taxed coupled with the progressivity of the tax system. A progressive tax is a tax by which the tax rate increases as the taxable base amount increases. [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] Overall income tax rates in the United States are below the OECD average, and until 2005 have been declining. [147]

Post-1980 rise in inequality

Most current discussion of income inequality in America centers on its rise since the mind to late 1970s, the so-called “ Great Divergence “. According to the United States Census Bureau , it reported that the income inequality between the richest and poorest people grew to its widest in 2011, as the census recorded 46.2 million people living in poverty . [148]

Broad breakdown

Breaking down how much of the increase in income inequality between 1979 and 2007 came from distribution of pre-tax income and how much from taxes and “government transfers”, the CBO data shows that the 33% increase in inequality [149] came from a

  • 23% increase in inequality from changes in distribution of “market income” to households (top earners received a larger share of salaries, interest, dividends, capital gains, business income, etc.); a
  • 6% increase from changes in “government transfers” (social security, unemployment, the end of AFDC welfare, etc.); and a
  • 4% increase from changes in federal taxation (overall decline in the average federal tax rate and shift in federal revenues from income taxes to less progressive payroll taxes, etc.).

[150] [151]

Of the 23% increase in inequality from changes in pre-tax “market” income, most of that (79%) came from a shift to top earners in different types of income across the board. A smaller amount of inequality increase (21%) came from a shift from wages and salaries to more concentrated income sources—ie interest, dividends, business income and especially capital gains, which are more concentrated toward top earners than income from salaries/wages. [152]

According to Michael Cembalest, the chief investment officer of JPMorgan Chase , [153] as of 2011, corporate “profit margins have reached levels not seen in decades,” and “reductions in wages and benefits explain the majority of the net improvement. … US labor compensation is now at a 50-year low relative to both company sales and US GDP” [154]

Lisa Shalett, chief investment officer at Merrill Lynch Wealth Management noted that, “for the last two decades and especially in the current period, … productivity soared … [but] US real average hourly earnings are essentially flat to down, with today's inflation-adjusted wage equating to about the same level as that attained by workers in 1970. … So where have the benefits of technology-driven productivity cycle gone? Almost exclusively to corporations and their very top executives.” [74]

Explanations

According to the CBO and others, “the precise reasons for the [recent] rapid growth in income at the top are not well understood”, [40] [85] but “in all likelihood,” an “interaction of multiple factors” was involved. [155] “Researchers have offered several potential rationales.” [40] [56] Some of these rationales conflict, some overlap. [156] They include:

  • the globalization hypothesis—low skilled American workers have been losing ground in the face of competition from low-wage workers in Asia and other “emerging” economies; [157]
  • skill-biased technological change — the rapid pace of progress in information technology has increased the demand for the highly skilled and educated so that income distribution favored brains rather than brawn; [157]
  • the superstar hypothesis—modern technologies of communication often turn competition into a tournament in which the winner is richly rewarded, while the runners-up get far less than in the past; [157] [158]
  • immigration of less-educated workers — relatively high levels of immigration of low skilled workers since 1965 may have reduced wages for American-born high school dropouts; [159]
  • policy and politics — soaring executive compensation , stagnating middle income pay and more regressive taxation resulting from political decisions, not market forces. Decision such as not intervening to stop executive capture of corporate boards, the crushing of labor unions, etc.

Analyzing the top three hypotheses, economist Paul Krugman found them to be “increasingly inadequate” as more evidence accumulated.

Globalization can explain part of the relative decline in blue-collar wages, but it can't explain the 2,500 percent rise in CEO incomes. Technology may explain why the salary premium associated with a college education has risen, but it's hard to match up with the huge increase in inequality among the college-educated, with little progress for many but gigantic gains at the top. The superstar theory works for Jay Leno , but not for the thousands of people who have become awesomely rich without going on TV. [157]

Immigration was also found wanting as an explanation. [160]

Other scholars [161] questioning the explanation of educational attainment and workplace skills point out that other countries with similar education levels and economies have not gone the way of the US, and that concentration of income in the US hasn't followed a pattern of “the 29% of Americans with college degrees pulling away” from those who have less education. [57] [162] [163] [164] [165] [9]

Skill-biased technological change

As of the mid- to late- decade of the 2000s, the most common explanation for income inequality in America was “skill-biased technological change” [166] — “a shift in the production technology that favors skilled over unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its relative demand “. [167] For example, one scholarly colloquium on the subject that included many prominent labor economists estimated that technological change was responsible for over 40% of the increase in inequality. Other factors like international trade, decline in real minimum wage, decline in unionization and rising immigration, were each responsible for 10-15% of the increase. [168] [169]

Numbers show the strength of education's influence on income distribution. [170] In 2005, roughly 55% of income earners with doctorate degrees — the most educated 1.4% — were among the top 15 percent earners. Among those with Masters degrees — the most educated 10% — roughly half had incomes among the top 20 percent of earners. [131] Only among households in the top quintile were householders with college degrees in the majority. [101]

But while the higher education commonly translates into higher income, [170] and the highly educated are disproportionately represented in upper quintile households , differences in educational attainment fail to explain income discrepancies between the top 1 percent and the rest of the population. Large percentages of individuals lacking a college degree are present in all income demographics, including 33% of those with heading households with six figure incomes . [101] From 2000 to 2010, the 1.5% of Americans with an MD, JD, or MBA and the 1.5% with a PhD saw median income gains of approximately 5%. Among those with a college or master's degree (about 25% of the American workforce) average wages dropped by about 7%, (though this was less than the decline in wages for those who had not completed college). [171]

Approaching the issue from occupations that have been replaced or downgraded since the late 1970s, one scholar found that jobs that “require some thinking but not a lot” — or moderately skilled middle-class occupations such as cashiers, typists, welders, farmers, appliance repairmen — declined the furthest in wage rates and/or numbers. Employment requiring either more skill or less has been less affected. [172] However the timing of the great technological change of the era—internet use by business starting in the late 1990s—does not match that of the growth of income inequality (starting in the early 1970s but slackening somewhat in the 1990s). Nor does the introduction of technologies that increase the demand for more skilled workers seem to be generally associated with a divergence in household income among the population. Inventions of the 20th century such as AC electric power , the automobile, airplane, radio, television, the washing machine, Xerox machine, each had an economic impact the equal of computers/microprocessors/internet but did not coincide with greater inequality. [172]

Образовање

Another explanation is that the combination of the introduction of technologies that increase the demand for skilled workers, and the failure of the American education system to provide a sufficient increase in those skilled workers has bid up those workers' salaries. An example of the slowdown in education growth in America (that began about the same time as the Great Divergence began) is the fact that the average person born in 1945 received two more years of schooling than his parents, while the average person born in 1975 received only half a year more of schooling. [173] Author Timothy Noah's “back-of-the-envelope” estimation based on “composite of my discussions with and reading of the various economists and political scientists” is that the “various failures” in America's education system are “responsible for 30%” of the post-1978 increase in inequality. [173]

