En Wiki rapport om inntektsulikhet i USA

Inntektsulikhet i USA

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Fordeling av inntekter i USA har vært gjenstand for studier av forskere og institusjoner. Data fra en rekke kilder [1] viser at inntektsulikheten har vokst betydelig siden tidlig på 1970-tallet , [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] etter flere tiår med stabilitet . [7] [8] Mens ulikhet har steget blant de fleste utviklede land, og spesielt engelsktalende seg, er det høyeste i USA. [9] [10] [11]

Studier indikerer kilden til det økende gapet (noen ganger kalt stor divergens ) har ikke vært kjønnsforskjeller , noe som har falt i USA i løpet av de siste tiårene, [12] eller ulikhet mellom svarte og hvite amerikanere , som har stagnert i løpet av den tiden , [13] og heller ikke har gapet mellom de fattige og middelklassen vært den viktigste årsaken-selv om den har vokst. [14] Det meste av veksten har vært mellom middelklassen og toppen inntekter, med den forskjellen blir mer ekstrem den ytterligere ett går opp i inntektsfordelingen. [15]

En 2011 studie av CBO [16] fant at toppen tjene en prosent av husholdningene fikk ca 275% etter føderal skatt og inntekt overføringer over en periode mellom 1979 og 2007, sammenlignet med en gevinst på i underkant av 40% for 60 prosent i midten av USAs inntektsfordeling. [16] Andre kilder finner at trenden har fortsatt siden da. [17] Men bare 42% av amerikanerne tror ulikhet har økt de siste ti årene. [18] Inntektsulikhet er ikke ensartet blant statene, målt ved Gini-koeffisienten : inntekt etter skatt ulikhet i 2009 var størst i Texas og lavest i Maine . [19]

Forskere og andre forskjellige med hensyn til årsaker, løsninger og betydningen av trenden, [20] [21] som i 2011 bidro til å tenne "okkuperer" protestbevegelse . Utdanning og økt etterspørsel etter faglært arbeidskraft blir ofte sitert som årsaker, [22] noen har understreket viktigheten av offentlig politikk, andre mener årsaken (e) til ulikhet stige er ikke godt forstått. [16] Ulikhet er blitt beskrevet både som irrelevant i møte med økonomisk mulighet (eller sosial mobilitet ) i Amerika, og som en årsak til nedgangen i den muligheten. [23] [24]

Historie

US ulikhet from 1913-2008 [25] .

Andel av husholdningsinntekt før skatt mottatt av topp 1 prosent, topp 0,1 prosent og topp 0,01 prosent, mellom 1917 og 2005. [26] [27]

Nivået på konsentrasjon av inntekter i Amerika har ikke vært konstant gjennom hele sin historie. Går tilbake til begynnelsen av det 20. århundre, da inntektsstatistikk begynte å bli tilgjengelig, har det vært en "stor økonomisk arc" fra høy ulikhet "til relativ likhet og tilbake igjen," i ordene til nobelprisvinner økonomen Paul Krugman . [28] I 1915, en epoke der de Rockefellers og Carnegies dominert amerikansk industri, tjente de rikeste 1% av amerikanerne omtrent 18% av alle inntekter. Av 2007, den øverste 1 prosent står for 24% av alle inntekter. [29] I mellom, falt sin andel under 10% for tre tiår.

Den første æra av ulikhet varte omtrent fra etter borgerkrig era ("the Gilded Age ") til en gang rundt 1937. Men fra ca 1937 til 1947-en periode som har blitt kalt " Flott Compression " [30] -inntektsulikhet i Amerika falt dramatisk. Svært progressive New Deal beskatning, styrking av fagforeninger, og regulering av National War Labor Board under andre verdenskrig hevet inntekten til de fattige og arbeiderklassen og senket det av toppen inntekter. [31] Denne "middelklasse samfunnet" av relativt lavt nivå av ulikhet holdt seg nokså stabil i ca tre tiår som slutter på tidlig 1970-tallet, [7] [30] [32] et produkt av relativt høye lønninger for den amerikanske arbeiderklassen og politisk støtte for inntekt utjevning regjeringens politikk.

Lønn holdt seg relativt høy på grunn av mangel på utenlandsk konkurranse for amerikansk industri, mangel på lave faglærte arbeidsinnvandrere, [33] konkurranse for amerikanske arbeidere generelt, og - kanskje det viktigste - sterke fagforeninger. Ved 1947 mer enn en tredjedel av non-farm arbeidere var fagorganisert, [34] og fagforeninger både hevet gjennomsnittlig lønn for sitt medlemskap, og indirekte, og i mindre grad, hevet lønn for arbeidstakere i lignende yrker som ikke er representert av fagforeninger. [35 ] Forskere mener politisk støtte for å utjevne regjeringens politikk ble gitt av høy valgdeltakelse fra fagforenings stemmerett disker, støtte fra den ellers konservative Sør for New Deal og prestisje at massiv mobilisering og seier av andre verdenskrig hadde gitt regjeringen. [ 36]

Avkastningen til høy ulikhet-eller hva Krugman og journalist Timothy Noah har omtalt som den " Stor divergens " [29] -begynte i 1970.

Fordelene med økt produktivitet i løpet av de siste 35 årene har ikke gått til middelklassen [37]

Studier har funnet inntekter vokste mer ulik nesten kontinuerlig bortsett fra under de økonomiske nedgangstider i 1990 til 1991 , 2001 ( Dot-com boblen ), og 2007 sub-prime bust . [38] [39]

The Great Divergence avviker på noen måter fra pre-depresjonen epoken ulikhet. Før 1937 en større andel av toppen inntekter inntekter kom fra hovedstaden (renter, utbytte, inntekter fra husleie, kapitalgevinster). Post 1970, inntekt av høy inntekt skattebetalere kommer hovedsakelig fra "arbeid", dvs. etterlønn. [40]

Frem til 2011, hadde den store Divergence ikke vært et stort politisk problem i Amerika, men stagnasjon av middelklasse inntekt var. I 2009 ble Barack Obama administrasjonen Hvite Hus Middle Class arbeider familier Task Force kalt for å fokusere på økonomiske spørsmål spesielt påvirker middels inntekt amerikanere. I 2011, den Occupy bevegelsen trakk stor oppmerksomhet til inntektsulikhet i landet.