Globalization

While economists who have studied globalization agree imports have had an effect, the timing of import growth does not match the growth of income inequality. China is the world's biggest exporter and maker of manufactured products but had a per capita income in 2007 one-seventh that of the United States. By 1995 imports of manufactured goods from low-wage countries totaled less than 3% of US gross domestic product. [174]

It wasn't until 2006 that the US imported more manufactured goods from low-wage (developing) countries than from high-wage (advanced) economies. [175] Inequality increased during the 2000-2010 decade not because of stagnating wages for less-skilled workers, but because of accelerating incomes of the top 0.1%. [174] Author Timothy Noah estimates that “trade”, increases in imports are responsible for just 10% of the “Great Divergence” in income distribution. [173]

Immigration

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 increased immigration to America, especially of non-Europeans. [85] From 1970 to 2007, the foreign-born proportion of America's population grew from 5% to 11%, most of whom had lower education levels and incomes than native-born Americans. But the contribution of this increase in supply of low-skill labor seem to have been relatively modest. One estimate stated that immigration reduced the average annual income of native-born “high-school dropouts” (“who roughly correspond to the poorest tenth of the workforce”) by 7.4% from 1980 to 2000. The decline in income of better educated workers was much less. [85] Author Timothy Noah estimates that “immigration” is responsible for just 5% of the “Great Divergence” in income distribution. [173]

Changes in income calculation

One observer who denies that household income has become more unequal is Alan Reynolds , senior fellow with the Cato Institute . Reyonlds has declared that income inequality is a statistical illusion brought about by technical changes in the tax law that alter what income gets reported to the Internal Revenue Service and what income does not. [67] [176] This claim has been criticized as “a mountain of hard-to-follow, often irrelevant, and sometimes entirely erroneous statistical quibbles” [177] or “intellectual three-card monte .” [178]

Reynolds points out that all the data gathered to calculate income inequality is based on federal tax returns. Income that is not on tax returns is not included in the data. Not surprisingly, what income is required and not required to be reported has changed. Prior to the 1980s, interest in municipal bonds and executive stock options did not need to be reported as taxable income. [179] In addition, many corporations filed as C-Corporations and therefore their income did not show up on individual tax returns. After the 1986 tax reform legislation and tax cuts under President Reagan, many corporations switched to being S-Corporations and therefore paid the personal income tax rate rather than the corporate tax rate. [180] As a result of these and other changes, during and after the 1980s lots of new income began to show up on the tax returns of top earners that had really been earned all along. For this reason it is not surprising that studies done by Pikkety/Saez and others show most of the increase in the top 1%'s share of annual income occurring in the 1986-1988 period. Furthermore, tax-deferred accounts began to show income disappearing from the returns of the holders of the accounts as they appeared in the 1980s. A 2001 Federal Reserve study showed that just 5.5% of the top 1%'s assets were held in tax deferred accounts, while 14.5% of the 50th-95th percentile's assets were held in tax deferred accounts. [181] Transfer payments are also largely ignored by most studies, but the proportion of income the absorb has risen from 5.9% in 1970 to 14.2% in 2004. [182] These payments generally go to lower-income families and therefore their absence has steadily made the statistics more and more flawed over the years. Reynolds' argument is that the changes have eliminated income from the middle while adding income to the top, exacerbating the situation statistically but in reality changing little to nothing.

Political, normative, institutional

Critics of technological change as an explanation for the “Great Divergence” of income levels in America [22] point to public policy and party politics, or “stuff the government did, or didn't do”. [183] They argue these have led to a trend of declining labor union membership rates and resulting diminishing political clout, decreased expenditure on social services, and less government redistribution.

Political parties and presidents

Political scientist Larry Bartels has found a strong correlation between the party of the president and income inequality in America since 1948. (see below) [164] [184]

Examining average annual pre-tax income growth from 1948 to 2005, [185] Bartel shows that under Democratic presidents (from Harry Truman forward), the greatest income gains have been at the bottom of the income scale and tapered off as income rose. Under Republican presidents, in contrast, gains were much less but what growth there was concentrated towards the top, tapering off as you went down the income scale. [151] [186]

Summarizing Bartels's findings, journalist Timothy Noah referred to the administrations of Democratic presidents as “Democrat-world”, and GOP administrations as “Republican-world”:

In Democrat-world, pre-tax income increased 2.64% annually for the poor and lower-middle-class and 2.12% annually for the upper-middle-class and rich. There was no Great Divergence. Instead, the Great Compression—the egalitarian income trend that prevailed through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s—continued to the present, albeit with incomes converging less rapidly than before. In Republican-world, meanwhile, pre-tax income increased 0.43 percent annually for the poor and lower-middle-class and 1.90 percent for the upper-middle-class and rich. Not only did the Great Divergence occur; it was more greatly divergent. Also of note: In Democrat-world pre-tax income increased faster than in the real world not just for the 20th percentile but also for the 40th, 60th, and 80th. We were all richer and more equal! But in Republican-world, pre-tax income increased slower than in the real world not just for the 20th percentile but also for the 40th, 60th, and 80th. We were all poorer and less equal! Democrats also produced marginally faster income growth than Republicans at the 95th percentile, but the difference wasn't statistically significant. [183]

The pattern of distribution of growth appears to be the result of a whole host of policies,

including not only the distribution of taxes and benefits but also the government's stance toward unions, whether the minimum wage rises, the extent to which the government frets about inflation versus too-high interest rates, etc., etc. [151]

Noah admits the evidence of this correlation is “circumstantial rather than direct”, but so is “the evidence that smoking is a leading cause of lung cancer.” [183]

Non-party political action
Further information: Executive pay in the United States

Ratio of average compensation of CEOs and production workers, 1965-2009. Source: Economic Policy Institute. 2011. Based on data from Wall Street Journal/Mercer, Hay Group 2010. [187]

According to political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson writing in the book Winner-Take-All Politics , the important policy shifts were brought on not by the Republican Party but by the development of a modern, efficient political system, especially lobbying , by top earners—and particularly corporate executives and the financial services industry. [188] the end of the 1970s saw a transformation of American politics away from a focus on the middle class, with new, much more effective, aggressive and well-financed lobbyists and pressure groups acting on behalf of upper income groups. Executives successfully eliminated any countervailing power or oversight of corporate managers (from private litigation, boards of directors and shareholders, the Securities and Exchange Commission or labor unions). [189]

The financial industry's success came from successfully pushing for deregulation of financial markets, allowing much more lucrative but much more risky investments from which it privatized the gains while socializing the losses with government bailouts. [190] (the two groups formed about 60% of the top 0.1 percent of earners.) All top earners were helped by deep cuts in estate and capital gains taxes, and tax rates on high levels of income.