De fleste nyere statistikk

Fra 1992 til 2007 så de beste 400 lønnstakere i USA sine inntekter øke 392% og deres gjennomsnittlige skattesatsen redusert med 37%. [41] Den andelen av totale inntekter i Amerika kommer til toppen 1% av amerikanske husholdninger (også etter føderal skatter og inntektsoverføringer) økte fra 11,3% i 1979 for å 20,9% i 2007. [42] Under den store Resesjon av 2007-2009, ulikheten er blitt redusert, med samlede inntekter går til bunnen 99 prosent av amerikanerne en nedgang på 11,6%, men faller raskere (36,3%) for den øverste 1%. [43] [44] Men ulikhet i inntekt har økt igjen i 2009-2010 utvinning, med toppen 1% av inntekt inntekter fange 11,6% av inntekter og kapitalgevinster, og inntektene av de andre 99% forble flat, vokser med bare 0,2%. [45] [46]

Måling

Indikatorer

Inflasjonsjustert økning i etter-skatt husholdningsinntekt mellom 1979 og 2005 for den øverste 1% og fire av de fem kvintilene. [47]

Denne grafen viser inntekten til de gitte prosent 1947-2010 i 2010 dollar. De to kolonner med tall i høyre marg er den kumulative vekst 1970-2010 og den årlige veksten i denne perioden. Den vertikale skalaen er logaritmisk, noe som gjør konstant prosentvis vekst vises som en rett linje. Fra 1947 til 1970, alle prosent vokste i hovedsak de samme rate, de lyse, rette linjer for de ulike prosentiler for disse årene har alle den samme skråningen. Siden da har det vært betydelig divergens, med ulike prosentiler av inntektsfordelingen vokser på ulike priser. For den gjennomsnittlige amerikanske familien, er dette gapet $ 39 000 per år (i overkant av $ 100 per dag): Hvis den økonomiske veksten i denne perioden hadde vært grovt deles som det var 1947-1970, ville median husholdningsinntekt har vært $ 39 000 per år høyere enn det var i 2010. Denne tomten ble opprettet ved å kombinere data fra US Census Bureau [48] og den amerikanske Internal Revenue Service. [49] Det er systematiske forskjeller mellom disse to kildene, men forskjellene er små i forhold til omfanget av denne tomten. [50]

En rekke studier av US Department of Commerce , Congressional Budget Office (CBO), og Internal Revenue Service , har funnet at fordelingen av inntekt i USA - oftest målt ved husholdningen eller individ - har blitt stadig mer ulik siden 1970-tallet .

En av de nyeste og mest omfattende studier av endring i inntektsulikhet i Amerika var en 2011 studie av Congressional Budget Office (CBO) - "Trender i fordelingen av husholdningenes inntekt mellom 1979 og 2007". (Det valgte disse to årene fordi de begge innledes en økonomisk lavkonjunktur og så begge var perioder med "lik den samlede økonomiske aktiviteten" [51] ). Rapporten fant at husholdningenes realinntekter etter føderale skatter og inkludert statlige overføringer (betaling fra Social Security , arbeidsledighet forsikring , osv. [52] [53] ) vokste med 62%.

Men inntekten til husholdningene i toppen 1 prosent av inntekter økte med 275%, sammenlignet med 65% for de neste 19 prosent, i underkant av 40% for de neste 60 prosent, 18% for den nederste femtedelen av husholdningene. "Som et resultat av at ujevn inntektsvekst," fremgår det i rapporten, "andelen av total inntekt etter skatt som mottas av en prosent av befolkningen i husholdninger med høyest inntekt mer enn doblet mellom 1979 og 2007, mens andelen mottatt av husholdninger med lav og middels inntekt falt ... Andelen av inntekt mottatt av topp 1 prosent vokste fra ca 8% i 1979 til over 17% i 2007. Andelen som mottas av den andre 19 prosent av husholdningene i den høyeste inntekts kvintil (en femtedel av befolkningen som delt på inntekt) var ganske flat i samme periode, kanter opp fra 35% til 36%. " [54]

Ifølge CBO, [55] den viktigste årsaken til den observerte økningen i ulik fordeling av inntekt etter skatt var en økning i markedsinntekter, er at husholdningsinntekt før skatt og overføringer. Markeds inntekt for en husholdning er en kombinasjon av arbeidsinntekt (som kontant lønn, arbeidsgiveravgift betalte ytelser, arbeidsgiverbetalt arbeidsgiveravgift), næringsinntekt (for eksempel inntekter fra bedrifter og gårder drives utelukkende av sine eiere), kapitalgevinster (fortjeneste realisert ved salg av eiendeler, aksjeopsjoner), kapitalinntekter (for eksempel renter fra innskudd, utbytte, leieinntekter), og andre inntekter. Av disse salgsgevinster utgjorde 80% av økningen i inntekts markedet for husholdningene i topp 20%, i 2000-2007 perioden. Selv over 1991-2000 perioden, ifølge CBO, salgsgevinster utgjorde 45% av inntektene markedet for de beste 20% husholdninger.

Pionerer i bruk av IRS inntektsdata for å analysere inntektsfordelingen er Emmanuel Saez og Thomas Piketty ved Paris School of Economics viste at andelen av inntektene som innehas av den øverste 1 prosent var like stor i 2005 som i 1928. [5] Andre kilder that have noted the increased inequality included economist Janet Yellen who stated, “the growth [in real income] was heavily concentrated at the very tip of the top, that is, the top 1 percent.” [56]

Economist Timothy Smeeding summed up the current trend: [57]

Americans have the highest income inequality in the rich world and over the past 20–30 years Americans have also experienced the greatest increase in income inequality among rich nations. The more detailed the data we can use to observe this change, the more skewed the change appears to be … the majority of large gains are indeed at the top of the distribution.

United States Census Bureau studies on inequality of income measure both households [58] and individuals. [59] Their numbers show lower levels of inequality [60] but do not include data for the highest-income households where most of change in income distribution has occurred. [20] [61] [62] [63]

Data Total gain Percent gain 2003 2000 1997 1994 1991 1988 1985 1982 1979 1976 1973 1970 1967
20th percentile $3,982 28.4% $17,984 $19,142 $17,601 $16,484 $16,580 $17,006 $16,306 $15,548 $16,457 $15,615 $15,844 $15,126 $14,002
Median (50th) $9,980 29.9% $43,318 $44,853 $42,294 $39,613 $39,679 $40,678 $38,510 $36,811 $38,649 $36,155 $37,700 $35,832 $33,338
80th percentile $31,602 57.2% $86,867 $87,341 $81,719 $77,154 $74,759 $75,593 $71,433 $66,920 $68,318 $63,247 $64,500 $60,148 $55,265
95th percentile $65,442 73.8% $154,120 $155,121 $144,636 $134,835 $126,969 $127,958 $119,459 $111,516 $111,445 $100,839 $102,243 $95,090 $88,678
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2004 [64] (Page 44/45)

Demographic issues

Comparisons of income over time should adjust for changes in average age, family size, number of breadwinners, and other characteristics of a population. Measuring personal income ignores dependent children, but household income also has problems—a household of ten has a lower standard of living than one of two people, though the income of the two households may be the same. [65]

People's earnings tend to rise over their working lifetimes, so “snapshot measures of income inequality can be misleading.” [66] The inequality of a recent college graduate and a 55-year-old at the peak of his/her career is not an issue if the graduate has the same career path.