Arguing against the proposition that the explosion in pay for corporate executives — which grew from 35X average worker pay in 1978 to over 250X average pay before the 2007 recession [191] — is driven by an increased demand for scarce talent and set according to performance, Krugman points out that multiple factors outside of executives' control govern corporate profitability, particularly in short term when the head of a company like Enron may look like a great success. Further, corporate boards follow other companies in setting pay even if the directors themselves disagree with lavish pay “partly to attract executives whom they consider adequate, partly because the financial market will be suspicious of a company whose CEO isn't lavishly paid.” Finally “corporate boards, largely selected by the CEO, hire compensation experts, almost always chosen by the CEO” who naturally want to please their employers. [192]

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, the authors of Pay Without Performance , critique of executive pay , argue that executive capture of corporate governance is so complete that only public relations, ie public `outrage`, constrains their pay. [193] This in turn has been reduced as traditional critics of excessive pay—such as politicians (where need for campaign contributions from the richest outweighs populist indignation), media (lauding business genius), unions (crushed) — are now silent. [194]

In addition to politics, Krugman postulated change in norms of corporate culture have played a factor. In the 1950s and 60s, corporate executives had (or could develop) the ability to pay themselves very high compensation through control of corporate boards of directors, they restrained themselves. But by the end of the 1990s, the average real annual compensation of the top 100 CEO's skyrocketed from $1.3 million—39 times the pay of an average worker—to $37.5 million, more than 1,000 times the pay of ordinary workers from 1982 to 2002. [157] Journalist George Packer also sees the dramatic increase in inequality in America as a product of the change in attitude of the American elite, which (in his view) has been transitioning itself from pillars of society to a special interest group. [195] Author Timothy Noah estimates that what he calls “Wall Street and corporate boards' pampering” of the highest earning 0.1% is “responsible for 30%” of the post-1978 increase in inequality. [173]

Decline of unions

Union membership in the United States from the Great Depression to current day. (Source: Union Membership Trends in the United States , Table A-1 Appendix A for 1930 to 2000; Bureau of Labor Statistics for 2005 and 2010.)

The era of inequality growth has coincided with a dramatic decline in labor union membership from 20% of the labor force in 1983 to about 12% in 2007. [196] Economists have traditionally thought that since the chief purpose of a union is to maximize the income of its members, a strong but not all-encompassing union movement led to increased income inequality. Given the increase in income inequality of the past few decades, either the sign of the effect must be reversed, the magnitude of the effect small, or a much larger opposing force overridden it, since unionization has decreased in that period. [197] [198]

However more recently research has shown that unions' ability to reduce income disparities among members outweighed other factors and its net effect has been to reduce national income inequality. [198] [199] The decline of unions has hurt this leveling effect among men, and one economist (Berkeley economist David Card ) estimating about 15-20% of the “Great Divergence” among that gender is the result of declining unionization. [198] [200]

Still other researchers think it is the labor movement's loss of national political power to promote equalizing “government intervention and changes in private sector behavior” has had the greatest impact on inequality in the US. [198] [201] Timothy Noah estimates the “decline” of labor union power “responsible for 20%” of the Great Divergence. [173]

Taxation

How much tax policy change over the last thirty years has contributed to income inequality is disputed. In their comprehensive 2011 study of income inequality ( Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 ), [150] the CBO found that,

The top fifth of the population saw a 10-percentage-point increase in their share of after-tax income. Most of that growth went to the top 1 percent of the population. All other groups saw their shares decline by 2 to 3 percentage points. In 2007, federal taxes and transfers reduced the dispersion of income by 20 percent, but that equalizing effect was larger in 1979. The share of transfer payments to the lowest-income households declined. The overall average federal tax rate fell.

According to journalist Timothy Noah, “you can't really demonstrate that US tax policy had a large impact on the three-decade income inequality trend one way or the other. The inequality trend for pre-tax income during this period was much more dramatic.” [183] Noah estimates tax changes account for 5% of the Great Divergence. [173]

But many — such as economist Paul Krugman — emphasize the effect of changes in taxation — such as the 2001 and 2003 Bush administration tax cuts which cut taxes far more for high-income households than those below — on increased income inequality. [202]

Part of the growth of income inequality under Republican administrations (described by Larry Bartels) has been attributed to tax policy. A study by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez found that

Large reductions in tax progressivity since the 1960s took place primarily during two periods: the Reagan presidency in the 1980s and the Bush administration in the early 2000s. [203]

During Republican President Ronald Reagan 's tenure in office the top marginal income tax rate was reduced from over 70 to 28 percent, high top marginal rates like 70% being the sort in place during much of the period of great income equality following the “Great Compression”. [183] While the bottom marginal rate for the bottom fell from 14 to 11 percent. [204] However the effective rate on top earners before Reagan's tax cut was much lower because of loopholes and charitable contributions. (See Saez & Piketty, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” </ref> [205] President Ronald Reagan's 1981 cut in the top regular tax rate on unearned income reduced the maximum capital gains rate to only 20% — its lowest level since the Hoover administration. [206]

During the Republican George W. Bush administration, the tax rate on capital gains and qualifying dividends — a disproportionate source of income for top earners — fell to 15% — less than half the 35% top rate on ordinary income. [207] President Bush's veto of tax harmonization has also been attributed to rising inequality, as this would have shut down offshore tax havens. [208]

The highest earning 0.01% income group (“99.99-100% income group”) saw the greatest tax rate reductions since 1960.
Source: Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, [209]

One study [210] found reductions of total effective tax rates were most significant for individuals with highest incomes. (see “Federal Tax Rate by Income Group” chart) For those with incomes in the top 0.01 percent, overall rates of Federal tax fell from 74.6% in 1970, to 34.7% in 2004 (the reversal of the trend in 2000 with a rise to 40.8% came after the 1993 Clinton deficit reduction tax bill ), the next 0.09 percent falling from 59.1% to 34.1%, before leveling off with a relatively modest drop of 41.4 to 33.0% for the 99.5–99.9 percent group. Although the tax rate for low-income earners fell as well (though not as much), these tax reductions compare with virtually no change—23.3% tax rate in 1970, 23.4% in 2004—for the US population overall. [210]

The study found the decline in progressivity since 1960 was due to the shift from allocation of corporate income taxes among labor and capital to the effects of the individual income tax. [210] [211] Paul Krugman also supports this claim saying, “The overall tax rate on these high income families fell from 36.5% in 1980 to 26.7% in 1989.” [212]

From the White House's own analysis, the tax burden for those making greater than $250,000 fell considerably during the late 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, from an effective tax of 35% in 1980, down to under 30% from the late 1980s to present. [213]