Conservative researchers and organizations have focused on the flaws of household income as a measure for standard of living in order to refute claims that income inequality is growing, becoming excessive or posing a problem for society. [67] According to sociologist Dennis Gilbert, growing inequality can be explained in part by growing participation of women in the workforce. High earning households are more likely to be dual earner households, [7] And according to a 2004 analysis of income quintile data by the Heritage Foundation , inequality becomes less when household income is adjusted for size of household. Aggregate share of income held by the upper quintile (the top earning 20 percent) decreases by 20.3% when figures are adjusted to reflect household size. [68]

However the Pew Research Center found household income has appeared to decline less than individual income in the twenty-first century because those who are no longer able to afford their own housing have increasingly been moving in with relatives, creating larger households with more income earners in them. [69]

The 2011 CBO study “Trends in the Distribution of Household Income” mentioned in this article adjusts for household size so that its quintiles contain an equal number of people, not an equal number of households. [70]

Looking at the issue of how frequently workers or households move into higher or lower quintiles as their income rises or falls over the years, [71] the CBO found income distribution over a multi-year period “modestly” more equal than annual income. [72] The CBO study confirms earlier studies. [47]

Overall, according to Timothy Noah, correcting for demographic factors (today's population is older than it was 33 years ago, and divorce and single parenthood have made households smaller), you find that income inequality, though less extreme than shown by the standard measure, is also growing faster than shown by the standard measure. [73]

Wage inequality

According to Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,

…real hourly wages of those in the 90th percentile—where most people have college or advanced degrees—rose by 30% or more… among this top 10 percent, the growth was heavily concentrated at the very tip of the top, that is, the top 1 percent. This includes the people who earn the very highest salaries in the US economy, like sports and entertainment stars, investment bankers and venture capitalists, corporate attorneys, and CEOs. In contrast, at the 50th percentile and below—where many people have at most a high school diploma—real wages rose by only 5 to 10% – [56]

Lisa Shalett of Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, found that,real average hourly earnings in the US “are essentially flat to down, with today's inflation-adjusted wage equating to about the same level as that attained by workers in 1970″, despite the fact that “for the last two decades and especially in the current period”, productivity has “soared”. The benefits of productivity during this cycle had gone “almost exclusively to corporations and their very top executives.” [74]

Gini index

Further information: Gini coefficient

The Gini coefficient summarizes income inequality in a single number and is one of the most commonly used measures of income inequality. It uses a scale from 0 to 1 — the higher the number the more inequality. 0 represents perfect equality (everyone having exactly the same income), and 1 represents perfect inequality (one person having all income). (Index scores are commonly multiplied by 100 to make them easier to understand. [75] ) Gini index ratings can be used to compare inequality within (by race, gender, employment) and between countries, before and after taxes. [76] [77] [78] [79] Different sources will often give different gini values for the same country or population measured.

Comparisons by state

This Gini Index map shows regional and county level variation in pre-tax income inequality Gini index. The 2010 Gini index value range from 0.207 for Loving County ( Texas ) to 0.645 to East Carroll Parish ( Louisiana ). [80]

The household income Gini index for the United States was 0.468 in 2009, according to the US Census Bureau , [81] though it varied significantly between states . The states of Utah, Alaska and Wyoming have a pre-tax income inequality Gini coefficient that is 10% lower than the average, while Washington DC and Puerto Rico 10% higher. After including the effects of federal and state taxes, the US Federal Reserve estimates 34 states in the USA have a Gini coefficient between 0.30 and 0.35, with the state of Maine the lowest. [19] At the county and municipality levels, the pre-tax Gini index ranged from 0.21 to 0.65 in 2010 across the United States, according to Census Bureau estimates. [80]

OECD estimates the pre-tax Gini index for the United States was 0.49, and after-tax Gini index was 0.38, in 2008-2009. The average pre-tax Gini index for OECD countries was 0.46, while the average after-tax Gini index was 0.31. [76]

International comparisons

The UN , CIA World Factbook , [82] and OECD have used the gini index to compare inequality between countries, and as of 2006, the United States had one of the highest levels of income inequality among similar developed or high income countries , as measured by the index. [9] While inequality has increased since 1981 in two-thirds of OECD countries [12] [83] most developed countries are in the lower, more equal, end of the spectrum, with a Gini coefficient in the high twenties to mid thirties. [84]

The gini rating of the United States is sufficiently high, however, to put it among less developed countries. The US ranks above (more unequal than) South American countries such Guyana, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and roughly on par with Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, according to the CIA. [85] (although some developed countries have higher gini ratings before taxes and transfers. [10] )

Between 1985 and 2008 the OECD-24 countries with the fastest-rising Gini coefficients were Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, Israel, Germany, and Luxembourg. [86]

Organization US gini
rating
International range US ranking in
income equality
Year(s) rated
Most equal
(lowest gini)
Least equal
(highest gini)
UN [87] [88] 0.408 0.168 ( Azerbaijan ) 0.743 ( Namibia ) 77th out of 146 2000-2010
The World Factbook
(CIA) [82]
0.45 0.23 ( Sweden , 2005) 0.707 (Namibia, 2003) 100th out of 140 [89] 1994–2009
OECD [10]
(after taxes and transfers)
0.378 0.236 ( Slovenia ) 0.494 ( Chile ) 31st out of 34
(in OECD)
“late 2000s”
OECD [10]
(before taxes and transfers)
0.486 0.344 ( South Korea ) 0.534 ( Italy ) 26th out of 33
(in OECD)
“late 2000s”

Among the 34 “developed” countries of the OECD the US gini rank in income equality (27th) is higher before taxes and “transfers” are measured, [90] then after (31st) [91] —ie, the US has less income redistribution by government than some other post-industrial economies. However some developed countries, such as the Netherlands and Greece, have less inequality simply because incomes are more equal than in the US even before taxes. [92]

Some have argued that inequality is higher in other countries than official statistics indicate because of unreported income. European countries have higher amounts of wealth in offshore holdings. [93] [94] [95] [96]

Income levels

High income

60% of earners in the top 0.1 percent are executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals. More than half of them work in closely held businesses. [97] The top 1 percent is composed of many professions, the five most common professions being managers , [98] physicians , administrators , lawyers , and financial specialists. Doctors are more likely than any other profession to be in the 1 percent. [99]

Årsaker

Inequality in general

Expertise, productiveness and work experience, inheritance, gender, and race have had a strong influence on distribution of personal income [100] [101] in the United States as in other countries.

Race and gender disparities

Income levels vary by gender and race with median income levels considerably below the national median for females compared to men with certain racial demographics. [102]

Median personal income by gender and race in 2005.

Despite considerable progress in pursuing gender and racial equality, some social scientists attribute these discrepancies in income to continued discrimination. [103] Others argue that the majority of the wage gap is due to women's choices and preferences. Women are more likely to consider factors other than salary when looking for employment. On average, women are less willing to travel or relocate, take more hours off and work fewer hours, and choose college majors that lead to lower paying jobs. Women are also more likely to work for governments or non-profits, that pay less than the private sector. [104] [105] According to this perspective certain ethnic minorities and women receive fewer promotions and opportunities for occupation and economic advancement than others. In the case of women this concept is referred to as the glass ceiling keeping women from climbing the occupational ladder.

In terms of race, Asian Americans are far more likely to be in the highest earning 5 percent than the rest of Americans. [106]

However studies have shown that African Americans are less likely to be hired than European-Americans with the same qualifications. [107] The continued prevalence of traditional gender roles and ethnic stereotypes may partially account for current levels of discrimination. [103] In 2005, median income levels were highest among Asian and White males and lowest among females of all races, especially those identifying as African American or Hispanic. Despite closing gender and racial gaps, considerable discrepancies remain among racial and gender demographics, even at the same level of educational attainment. [108] The success of Asian Americans may come from how parents and children spend much longer hours on education than their peers. Asian American have significantly higher college graduation rates than their peers and are much more likely to enter high status occupations. [109]

Median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers, by sex, race, and ethnicity, 2009. [110]

Since 1953 the income gap between male and female workers has decreased considerably but remains relatively large. [111] Women currently earn significantly more Associate's, Bachelor's, and Master's degrees than men and almost as many Doctorates. [112] Women are projected to have passed men in Doctorates earned in 2006–2007, and to earn nearly two thirds of Associate's, Bachelor's, and Master's degrees by 2016. [113] Despite this, some [ who? ] still argue that male workers still hold higher educational attainment, as the success of women in academia is a relatively new phenomenon. [100]

Though it is important to note that income inequality between sexes remained stark at all levels of educational attainment. [102] Between 1953 and 2005 median earnings as well as educational attainment increased, at a far greater pace for women than for men. Median income for female earners male earners increased 157.2% versus 36.2% for men, over four times as fast. Today the median male worker earns roughly 68.36% more than their female counterparts, compared to 176.25% in 1953. The median income of men in 2005 was 2% higher than in 1973 compared to a 74.6% increase for female earners. [111]

Racial differences remained stark as well, with the highest earning sex-gender demographic of workers aged 25 or older, Asian males (who were roughly tied with white males ) earning slightly more than twice as much as the lowest-earning demographic, Hispanic females. [114] [115] As mentioned above, inequality between races and gender persisted at similar education levels. [115] [116] Racial differences were overall more pronounced among male than among female income earners. In 2009, Hispanics were more than twice as likely to be poor than non-Hispanic whites, research indicates. [117] Lower average English ability, low levels of educational attainment, part-time employment, the youthfulness of Hispanic household heads, and the 2007–09 recession are important factors that have pushed up the Hispanic poverty rate relative to non-Hispanic whites.

During the early 1920s, median earnings decreased for both sexes, not increasing substantially until the late 1990s. Since 1974 the median income for workers of both sexes increased by 31.7% from $18,474 to $24,325, reaching its high-point in 2000. [118]

Demographic Median personal income
Overall Median High school graduate Noen college Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Masters degree Doctorate degree
Hvit Male [119] $40,432 $33,805 $40,427 $61,175 $55,129 $67,903 $77,818
Female [120] $26,636 $21,306 $25,190 $40,161 $36,076 $45,555 $56,759
Both sexes [121] $32,919 $27,291 $31,510 $49,879 $43,841 $52,244 $71,184
Black Male [122] $30,549 $25,747 $32,758 $46,474 $41,889 $52,488 N / A
Female [122] $25,435 $20,366 $25,574 $42,461 $41,263 $45,830 N/A
Both sexes [123] $27,110 $22,328 $27,589 $44,460 $41,565 $47,407 $61,993
Asian Male [116] $42,217 $28,486 $34,548 $61,165 $51,448 $70,979 $81,676
Female [124] $30,332 $21,057 $23,523 $41,442 $37,057 $48,177 $53,659
Both sexes [125] $36,152 $25,285 $29,982 $51,481 $42,466 $61,452 $69,653
Hispanic Male [126] $26,162 $26,579 $33,617 $48,282 $43,791 $60,194 N/A
Female [127] $20,133 $18,886 $25,088 $37,405 $34,302 $47,052 N/A
Both sexes [128] $23,613 $22,941 $28,698 $41,596 $37,819 $50,901 $67,274
All racial/ethnic demographics Male [129] $39,403 $32,085 $39,150 $60,493 $52,265 $67,123 $78,324
Female [130] $26,507 $21,117 $25,185 $40,483 $36,532 $45,730 $54,666
Both sexes [131] $32,140 $26,505 $31,054 $49,303 $43,143 $52,390 $70,853
NOTE: The highest median for each level of educational attainment is highlighted in green, the lowest in orange.
SOURCE: US Bureau of Census, 2006

Household income levels and gains for different percentiles in 2003 dollars. [132]

Education and technology

Median personal and household income according to different education levels. [131] [133]

Income differences between the varying levels of educational attainment (usually measured by the highest degree of education an individual has completed) have increased. Expertise and skill certified through an academic degree translates into increased scarcity of an individual's occupational qualification which in turn leads to greater economic rewards. [134] As the United States has developed into a post-industrial society more and more employers require expertise that they did not a generation ago, while the manufacturing sector which employed many of those lacking a post-secondary education is decreasing in size. [135]

In the resulting economic job market the income discrepancy between the working class and the professional with the higher academic degrees, [100] who possess scarce amounts of certified expertise, may be growing.

Households in the upper quintiles are generally home to more, better educated and employed working income earners, than those in lower quintiles. [68] Among those in the upper quintile, 62% of householders were college graduates, 80% worked full-time and 76% of households had two or more income earners, compared to the national percentages of 27%, 58% and 42%, respectively. [100] [101] [136] Upper-most sphere US Census Bureau data indicated that occupational achievement and the possession of scarce skills correlates with higher income. [136]

Average earnings in 2002 for the population 18 years and over were higher at each progressively higher level of education… This relationship holds true not only for the entire population but also across most subgroups. Within each specific educational level, earnings differed by sex and race. This variation may result from a variety of factors, such as occupation, working full- or part-time, age, or labor force experience. – [100] [137]
Demographic High school graduate Noen college Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Master's degree First professional degree Doctorate degree
Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings
(2005)
Both sexes $26,505 −17.5% $31,054 −3.5% $49,303 +53.4% $43,143 +34.2% $52,390 +63.0% $82,473 +156.6% $70,853 +120.4%
Males $32,085 −18.6% $39,150 −0.6% $60,493 +53.5% $52,265 +32.6% $67,123 +70.3% $ 100,000 +153.8% $78,324 +98.8%
Females $21,117 −20.3% $25,185 −5.0% $40,483 +52.7% $36,532 +37.82% $45,730 +72.5% $66,055 +149.2% $54,666 +106.2%
Both sexes employed full-time $31,539 −19.8% $37,135 −5.6% $56,078 +42.5% $50,944 +29.5% $61,273 +55.8% $ 100,000 +154.2% $79,401 +101.8%
Households
(2003)
$ 36835 -20,5% $ 45854 -0,8% $ 73446 58,8% $ 68728 48,6 $ 78541 69,9% $ 100,000 116,2% $ 96830 109,4%
KILDE: US Census Bureau, 2004/06 [131] [133]

Insentiver

Prosent av husholdningene med 2 + inntekt inntekter, og heltidsarbeidere etter inntekt. [136]

I sammenheng med bekymring over inntektsulikhet en rekke økonomer, slik som Federal Reserve styreformann Ben Bernake, har snakket om viktigheten av insentiver: "... uten mulighet for ulik utfall knyttet til forskjeller i innsats og dyktighet, økonomiske incitament for produktiv oppførsel ville bli eliminert, og vår markedsbasert økonomi ... ville fungere langt mindre effektivt. " [134] [138] Yale økonomen Arthur Okun argumenterer er det en avveining mellom økonomisk vekst og økonomisk omfordeling. [139] [140]

Siden rikelig tilførsel reduserer markedsverdien, besittelse av knappe ferdigheter betraktelig øker inntekten. [100] Blant de amerikanske lavere klasse , den vanligste kilden til inntekt var ikke okkupasjon, men regjeringen velferd. [141]

Beskatning

Gjennomsnittlig skattesats prosenter for de høyest inntekt amerikanske skattebetalere, 1945-2009

En annen faktor i inntektsulikhet / likestilling er den effektive hastigheten som inntekten blir skattlagt kombinert med progressiviteten i skattesystemet. En progressiv skatt er en skatt der de skattesatsen øker etter hvert som den skattepliktige grunnbeløp øker. [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] Totalt skattesatser i USA er under OECD gjennomsnittet, og inntil 2005 har vært fallende. [147]