Many studies argue that tax changes of S-type Corporations confound the statistics prior to 1990. However, even after these changes inflation-adjusted average after-tax income grew by 25% between 1996 and 2006 (the last year for which individual income tax data is publicly available). This average increase, however, obscures a great deal of variation. The poorest 20% of tax filers experienced a 6% reduction in income while the top 0.1 percent of tax filers saw their income almost double. Tax filers in the middle of the income distribution experienced about a 10% increase in income. Also during this period, the proportion of income from capital increased for the top 0.1 percent from 64% to 70%. [214]

Effects of race and gender

The black/white gap in median family income is about 3% smaller today than it was in 1979, a lack of progress that may be dismaying but excludes the disparity from explaining any part of the 30-year growth of inequality. [24]

Gender disparity in income has also improved in during the last three decades. The gap in the median annual income between men and women working full-time has declined from 40% to 23%. [24]

Median income for male and female workers from 1953 to 2005 in constant dollars. [111]

Year or change Gini index, Persons, age 25+, employed full-time [59] Gini index,
Households [58]
Men Жене Both sexes
1967 31.4 29.8 34.0 39.7
2005 42.4 35.7 40.9 46.9
Increase 35.0% 19.8% 20.3% 18.1%
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2006 [215]

Since 1967 inequality has risen for households and for full-time workers of both sexes, but especially for male workers. (see table above) Personal income has risen considerably for female workers since 1953, less so for male workers, whose income stagnated during the 1970s 1980s, and 1990s. [111]

It is unclear whether the dramatic increase of women in the workforce and women's income has led to greater inequality (eg dual earner families causing greater inequality). According to the Census Bureau, as of 2005, 42% of all US households and 76% of those in the top quintile had two or more income earners . [132] [136] But looking at empirical studies, the CBO study “Trends in the Distribution of Household Income”, found “mixed results” of the effect of dual earner families “with estimates depending on the period studied and the methodology use.” The study also found that the level of inequality for household with children and (nonelderly) households without children was “virtually identical”. [216] The growth of single parent households may have led to lower incomes but most of it occurred before 1980 and in recent years the percentage of women who are actually working who are single parents has increased. [85]

Significance of inequality

Commentators, economists, politicians do not agree on the issue of increase in inequality in America or its importance. Among economists and other experts most agree that America's growing income inequality is “deeply worrying”, [24] unjust, [157] a danger to democracy/social stability, [217] [218] [219] and/or even a sign of national decline. [195] Concern extends even to such supporters (or former supporters) of laissez-faire economics and private sector financiers.

Former Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan , has stated reference to growing inequality: “This is not the type of thing which a democratic society — a capitalist democratic society — can really accept without addressing.” [24] Some economists (David Moss, Paul Krugman) believe the Great Divergence may be connected to the financial crisis of 2008. [220] [221] Money manager William H. Gross , managing director of PIMCO , criticized the shift in distribution of income from labor to capital behind some of the growth in inequality as unsustainable, saying:

“even conservatives must acknowledge that return on capital investment, and the liquid stocks and bonds that mimic it, are ultimately dependent on returns to labor in the form of jobs and real wage gains. If Main Street is unemployed and undercompensated, capital can only travel so far down Prosperity Road.”

He concluded: “Investors/policymakers of the world wake up – you're killing the proletariat goose that lays your golden eggs.” [222] [223]

On the other side of the issue are those who have claimed that the increase is not significant, [224] that it doesn't matter [219] because America's economic growth and/or equality of opportunity are what's important, [21] that it is a global phenomenon which would be foolish to try to change through US domestic policy, [225] that it “has many economic benefits and is the result of … a well-functioning economy”, [220] [226] and has or may become an excuse for “class-warfare rhetoric”, [224] and may lead to policies that “reduce the well-being of wealthier individuals”. [71] [220]

Consumption and debt

Arguing that income inequality is not significant because inequality of consumption is less are Will Wilkinson of the libertarian Cato Institute and other conservatives. Wilkinson states that “the weight of the evidence shows that the run-up in consumption inequality has been considerably less dramatic than the rise in income inequality,” and consumption is more important than income. [227] According to Johnson, Smeeding, and Tory, consumption inequality was actually lower in 2001 than it was in 1986. [228] [229]

The CBO agrees that household consumption numbers show more equal distribution than household income but finds the data do not “adequately capture consumption by high-income households” as it does their income. [230] Other studies have not found consumption inequality less dramatic than household income inequality. [73] [231]

Others have disputed the importance of consumption over income, as consumption in excess of income usually means debt, [220] and a “growing body of work” suggests that income inequality has been the driving factor in the growing household debt [73] [232] as middle income earners go deeper into debt trying to maintain what once was a middle class lifestyle. Between 1983 and 2007, the top 5 percent saw their debt fall from 80 cents for every dollar of income to 65 cents, while the bottom 95 percent saw their debt rise from 60 cents for every dollar of income to $1.40. [73] Economist Krugman has found a strong correlation between inequality and household debt in America over the last hundred years. [233]

Deep debt may lead to bankruptcy and researchers Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi found a fivefold increase in the number of families filing for bankruptcy between 1980 and 2005. [234] The bankruptcies came not from increased spending “on luxuries”, but from an “increased spending on housing, largely driven by competition to get into good school districts.” Intensifying inequality may mean a dwindling number of ever more expensive school districts that compel middle class—or would-be middle class—to “buy houses they can't really afford, taking on more mortgage debt than they can safely handle”. [235]

Public attitudes

The growth of inequality has provoked a political protest movement—the Occupy movement —starting in Wall Street and spreading to 600 communities across the United States in 2011. Its main political slogan — “ We are the 99% ” — references its dissatisfaction with the concentration of income in the top 1%.

A 16 December 2011 Gallup poll found a decline in the number of Americans who felt reducing the gap in income and wealth between the rich and the poor was extremely or very important (21 percent of Republicans, 43 percent of independents, and 72 percent of Democrats). [236] In 2012, several surveys of voters attitudes toward growing income inequality found the issue ranked less important than other economic issues such as growth and equality of opportunity, and relatively low in affecting voters “personally”. [237] [238] In 1998 a Gallup poll found 52% of Americans agreeing that the gap between rich and the poor was a problem that needed to be fixed, while 45% regarded it as “an acceptable part of the economic system”. In 2011, those numbers are reversed: Only 45% see the gap as in need of fixing, while 52% do not. However, there was a large difference between Democrats and Republicans, with 71% of Democrats calling for a fix. [236]

In contrast, a national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, [239] found that respondents' sense of unfairness about taxes centered on the perception that wealthy Americans were not paying their fair share of taxes; 57% say this is what bothers them most about the tax system, an increase of 6% over a poll taken in March 2003. [240] A more recent poll found about two-thirds of Americans now believe there are “strong conflicts” between rich and poor in the United States. [241] [242]

Opinion surveys of what respondents thought was the right level of inequality have found Americans no more accepting of income inequality than other citizens of other nations, but more accepting of what they thought the level of inequality was in their country, being under the impression that there was less inequality than there actually was. [243] Dan Ariely and Michael Norton show in a study (2011) that US citizens across the political spectrum significantly underestimate the current US wealth inequality and would prefer a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. [244] Joseph Stiglitz in “The Price of Inequality” has argued that this sense of unfairness has led to distrust in government and business. [245]

Impact on democracy and society

A study by Larry Bartels found that Senate votes were more responsive to the opinions of high income groups and were less and even negatively responsive to the opinions of middle and lower class groups. [246]

Economists Jared Bernstein and Paul Krugman have attacked the concentration of income as variously “unsustainable” [218] and “incompatible” [219] with real democracy. American political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson quote a warning by Greek/Roman historian Plutarch : `An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics.` [217]

Two journalists concerned about social separation in the US are Robert Frank who notes that:

Today's rich had formed their own virtual country .. [T]hey had built a self-contained world unto themselves, complete with their own health-care system (concierge doctors), travel network (Net jets, destination clubs), separate economy. .... The rich weren't just getting richer; they were becoming financial foreigners, creating their own country within a country, their own society within a society, and their economy within an economy. [247]

and George Packer ,

Inequality hardens society into a class system … Inequality divides us from one another in schools, in neighborhoods, at work, on airplanes, in hospitals, in what we eat, in the condition of our bodies, in what we think, in our children's futures, in how we die. Inequality makes it harder to imagine the lives of others. [195]

Economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that hyper-inequality may explain political questions such as why America's infrastructure is deteriorating,as a result of the reduction in broadly beneficial public investment and support for public education, [248] or its recent relative lack of reluctance to engage in military conflicts such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Top earning families wealthy enough to buy their own education, medical care, personal security, and parks, have little interest in helping pay for such things for the rest of society, and the political influence to make sure they don't have to. So too, the lack of personal or family sacrifice involved for top earners in the military intervention of their country — their children being few and far between in the relatively low-paying all-volunteer military — may mean more willingness by the American government to wage war. [249]

The relatively high rates of health and social problems ( obesity , mental illness , homicides , teenage births , Incarceration , child conflict, drug use) and lower rates of social goods ( life expectancy , educational performance, trust among strangers , women's status , social mobility , even numbers of patents issued per capita), in the US compared to other developed countries may be related to its high income inequality. Using statistics from 23 developed countries and the 50 states of the US, British researchers Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have found such a correlation which remains after accounting for ethnicity, [250] national culture [251] ), and occupational classes or education levels. [252] Their findings, based on UN Human Development Reports and other sources, locate the United States at the top of the list in regards to inequality and various social and health problems among developed countries. [253] The authors argue inequality leads to the social ills through the psychosocial stress , status anxiety it creates. [254]

Disagreeing with this focus on the top earning 1% and urging attention to the economic and social pathologies of lower income/lower education Americans, is conservative journalist David Brooks . Whereas in the 1970s, high school and college graduates had “very similar family structures”, today, high school grads are much less likely to get married and be active in their communities, and much more likely to smoke, be obese, get divorced, or have “a child out of wedlock.” [255]

The zooming wealth of the top one percent is a problem, but it's not nearly as big a problem as the tens of millions of Americans who have dropped out of high school or college. It's not nearly as big a problem as the 40 percent of children who are born out of wedlock. It's not nearly as big a problem as the nation's stagnant human capital, its stagnant social mobility and the disorganized social fabric for the bottom 50 percent. [255] [256]

Contradicting most of these arguments, classical liberals such as Friedrich Hayek have maintained that because individuals are diverse and different, state intervention to redistribute income is inevitably arbitrary and incompatible with the concept of general rules of law, and that “what is called 'social' or distributive' justice is indeed meaningless within a spontaneous order”. Those who would use the state to redistribute, “take freedom for granted and ignore the preconditions necessary for its survival.” It is not great wealth but government and that gives power to control others in liberal democracies such as the United States. [257] [258] [258]

Opportunity, growth and equality

Conservatives and libertarians such as economist Thomas Sowell , and Congressman Paul Ryan (R., Wisc.) [259] argue that more important than the level of equality of results is America's equality of opportunity, especially relative to other developed countries such as western Europe.

Economic growth and inequality

In response to the Occupy movement Richard A. Epstein defended inequality in a free market society, maintaining that “taxing the top one percent even more means less wealth and fewer jobs for the rest of us.” According to Epstein, “the inequalities in wealth … pay for themselves by the vast increases in wealth”, while “forced transfers of wealth through taxation … will destroy the pools of wealth that are needed to generate new ventures. [260] Stiglitz on the other hand concludes that moving money from the bottom to the top through income inequality lowers consumption because higher-income individuals consume a smaller proportion of their income than do lower-income individuals (those at the top save 15 to 25 percent of their income, those at the bottom spend all of their income). [261]

Some (while specifically advocating redistribution of income through taxation) have not found a “tradeoff” between greater equality and economic growth; but according to economist Branko Milanovic , while traditionally economists thought inequality was good for growth

“The view that income inequality harms growth—or that improved equality can help sustain growth—has become more widely held in recent years. … The main reason for this shift is the increasing importance of human capital in development. When physical capital mattered most, savings and investments were key. Then it was important to have a large contingent of rich people who could save a greater proportion of their income than the poor and invest it in physical capital. But now that human capital is scarcer than machines, widespread education has become the secret to growth.” [262]

“Broadly accessible education” is both difficult to achieve when income distribution is uneven and tends to reduce “income gaps between skilled and unskilled labor.”

Economic sociologist Lane Kenworthy has found no correlation between levels of inequality and economic growth among developed countries, among states of the US, or in the US over the years from 1947 to 2005. [263] Jared Bernstein found a nuanced relation he summed up as follows: “In sum, I'd consider the question of the extent to which higher inequality lowers growth to be an open one, worthy of much deeper research, perhaps along some of the lines noted above. [264]

Some researchers have found a connection between “leveling” higher marginal tax rates on high income earners, and higher rates of employment growth. [265] [266] [267]

Mobility during a lifetime

Strong “ intra-generational ” or individual economic mobility between the strata of rich, middle class and poor means both that (1) a high level of inequality of annual income is made irrelevant by a more even distribution of lifetime income, and (2) however extreme the earnings at the top, they are not out of reach for the poor (or middle income) but ambitious. [20]

Sowell claims mobility is robust.