Post-1980 økningen i ulikhet

Mest aktuell diskusjon av inntektsulikhet i Amerika sentre på sin stige ettersom tankene til slutten av 1970-tallet, den såkalte " Flott Divergence ". Ifølge United States Census Bureau , rapporterte det at inntektsulikhet mellom de rikeste og fattigste menneskene vokste til det bredeste i 2011, da folketellingen registrert 46,2 millioner mennesker som lever i fattigdom . [148]

Bred sammenbrudd

Bryte ned hvor mye av økningen i inntektsulikhet mellom 1979 og 2007 kom fra fordeling av resultat før skatt og hvor mye fra skatter og "statlige overføringer", viser CBO data at 33% økning i ulikhet [149] kom fra en

  • 23% økning i ulikhet fra endringer i fordelingen av "markedsinntekter" til husholdninger (toppen inntekter mottok en større andel av lønn, renter, utbytte, aksjegevinster, næringsinntekt, etc.), en
  • 6% økning fra endringer i "statlige overføringer" (trygd, arbeidsledighet, slutten av afdc velferd, osv.), og en
  • 4% økning fra endringer i føderale beskatning (generell nedgang i den gjennomsnittlige føderale skattesatsen og skifte i føderale inntekter fra skatt til mindre progressive arbeidsgiveravgift, etc.).

[150] [151]

Av de 23% økning i ulikhet fra endringer i pre-skatt "markedet" inntekt, det meste av det (79%) kom fra et skifte til toppen inntekter i ulike typer inntekter over hele linja. En mindre mengde ulikhet økning (21%) kom fra et skifte fra lønn og lønn til mer konsentrert inntektskilder-ie renter, utbytte, næringsinntekt og spesielt kapitalgevinster, som er mer konsentrert mot toppen inntekter enn inntekter fra lønn / lønn. [152]

Ifølge Michael Cembalest, administrerende investering offiser av JPMorgan Chase , [153] som av 2011, corporate "har fortjenestemarginer nådd nivåer ikke sett på flere tiår," og "reduksjoner i lønn og goder forklare mesteparten av netto forbedring. ... Amerikanske arbeidsmarkedet kompensasjon er nå på et 50-års lav i forhold til både selskapets salg og amerikanske BNP " [154]

Lisa Shalett, administrerende investering offiser ved Merrill Lynch Wealth Management bemerket at "for de siste to tiårene, og spesielt i inneværende periode, ... produktiviteten steget ... [men] amerikanske reelle gjennomsnittlige timefortjeneste er i hovedsak flat til ned, med dagens inflasjonsjustert lønns likhetstegn til omtrent samme nivå som det som oppnås av arbeidere i 1970. ... Så der har fordelene av teknologidrevet produktivitet syklus borte? Nesten utelukkende til selskaper og deres svært toppledere. " [74]

Forklaringer

Ifølge CBO og andre, "de nøyaktige årsakene til [siste] rask vekst i inntekter på toppen er ikke godt forstått", [40] [85] , men "etter all sannsynlighet", en "samspill av flere faktorer" var . involvert [155] ". Forskere har tilbudt flere mulige begrunnelser" [40] [56] . Noen av disse begrunnelser konflikt, noe overlapping [156] De omfatter:

  • globaliserings hypotese-lav dyktige amerikanske arbeidere har vært på vikende front i møte med konkurransen fra lavtlønnsarbeidere i Asia og andre "nye" økonomier, [157]
  • ferdighet-partisk teknologisk endring - den raske fremskritt i informasjonsteknologi har økt etterspørselen etter dyktige og utdannede slik at inntektsfordelingen favoriserte hjernen snarere enn muskler, [157]
  • superstjernen hypotese-moderne teknologier for kommunikasjon slår ofte konkurranse inn i en turnering hvor vinneren blir rikt belønnet, mens andreplass får langt mindre enn i det siste, [157] [158]
  • innvandring av mindre utdannede arbeidstakere - relativt høye nivåer av innvandring av lave fagarbeidere siden 1965 kan ha redusert lønn for amerikansk-født high school dropouts, [159]
  • politikk og politikk - stigende lederlønninger , stagnerende middels inntekt lønn og mer regressiv beskatning som følge av politiske beslutninger, ikke markedskreftene. Beslutning som ikke gripe inn for å stoppe utøvende fangst av styrene, knusing av fagforeninger, etc.

Analysere de tre hypoteser, økonom Paul Krugman fant dem til å være "stadig utilstrekkelig" som mer bevis akkumulert.

Globalisering kan forklare en del av den relative nedgangen i blue-collar lønn, men det kan ikke forklare det 2500 prosent økning i CEO inntekter. Teknologi kan forklare hvorfor lønnen premie forbundet med en høyskole utdanning har økt, men det er vanskelig å matche opp med den enorme økningen i ulikhet blant college-utdannede, med litt fremgang for mange, men gigantiske gevinster på toppen. Den superteori fungerer for Jay Leno , men ikke for de tusenvis av mennesker som har blitt awesomely rik uten å gå på TV. [157]

Innvandring ble også funnet for lett som en forklaring. [160]

Andre forskere [161] avhør forklaringen på utdanningsnivå og arbeidsplass ferdigheter påpeke at andre land med tilsvarende utdanningsnivå og økonomier ikke har gått veien for oss, og at konsentrasjonen av inntekter i USA har ikke fulgt et mønster av " de 29% av amerikanere med høyskoleutdannelse trekke unna "fra de som har lavere utdanning. [57] [162] [163] [164] [165] [9]

Skill-partisk teknologisk endring

Per midten til slutten av tiåret av 2000-tallet, den vanligste forklaringen på inntektsulikhet i Amerika var "dyktighet-partisk teknologisk endring" [166] - "et skifte i produksjonsteknologi som favoriserer dyktig enn ufaglært arbeidskraft ved å øke sin relativ produktivitet , og derfor dens relative etterspørsel ". [167] For eksempel, en vitenskapelig kollokvium om emnet som inkluderte mange prominente arbeidskraft økonomer anslått at teknologisk endring var ansvarlig for over 40% av økningen i ulikhet. Andre faktorer som internasjonal handel, nedgang i real minstelønn, nedgang i unionization og økende innvandring, var hver ansvarlig for 10-15% av økningen. [168] [169]

Tall viser styrken på utdanning innflytelse på inntektsfordelingen. [170] I 2005, omtrent 55% av inntekt inntekter med doktorgrad grader - var blant de beste 15 prosent inntekter - de mest utdannede 1,4%. Blant kandidater med mastergrad - den mest utdannede 10% - omtrent halvparten hadde inntekter blant de øverste 20 prosent av inntekter. [131] Bare blant husholdninger i øverste femtedel ble boligeiere med høyskoleutdannelse i flertall. [101]

Men mens høyere utdanning vanligvis oversettes til høyere inntekter, [170] og høyt utdannede er uforholdsmessig representert i øverste kvintil husholdninger , forskjeller i utdanningsnivå ikke klarer å forklare inntekt avvik mellom den øverste 1 prosent og resten av befolkningen. Store prosenter av individer mangler en høyskole grad er til stede i alle inntekts demografi, inkludert 33% av de med overskriften husholdninger med seks figuren inntekter . [101] Fra 2000 til 2010 var 1,5% av amerikanere med en MD, JD, eller MBA og 1,5% med en doktorgrad så median inntekt gevinst på ca 5%. Blant de med høyskole eller mastergrad (ca 25% av den amerikanske arbeidsstokken) gjennomsnittlig lønn falt med om lag 7%, (selv om dette var mindre enn nedgangen i lønn for de som ikke hadde fullført college). [171]

Nærmer saken fra yrker som har blitt erstattet eller nedgradert siden slutten av 1970-tallet, en av forskerne fant at jobber som "krever litt tenking, men ikke mye" - eller moderat dyktige middelklasseyrker som kasser, typists, sveisere, bønder, apparatet reparatører - falt lengst i lønnssatsene og / eller tall. Sysselsetting krever enten mer dyktighet eller mindre har vært mindre berørt. [172] Men timingen av den store teknologiske endringer av æra-internett bruk av virksomheten starter i slutten av 1990-tallet-ikke stemmer at av veksten i inntektsulikhet (starter i Tidlig på 1970-tallet, men slakke litt på 1990-tallet). Heller ikke innføringen av teknologier som øker etterspørselen etter flere dyktige arbeidere synes å være generelt forbundet med en divergens i husholdningenes inntekter blant befolkningen. Oppfinnelser av det 20. århundre som AC elektrisk strøm , bil, fly, radio, tv, vaskemaskin, Xerox maskin, hver hadde en økonomisk effekt lik av datamaskiner / mikroprosessorer / Internett, men ikke sammenfaller med økt ulikhet. [172 ]

Utdanning

En annen forklaring er at kombinasjonen av innføringen av teknologier som øker etterspørselen etter fagarbeidere, og svikt i det amerikanske utdanningssystemet til å gi en tilstrekkelig økning i de faglærte har budt opp disse arbeidernes lønninger. Et eksempel på nedgangen i utdanning vekst i Amerika (som begynte omtrent samtidig som den store Divergence begynte) er det faktum at den gjennomsnittlige person som er født i 1945 fikk to års skolegang enn sine foreldre, mens den gjennomsnittlige person født i 1975 fikk bare et halvt år mer skolegang. [173] Forfatter Timothy Noahs "back-of-the-konvolutt" estimering basert på "composite av mine diskusjoner med og lesning av de ulike økonomer og statsvitere" er at de "ulike feil" i USAs utdanningssystemet er "ansvarlig for 30%" av post-1978 økningen i ulikhet. [173]

Globalisering

Mens økonomer som har studert globalisering enig importen har hatt en effekt, ikke tidspunktet for importveksten stemmer ikke veksten av inntektsulikhet. Kina er verdens største eksportør og produsent av industriprodukter, men hadde en inntekt per innbygger i 2007 en syvendedel som i USA. Av 1995 import av industrivarer fra lavtlønnsland utgjorde mindre enn 3% av USAs bruttonasjonalprodukt. [174]

Det var ikke før i 2006 at USA importert mer industrivarer fra lav lønn (u) land enn fra høy lønns (avanserte) økonomier. [175] Ulikhet økte i løpet av 2000-2010 tiåret ikke på grunn av stagnerende lønninger for mindre- fagarbeidere, men på grunn av akselerer inntektene til toppen 0,1%. [174] Forfatter Timothy Noah anslår at "trade", økning i importen er ansvarlig for bare 10% av den "Great Divergence" i inntektsfordelingen. [173]

Utlendings

Den utlendingsloven og statsborgerloven av 1965 økte innvandringen til Amerika, spesielt av ikke-europeere. [85] Fra 1970 til 2007 økte utenlandsfødte andel av USAs befolkning fra 5% til 11%, hvorav de fleste hadde lavere utdanningsnivå og inntekter enn innfødte amerikanere. Men bidraget fra denne økningen i tilbudet av lav-ferdigheter arbeidskraft ser ut til å ha vært relativt beskjeden. Et estimat uttalt at innvandring redusert gjennomsnittlig årlig inntekt på innfødte "high-school dropouts" ("som omtrent tilsvarer den fattigste tiendedelen av arbeidsstokken") med 7,4% 1980-2000. Nedgangen i inntekt av bedre utdannede arbeidere var mye mindre. [85] Forfatter Timothy Noah anslår at «innvandring» er ansvarlig for bare 5% av "Great Divergence" i inntektsfordelingen. [173]

Endringer i inntektsberegningen

En observatør som benekter at husholdningenes inntekter er blitt skjevere er Alan Reynolds , senior fellow ved Cato Institute . Reyonlds har erklært at inntektsulikheten er en statistisk illusjon forårsaket av tekniske endringer i skatteloven som endrer hva inntekten blir rapportert til Internal Revenue Service og hva inntekt ikke. [67] [176] Denne påstanden har blitt kritisert som "en fjell av vanskelige å følge, ofte irrelevante, og noen ganger helt feilaktige statistiske småplukk " [177] eller "intellektuell tre-kort monte . " [178]

Reynolds påpeker at alle dataene samlet for å beregne inntektsulikhet er basert på føderale selvangivelse. Inntekter som ikke er på selvangivelsen er ikke inkludert i dataene. Ikke overraskende, er hvilke inntekter nødvendig og ikke nødvendig for å bli rapportert har endret seg. Før 1980-tallet, fikk interesse for kommunale obligasjoner og utøvende aksjeopsjoner ikke trenger å bli rapportert som skattepliktig inntekt. [179] I tillegg har mange selskaper arkivert som C-selskaper, og derfor deres inntekt ikke opp på individuelle selvangivelse. Etter 1986 skattereformen lovgivning og skattelettelser under president Reagan, mange selskaper byttet til å være S-selskaper, og derfor betalte den personlige skattesats snarere enn bedriftens skattesats. [180] Som et resultat av disse og andre endringer, under og etter 1980 mange nye inntekter begynte å dukke opp på selvangivelsen til toppen inntekter som virkelig hadde vært tjent alle sammen. Av denne grunn er det ikke overraskende at undersøkelser gjort av Pikkety / Saez og andre viser det meste av økningen i den øverste 1% andel av årlig inntekt oppstår i 1986-1988 perioden. Videre skatte-utsatt kontoer begynte å vise inntekter forsvinner fra avkastningen av innehaverne av regnskapet slik de så ut på 1980-tallet. En 2001 Federal Reserve studie viste at bare 5,5% av de beste 1% 's eiendeler ble holdt i skatte utsatt kontoer, mens 14,5% av den femtinde-nittifemte persentil eiendeler ble holdt i skatte utsatt kontoer. [181] Transfer betalinger er også i stor grad ignorert av de fleste studier, men andelen av inntekten den absorbere har økt fra 5,9% i 1970 til 14,2% i 2004. [182] Disse utbetalingene generelt gå til lavere inntekt familier og derfor deres fravær har stadig gjort statistikken mer og mer feil i løpet av årene. Reynolds 'argument er at endringene har eliminert inntekter fra midten mens du legger inntekt til toppen, forverrer situasjonen statistisk, men i virkeligheten endrer lite eller ingenting.