An absolute majority of the people who were in the bottom 20 percent [of income] in 1975 have also been in the top 20 percent at some time since then. Most Americans don't stay put in any income bracket. At different times, they are both “rich” and “poor” — as these terms are recklessly thrown around in the media. [...] There are of course some people who remain permanently in the bottom 20 percent. But such people constitute less than one percent of the American population, according to data published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in its 1995 annual report. Perhaps the intelligentsia and the politicians have been too busy waxing indignant to be bothered by anything so mundane as facts. [21]

According to Thomas A. Garrett, studies examining quintiles of wealth levels may provide a misleading picture. [71] For example, a US Treasury study of the period from 1996 to 2005 found that “[l]ess than half (40% or 43% depending on the measure) of those in the top 1 percent in 1996 were still in the top 1 percent in 2005. Only about 25 percent of the individuals in the top 1/100th percent in 1996 remained in the top 1/100th percent in 2005.” [268]

Other have not found individual mobility so fluid. A 2007 study (by Kopczuk, Saez and Song in 2007) found the top population in America “very stable” and “not mitigated the dramatic increase in annual earnings concentration since the 1970s.” [269]

Economist Paul Krugman , attacks conservatives for resorting to “extraordinary series of attempts at statistical distortion”. He argues that while in any given year, some of the people with low incomes will be “workers on temporary layoff, small businessmen taking writeoffs, farmers hit by bad weather”—the rise in their income in succeeding years is not the same 'mobility' as poor people rising to middle class or middle income rising to wealth. It's the mobility of “the guy who works in the college bookstore and has a real job by his early thirties.”

Studies by the Urban Institute and the US Treasury have both found that about half of the families who start in either the top or the bottom quintile of the income distribution are still there after a decade, and that only 3 to 6% rise from bottom to top or fall from top to bottom. [20]

On the issue of whether most Americans do not stay put in any one income bracket, Krugman quotes from 2011 CBO distribution of income study

Household income measured over a multi-year period is more equally distributed than income measured over one year, although only modestly so. Given the fairly substantial movement of households across income groups over time, it might seem that income measured over a number of years should be significantly more equally distributed than income measured over one year. However, much of the movement of households involves changes in income that are large enough to push households into different income groups but not large enough to greatly affect the overall distribution of income. Multi-year income measures also show the same pattern of increasing inequality over time as is observed in annual measures. [16]

In other words, “many people who have incomes greater than $1 million one year fall out of the category the next year — but that's typically because their income fell from, say, $1.05 million to 0.95 million, not because they went back to being middle class.” [16] [270]

Mobility between generations

Several studies have found the ability of children from poor or middle-class families to rise to upper income — known as “upward relative intergenerational mobility” — is lower in the US than in other developed countries [271] — and at least two economist have found lower mobility linked to income inequality. [23] [24]

The Great Gatsby Curve.png

In their “Great Gatsby” curve, [23] White House Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Alan B. Krueger and labor economist Miles Corak show a negative correlation between inequality and social mobility. The curve plotted “intergenerational income elasticity”—ie the likelihood that someone will inherit their parents' relative position of income level—and inequality for a number of countries. [24] [272]

In the words of journalist Timothy Noah

you can't really experience ever-growing income inequality without experiencing a decline in Horatio Alger -style upward mobility because (to use a frequently-employed metaphor) it's harder to climb a ladder when the rungs are farther apart. [24]

Aside from the proverbial distant rungs, the connection between income inequality and low mobility can be explained by the lack of access for un-affluent children to better (more expensive) schools and preparation for schools crucial to finding high-paying jobs; the lack of health care that may lead to obesity and diabetes and limit education and employment. [271]

Krueger estimates that “the persistence in the advantages and disadvantages of income passed from parents to the children” will “rise by about a quarter for the next generation as a result of the rise in inequality that the US has seen in the last 25 years.” [24]

Income at a glance

Median income levels
Households Persons, age 25 or older with earnings Household income by race
All households Dual earner
households
Per household
member
Males Females Both sexes Азијски White,
non-hispanic
Hispanic Црн
$46,326 $67,348 $23,535 $39,403 $26,507 $32,140 $57,518 $48,977 $34,241 $30,134
Median personal income by educational attainment
Measure Some High School High school graduate Some college Associate's degree Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Master's degree Professional degree Doctorate degree
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings $20,321 $26,505 $31,054 $35,009 $49,303 $43,143 $52,390 $82,473 $70,853
Male, age 25+ w/ earnings $24,192 $32,085 $39,150 $42,382 $60,493 $52,265 $67,123 $100,000 $78,324
Female, age 25+ w/ earnings $15,073 $21,117 $25,185 $29,510 $40,483 $36,532 $45,730 $66,055 $54,666
Persons, age 25+, employed full-time $25,039 $31,539 $37,135 $40,588 $56,078 $50,944 $61,273 $100,000 $79,401
Household $22,718 $36,835 $45,854 $51,970 $73,446 $68,728 $78,541 $100,000 $96,830
Household income distribution
Bottom 10% Bottom 20% Bottom 25% Middle 33% Middle 20% Top 25% Top 20% Top 5% Top 1.5% Top 1%
$0 to $10,500 $0 to $18,500 $0 to $22,500 $30,000 to $62,500 $35,000 to $55,000 $77,500 and up $92,000 and up $167,000 and up $250,000 and up $350,000 and up
Source: US Census Bureau, 2006; income statistics for the year 2005

See also

Белешке

  1. ^ the US Department of Commerce , Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Internal Revenue Service
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    • “Among the industrial democracies where income inequality is increasing, it's much worse in the United States than it is almost anywhere else. Among 34 nations recently surveyed by the OECD, the United States got beat only by Turkey, Mexico, and Chile. That's as measured by the Gini coefficient, and including taxes and government transfer payments.”
    • note: inequality is higher in less economically developed countries such as Turkey, Mexico, Chile, which are also members of the OECD
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  142. ^ Webster (4b): increasing in rate as the base increases (a progressive tax)
  143. ^ American Heritage (6). Increasing in rate as the taxable amount increases.
  144. ^ Britannica Concise Encyclopedia : Tax levied at a rate that increases as the quantity subject to taxation increases.
  145. ^ Princeton University WordNet : (n) progressive tax (any tax in which the rate increases as the amount subject to taxation increases)
  146. ^ Sommerfeld, Ray M., Silvia A. Madeo, Kenneth E. Anderson, Betty R. Jackson (1992), Concepts of Taxation , Dryden Press: Fort Worth, TX
  147. ^ Growing Unequal?: Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries , OECD Publishing, ISBN 978-92-64-04418-0 , 2008, pgs. 103, 104.
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  149. ^ 33% increase in gini index rating
  150. ^ a b Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.20 and figure 12. “Between 1979 and 2007, the Gini index for market income increased by 23 percent, the index for market income after transfers increased by 29 percent, and the index for income measured after transfers and federal taxes increased by 33 percent.”
  151. ^ a b c Paul Ryan: Inequality, Take Two | Timothy Noah |tnr.com| November 18, 2011
  152. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.12-13 and table 1
  153. ^ written in in a clients-only July 2011 JPMorgan Chase newsletter obtained by Washington Post columnist Harold Meyerson An economic recovery that leaves workers further behind Harold Meyerson| April 10, 2012
  154. ^ Brooks Brothers Bolshevism Timothy Noah| tnr.com September 14, 2011
  155. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.13
  156. ^ Inequality in America. The rich, the poor and the growing gap between them June 15, 2006
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  158. ^ the superstar hypothesis was coined by the Chicago economist Sherwin Rosen ) used the example of the passing of the hundreds of comedians that made a modest living at live shows in the borscht belt and other places in bygone days that have been replaced by a handful of superstar TV comedians.
  159. ^ estimate by economist George Borjas , quoted in Conscience of a Liberal , p.34
  160. ^ The United States of Inequality. Entry 3 : By Timothy Noah| 7 September 2010, Did the post-1965 immigration surge cause the Great Divergence?
  161. ^ such as political scientists Jacob S. Hacker , Paul Pierson , Larry Bartels and Nathan Kelly, and economist Timothy Smeeding
  162. ^ American politics, Democracy in America Winner-Take-All Politics . It's a pretty good book. economist.com Democracy in America. 21 September 2010]
  163. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.39, Figure 3
  164. ^ a b Bartels, LM (2008). Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  165. ^ Krugman, P. (2007). The conscience of a liberal . New York: WW Norton.
  166. ^ Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson (2011) Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington made the rich richer — and turned its back on the middle class.
  167. ^ Dictionary of economics online
  168. ^ Economic Report of the President 1997 mentions “colloquium on this topic at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York” (1995?)
  169. ^ Experts' Consensus on Earnings Inequality . Economic Report of the President 1997
  170. ^ a b “New York Times. (June 7, 2007). The Rewards of Education” . The New York Times . 2007-06-09. Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  171. ^ CNN-Travis Waldon-Only Advanced Degree Holders Saw Wage Gains in the Past Decade
  172. ^ a b The United States of Inequality Entry 4: Did Computers Create Inequality?| By Timothy Noah| 8 September 2010
  173. ^ a b c d e f g The United States of Inequality. Entry 9: How the Decline in K-12 Education Enriches College Graduates| By: Timothy Noah Slate.com | 15 September 2010
  174. ^ a b The United States of Inequality Entry 7: Trade Didn't Create Inequality, and Then It Did| By Timothy Noah| 14 September 2010
  175. ^ TRADE AND WAGES, RECONSIDERED | Paul Krugman| February 2008]
  176. ^ Tax Rates, Inequality and the 1% By ALAN REYNOLDS 6 December 2011
  177. ^ Alan Reynolds Vs. Inequality | Timothy Noah | December 6, 2011
  178. ^ Intellectual Garbage Collection: The Unreliability of Alan Reynolds
  179. ^ Reynolds, Alan. Income and Wealth. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006. 108. Print.
  180. ^ Alan J Auerbach, “Who Bears the Corporate Tax?” NBER Working Paper 11686 (October 2005), p. 4
  181. ^ Arthur B. Kennickell, “A Rolling Tide: changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the US, 1989-2001” (Federal Reserve Board, September 2003), tables 10 and 11.
  182. ^ Economic Report of the President (2005), table B-29.
  183. ^ a b c d e Noah, Timothy. “Can We Blame Income Inequality on Republicans” in the multi-part series “The United States of Inequality.” Slate , Sept. 9, 2010.
  184. ^ Kelly, NJ (2009). The Politics of Income Inequality in the United States . New York: Cambridge University Press.
  185. ^ which encompassed most of the egalitarian Great Compression and the entire inegalitarian Great Divergence (up until the time he did his research) and published his findings in the book Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton University Press: 2008)
  186. ^ chart of Income Growth Rates 1948-2005 under Democratic presidents and under Republican presidents. Graphics by Catherine Mulbrandon
  187. ^ More compensation heading to the very top: 1965-2009 . May 16, 2011.
  188. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.7
  189. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.115, 219, 228
  190. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.66
  191. ^ More compensation heading for the very top EPI 2010
  192. ^ Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal , WW Norton & Company, 2007, p.143-44
  193. ^ Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation By Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried]
  194. ^ Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal , 2007, p.145
  195. ^ a b c “The Broken Contract”, By George Packer, Foreign Affairs , November/December 2011
  196. ^ UNION MEMBERS IN 2007 US Bureau of Labor Statistics. January 25, 2008
  197. ^ Unions and wage inequality | David Card, Thomas Lemieux and W. Craig Riddell| Journal of Labor Research Volume 25, Number 4, 519-559, doi : 10.1007/s12122-004-1011-z
  198. ^ a b c d The United States of Inequality, Entry 6: The Great Divergence and the death of organized labor. By Timothy Noah| slate.com| 12 September 2010
  199. ^ UNIONISM AND THE DISPERSION OF WAGES by RICHARD B. FREEMAN, National Bureau of Economic Research 1980
  200. ^ The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the US Labor Market | David Card| Industrial and Labor Relations Review , Vol. 54, No. 2. (Jan., 2001), pp. 296-315.
  201. ^ Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America Frank Levy and Peter Temin] Revised June 27, 2007
  202. ^ New CBO Data Show Income Inequality Continues to Widen After-Tax-Income for Top 1 Percent Rose by $146,000 in 2004 | By Aviva Aron-Dine and Arloc Sherman| cbpp.org| January 23, 2007
  203. ^ How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, p.23
  204. ^ Silliman, BR (2008). Will the next president reform the tax code? A historical examination. The CPA Journal, 78(11), 23-27. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com
  205. ^ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec11/makingsense_12-12.html
  206. ^ “The Hidden Entitlements” . CTJ .
  207. ^ Kocieniewski, David (2012-01-18). “Since 1980s, the Kindest of Tax Cuts for the Rich” . New York Times . Retrieved 2012-01-21.
  208. ^ Dickinson, Tom (2011-11-09). “How the GOP Became the Party of the Rich” . Rolling Stone . Retrieved 2012-01-02.