Politisk, normative, institusjonelle

Kritikere av teknologisk endring som en forklaring på den "Great Divergence" av inntektsnivået i Amerika [22] peker på offentlig politikk og partipolitikk, eller "ting regjeringen gjorde, eller ikke gjorde". [183] ​​De hevder disse har førte til en trend med fallende fagforenings medlemskap priser og resulterer avtagende politisk innflytelse, redusert utgifter til sosiale tjenester, og mindre statlig omfordeling.

Politiske partier og presidenter

Statsviter Larry Bartels har funnet en sterk sammenheng mellom partiet til presidenten og inntektsulikhet i Amerika siden 1948. (Se nedenfor) [164] [184]

Undersøke gjennomsnittlig årlig før skatt inntektsvekst 1948-2005, [185] viser Bartel at under demokratiske presidenter (fra Harry Truman fremover), har de største inntektsgevinster vært på bunnen av inntektsskalaen og avtatt som inntekt steg. Under republikanske presidenter, i kontrast, gevinster var mye mindre, men hva vekst det ble konsentrert mot toppen, smalner av som du gikk ned inntektsskalaen. [151] [186]

Oppsummering Bartels funn, journalist Timothy Noah henvist til administrasjonene av demokratiske presidenter som "demokrat-verden", og GOP administrasjoner som "Republican-verden":

I demokrat-verden, økte resultatet før skatt 2,64% årlig for de fattige og lavere middelklasse og 2,12% årlig for den øvre middelklassen og rik. Det var ingen stor divergens. I stedet, den store kompresjons den egalitære inntektsutvikling som rådet gjennom 1940-tallet, 1950-tallet, og 1960-fortsatt til stede, om enn med inntekt konvergerende mindre raskt enn før. I republikaner-verden, i mellomtiden, økte resultatet før skatt 0,43 prosent årlig for de fattige og lavere middelklasse og 1,90 prosent for den øvre middelklassen og rik. Ikke bare gjorde den store Divergence skje, det var mer sterkt avvikende. Også verdt å merke: I demokrat-verden økte inntekter før skatt raskere enn i den virkelige verden ikke bare for de 20 prosent, men også for den 40., 60., og 80.. Vi var alle rikere og mer lik! Men i republikaner-verden, økte resultat før skatt tregere enn i den virkelige verden ikke bare for de 20 prosent, men også for den 40., 60., og 80.. Vi var alle fattigere og mindre lik! Demokratene produserte også marginalt raskere inntektsvekst enn republikan på 95-persentilen, men forskjellen var ikke statistisk signifikant. [183]

Mønsteret for fordeling av vekst synes å være et resultat av en hel rekke av prosedyrer,

herunder ikke bare fordelingen av skatter og fordeler, men også regjeringens holdning til fagforeninger, om minstelønn stiger, i hvilken grad regjeringen frets om inflasjon versus altfor høye renter, etc., etc. [151]

Noah innrømmer bevis for denne sammenhengen er "indisier snarere enn direkte", men så er "bevisene på at røyking er en ledende årsak til lungekreft." [183]

Non-partiet politisk handling
Ytterligere informasjon: lederlønninger i USA

Forhold av gjennomsnittlige godtgjørelse for administrerende direktører og produksjonsarbeidere, 1965-2009. Kilde: Economic Policy Institute. 2011. Basert på data fra Wall Street Journal / Mercer, Hay Group 2010. [187]

Ifølge statsvitere Jacob Hacker og Paul Pierson skriver i boken Vinneren tar alt politikk , de viktige politiske endringer ble brakt videre ikke av det republikanske partiet, men med utviklingen av et moderne, effektivt politisk system, spesielt lobbyvirksomhet , etter toppen inntekter -og spesielt bedriftens ledere og finansnæringen. [188] slutten av 1970-tallet så en transformasjon av amerikansk politikk bort fra et fokus på middelklassen, med nye, mye mer effektiv, aggressive og godt finansiert lobbyister og pressgrupper acting on behalf of upper income groups. Executives successfully eliminated any countervailing power or oversight of corporate managers (from private litigation, boards of directors and shareholders, the Securities and Exchange Commission or labor unions). [189]

The financial industry's success came from successfully pushing for deregulation of financial markets, allowing much more lucrative but much more risky investments from which it privatized the gains while socializing the losses with government bailouts. [190] (the two groups formed about 60% of the top 0.1 percent of earners.) All top earners were helped by deep cuts in estate and capital gains taxes, and tax rates on high levels of income.

Arguing against the proposition that the explosion in pay for corporate executives — which grew from 35X average worker pay in 1978 to over 250X average pay before the 2007 recession [191] — is driven by an increased demand for scarce talent and set according to performance, Krugman points out that multiple factors outside of executives' control govern corporate profitability, particularly in short term when the head of a company like Enron may look like a great success. Further, corporate boards follow other companies in setting pay even if the directors themselves disagree with lavish pay “partly to attract executives whom they consider adequate, partly because the financial market will be suspicious of a company whose CEO isn't lavishly paid.” Finally “corporate boards, largely selected by the CEO, hire compensation experts, almost always chosen by the CEO” who naturally want to please their employers. [192]

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, the authors of Pay Without Performance , critique of executive pay , argue that executive capture of corporate governance is so complete that only public relations, ie public `outrage`, constrains their pay. [193] This in turn has been reduced as traditional critics of excessive pay—such as politicians (where need for campaign contributions from the richest outweighs populist indignation), media (lauding business genius), unions (crushed) — are now silent. [194]

In addition to politics, Krugman postulated change in norms of corporate culture have played a factor. In the 1950s and 60s, corporate executives had (or could develop) the ability to pay themselves very high compensation through control of corporate boards of directors, they restrained themselves. But by the end of the 1990s, the average real annual compensation of the top 100 CEO's skyrocketed from $1.3 million—39 times the pay of an average worker—to $37.5 million, more than 1,000 times the pay of ordinary workers from 1982 to 2002. [157] Journalist George Packer also sees the dramatic increase in inequality in America as a product of the change in attitude of the American elite, which (in his view) has been transitioning itself from pillars of society to a special interest group. [195] Author Timothy Noah estimates that what he calls “Wall Street and corporate boards' pampering” of the highest earning 0.1% is “responsible for 30%” of the post-1978 increase in inequality. [173]

Decline of unions

Union membership in the United States from the Great Depression to current day. (Source: Union Membership Trends in the United States , Table A-1 Appendix A for 1930 to 2000; Bureau of Labor Statistics for 2005 and 2010.)

The era of inequality growth has coincided with a dramatic decline in labor union membership from 20% of the labor force in 1983 to about 12% in 2007. [196] Economists have traditionally thought that since the chief purpose of a union is to maximize the income of its members, a strong but not all-encompassing union movement led to increased income inequality. Given the increase in income inequality of the past few decades, either the sign of the effect must be reversed, the magnitude of the effect small, or a much larger opposing force overridden it, since unionization has decreased in that period. [197] [198]

However more recently research has shown that unions' ability to reduce income disparities among members outweighed other factors and its net effect has been to reduce national income inequality. [198] [199] The decline of unions has hurt this leveling effect among men, and one economist (Berkeley economist David Card ) estimating about 15-20% of the “Great Divergence” among that gender is the result of declining unionization. [198] [200]

Still other researchers think it is the labor movement's loss of national political power to promote equalizing “government intervention and changes in private sector behavior” has had the greatest impact on inequality in the US. [198] [201] Timothy Noah estimates the “decline” of labor union power “responsible for 20%” of the Great Divergence. [173]

Taxation

How much tax policy change over the last thirty years has contributed to income inequality is disputed. In their comprehensive 2011 study of income inequality ( Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 ), [150] the CBO found that,

The top fifth of the population saw a 10-percentage-point increase in their share of after-tax income. Most of that growth went to the top 1 percent of the population. All other groups saw their shares decline by 2 to 3 percentage points. In 2007, federal taxes and transfers reduced the dispersion of income by 20 percent, but that equalizing effect was larger in 1979. The share of transfer payments to the lowest-income households declined. The overall average federal tax rate fell.