  209. ^ “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007 (p.13) Table 2. Federal Tax Rates by Income Group from 1960
  210. ^ a b c Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” . Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007
  211. ^ “Even after exploiting all possible deductions and credits, the typical high-income taxpayer during the Great Prosperity paid a federal tax of well over 50 percent of his earnings.” Clinton Administration Secretary of labor Robert Reich In his book Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future
  212. ^ Krugman, Paul (1995). Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations . New York: WW Norton & Company. p. 155. ISBN 978-0-393-31292-8 . Retrieved 2-03-12.
  213. ^ “FactChecking Obama's Budget Speech” . FactCheck.org . 2011-04-15. Retrieved 2011-01-04.
  214. ^ Thomas L. Hungerford “Changes in the Distribution of Income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy.” Congressional Research Service, Dec. 29, 2011. http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/crs-1.pdf
  215. ^ As an alternative to the Census Bureau's estimate of the Gini index, a Gini index based on Adjusted Gross Income from IRS Tax Returns can be computed. In 1990, the IRS AGI Gini was 0.529 and increased to 0.584 by 2008.
  216. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.15 and figure 8
  217. ^ a b Winner-Take-All Politics (book) by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson p.75
  218. ^ a b “CBO Report Shows Rich Got Richer, As Did Most Americans: View” . businessweek.com. October 31, 2011.
  219. ^ a b c Oligarchy, American Style By PAUL KRUGMAN . 3 November 2011
  220. ^ a b c d The United States of Inequality, Entry 10: Why We Can't Ignore Growing Income Inequality By: Timothy Noah. slate.com| 16 September 2010
  221. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman
  222. ^ Investment Outlook | October 2011 |Six Pac(k)in'
  223. ^ Wall Street Bolshies Watch Timothy Noah| tnr.com| October 3, 2011
  224. ^ a b Two Americas: One Rich, One Poor? Understanding Income Inequality in the United States By Rea Hederman, Jr. and Robert Rector| Heritage Foundation. August 24, 2004]
  225. ^ A Look at the Global One Percent By ALLAN H. MELTZER| wsj.com| 9 March 2012
  226. ^ US Income Inequality: It's Not So Bad By Thomas A. Garrett| Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis| Spring 2010
  227. ^ “Thinking Clearly About Economic Inequality” , Will Wilkinson, Cato Institute 2009
  228. ^ Johnson, Smeeding, Tory, “Economic Inequality” in Monthly Labor review of April 2005, table 3.
  229. ^ see also Hassett and Mathur: Consumption and the Myths of Inequality | BY KEVIN A. HASSETT AND APARNA MATHUR| online.wsj.com| October 24, 2012
  230. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.5
  231. ^ The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in The US, 1980-2010 |Orazio Attanasio| Erik Hurst| Luigi Pistaferri| National Bureau of Economic Research| NBER Working Papers #17982| Apr 2012
  232. ^ The Way Forward | By Daniel Alpert, Westwood Capital; Robert Hockett, Professor of Law, Cornell University; and Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics, New York University| New America Foundation| October 10, 2011
  233. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman (see last chart: Inequality and household debt)
  234. ^ Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience Elizabeth Warren*
  235. ^ Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal , WW Norton & Company, 2007, (p.246-7)
  236. ^ a b Why Obama's New Populism May Sink His Campaign William Galston | tnr.com| 17 December 2011]
  237. ^ Why the President's Campaign Shouldn't Focus on Inequality William Galston| tnr.com| 3 May 2012| accessed 5 May 2012
  238. ^ NBC/WSJ: Americans prefer message focused on fairness over anti-government or inequality argument by Jed Lewison dailykos.com 20 April 2012
  239. ^ conducted Dec. 7-11 among 1,521 adults
  240. ^ Tax System Seen as Unfair, in Need of Overhaul, Wealthy Not Paying Fair Share Top Complaint pewresearch.org 20 December 2011]
  241. ^ Survey Finds Rising Perception of Class Tension | By SABRINA TAVERNISE| 11 January 2012
  242. ^ Rising Share of Americans See Conflict Between Rich and Poor by Rich Morin| 11 January 2012
  243. ^ Lars Osberg and Timothy Smeeding. “Fair Inequality? Attitudes Toward Pay Dfferentials: The United States in Comparative Perspective, ” American Sociological Review, 71, 2006, pp. 450 – 473.
  244. ^ Norton, MI, & Ariely , D., “Building a Better America – One Wealth Quintile at a Time” , Perspectives on Psychological Science , January 2011 6: 9-12
  245. ^ Joseph E. Stiglitz (2012) The Price of Inequality. New York: WWNorton
  246. ^ Based on Larry Bartels's study Economic Inequality and Political Representation , Table 1: Differential Responsiveness of Senators to Constituency Opinion.
  247. ^ Richistan: A Journey Through the American Wealth Boom and the Lives of the New Rich … By Robert Frank
  248. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 92). Norton. Kindle Edition.
  249. ^ Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1% | vanityfair.com| May 2010
  250. ^ A study confined to non-Hispanic whites in US and England also showed the effect. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.177)
  251. ^ Countries of similar cultures and different levels of equality — Spain and Portugal — showed difference in the index, while countries with very different cultures and ways of achieving equality — Nordic countries and Japan — charted closer to each other. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.183)
  252. ^ The effect was worse among low class/education level in high inequality countries, but continued through all occupational classes and was still significant among the highest. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.178-9)
  253. ^ Statistics and graphs from Wilkinson and Pickett research.
  254. ^ The Spirit Level: how 'ideas wreckers' turned book into political punchbag | Robert Booth| The Guardian| 13 August 2010
  255. ^ a b The Wrong Inequality By David Brooks | nyt.com |31 October 2011.
  256. ^ see also The White Underclass By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF| 8 February 2012
  257. ^ Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976. 33. Print.
  258. ^ a b Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960. 231. Print.
  259. ^ Paul Ryan on Income Inequality and Upward Mobility Diane Ellis, Ed. · 28 November 2011
  260. ^ Three Cheers for Income Inequality
  261. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 85). Norton. Kindle Edition. See also: Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes, “Do the Rich Save More?,” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 2 (2004): 397– 444.
  262. ^ More or Less | Branko Milanovic| Finance & Development | September 2011| Vol. 48, No. 3
  263. ^ Kenworthy, Lane (December 3, 2007). “Does More Equality Mean Less Economic Growth?” .
  264. ^ Does inequality prevent economic growth? | By Jared Bernstein, On the Economy| 1 October 2012
  265. ^ Corley-Coulibaly, Marva; Prasadm, Naren ; Sekerler Richiardi, Pelin (October 2011). “Tax reform for improving job recovery and equity” . World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 97–120. doi : 10.1002/wow3.28 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  266. ^ Escudero, Verónica; López Mourelo, Elva (2012). “Chapter 3, Fiscal consolidation and employment growth” . In Torres, Raymond (ed.). World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 59–80. ISBN 978-92-9251-010-7 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  267. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph (July 2, 2012). Interview with Ben Chu. “Stiglitz: the full transcript” . The Independent . Retrieved September 8, 2012.
  268. ^ Income Mobility in the US from 1996 to 2005. Report of the DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. November 13, 2007. p.4. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/incomemobilitystudy03-08revise.pdf
  269. ^ Uncovering the American Dream: Inequality and Mobility in Social Security Earnings Data since 1937 Wojciech Kopczuk, Emmanuel Saez, Jae Song, September 15, 2007, Figure 4B
  270. ^ Millionaire For A Day Paul Krugman. 3 November 2011,
  271. ^ a b Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs | By JASON DePARLE | January 4, 2012 ]
  272. ^ Corak graphs 25 countries, Krueger limits his to developed countries and lists 10

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