According to journalist Timothy Noah, “you can't really demonstrate that US tax policy had a large impact on the three-decade income inequality trend one way or the other. The inequality trend for pre-tax income during this period was much more dramatic.” [183] Noah estimates tax changes account for 5% of the Great Divergence. [173]

But many — such as economist Paul Krugman — emphasize the effect of changes in taxation — such as the 2001 and 2003 Bush administration tax cuts which cut taxes far more for high-income households than those below — on increased income inequality. [202]

Part of the growth of income inequality under Republican administrations (described by Larry Bartels) has been attributed to tax policy. A study by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez found that

Large reductions in tax progressivity since the 1960s took place primarily during two periods: the Reagan presidency in the 1980s and the Bush administration in the early 2000s. [203]

During Republican President Ronald Reagan 's tenure in office the top marginal income tax rate was reduced from over 70 to 28 percent, high top marginal rates like 70% being the sort in place during much of the period of great income equality following the “Great Compression”. [183] While the bottom marginal rate for the bottom fell from 14 to 11 percent. [204] However the effective rate on top earners before Reagan's tax cut was much lower because of loopholes and charitable contributions. (See Saez & Piketty, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” </ref> [205] President Ronald Reagan's 1981 cut in the top regular tax rate on unearned income reduced the maximum capital gains rate to only 20% — its lowest level since the Hoover administration. [206]

During the Republican George W. Bush administration, the tax rate on capital gains and qualifying dividends — a disproportionate source of income for top earners — fell to 15% — less than half the 35% top rate on ordinary income. [207] President Bush's veto of tax harmonization has also been attributed to rising inequality, as this would have shut down offshore tax havens. [208]

The highest earning 0.01% income group (“99.99-100% income group”) saw the greatest tax rate reductions since 1960.
Source: Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, [209]

One study [210] found reductions of total effective tax rates were most significant for individuals with highest incomes. (see “Federal Tax Rate by Income Group” chart) For those with incomes in the top 0.01 percent, overall rates of Federal tax fell from 74.6% in 1970, to 34.7% in 2004 (the reversal of the trend in 2000 with a rise to 40.8% came after the 1993 Clinton deficit reduction tax bill ), the next 0.09 percent falling from 59.1% to 34.1%, before leveling off with a relatively modest drop of 41.4 to 33.0% for the 99.5–99.9 percent group. Although the tax rate for low-income earners fell as well (though not as much), these tax reductions compare with virtually no change—23.3% tax rate in 1970, 23.4% in 2004—for the US population overall. [210]

The study found the decline in progressivity since 1960 was due to the shift from allocation of corporate income taxes among labor and capital to the effects of the individual income tax. [210] [211] Paul Krugman also supports this claim saying, “The overall tax rate on these high income families fell from 36.5% in 1980 to 26.7% in 1989.” [212]

From the White House's own analysis, the tax burden for those making greater than $250,000 fell considerably during the late 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, from an effective tax of 35% in 1980, down to under 30% from the late 1980s to present. [213]

Many studies argue that tax changes of S-type Corporations confound the statistics prior to 1990. However, even after these changes inflation-adjusted average after-tax income grew by 25% between 1996 and 2006 (the last year for which individual income tax data is publicly available). This average increase, however, obscures a great deal of variation. The poorest 20% of tax filers experienced a 6% reduction in income while the top 0.1 percent of tax filers saw their income almost double. Tax filers in the middle of the income distribution experienced about a 10% increase in income. Also during this period, the proportion of income from capital increased for the top 0.1 percent from 64% to 70%. [214]

Effects of race and gender

The black/white gap in median family income is about 3% smaller today than it was in 1979, a lack of progress that may be dismaying but excludes the disparity from explaining any part of the 30-year growth of inequality. [24]

Gender disparity in income has also improved in during the last three decades. The gap in the median annual income between men and women working full-time has declined from 40% to 23%. [24]

Median income for male and female workers from 1953 to 2005 in constant dollars. [111]

Year or change Gini index, Persons, age 25+, employed full-time [59] Gini index,
Households [58]
Menn Women Both sexes
1967 31.4 29.8 34,0 39.7
2005 42,4 35,7 40,9 46.9
Øk 35.0% 19.8% 20.3% 18.1%
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2006 [215]

Since 1967 inequality has risen for households and for full-time workers of both sexes, but especially for male workers. (see table above) Personal income has risen considerably for female workers since 1953, less so for male workers, whose income stagnated during the 1970s 1980s, and 1990s. [111]

It is unclear whether the dramatic increase of women in the workforce and women's income has led to greater inequality (eg dual earner families causing greater inequality). According to the Census Bureau, as of 2005, 42% of all US households and 76% of those in the top quintile had two or more income earners . [132] [136] But looking at empirical studies, the CBO study “Trends in the Distribution of Household Income”, found “mixed results” of the effect of dual earner families “with estimates depending on the period studied and the methodology use.” The study also found that the level of inequality for household with children and (nonelderly) households without children was “virtually identical”. [216] The growth of single parent households may have led to lower incomes but most of it occurred before 1980 and in recent years the percentage of women who are actually working who are single parents has increased. [85]

Significance of inequality

Commentators, economists, politicians do not agree on the issue of increase in inequality in America or its importance. Among economists and other experts most agree that America's growing income inequality is “deeply worrying”, [24] unjust, [157] a danger to democracy/social stability, [217] [218] [219] and/or even a sign of national decline. [195] Concern extends even to such supporters (or former supporters) of laissez-faire economics and private sector financiers.

Former Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan , has stated reference to growing inequality: “This is not the type of thing which a democratic society — a capitalist democratic society — can really accept without addressing.” [24] Some economists (David Moss, Paul Krugman) believe the Great Divergence may be connected to the financial crisis of 2008. [220] [221] Money manager William H. Gross , managing director of PIMCO , criticized the shift in distribution of income from labor to capital behind some of the growth in inequality as unsustainable, saying:

“even conservatives must acknowledge that return on capital investment, and the liquid stocks and bonds that mimic it, are ultimately dependent on returns to labor in the form of jobs and real wage gains. If Main Street is unemployed and undercompensated, capital can only travel so far down Prosperity Road.”

He concluded: “Investors/policymakers of the world wake up – you're killing the proletariat goose that lays your golden eggs.” [222] [223]

On the other side of the issue are those who have claimed that the increase is not significant, [224] that it doesn't matter [219] because America's economic growth and/or equality of opportunity are what's important, [21] that it is a global phenomenon which would be foolish to try to change through US domestic policy, [225] that it “has many economic benefits and is the result of … a well-functioning economy”, [220] [226] and has or may become an excuse for “class-warfare rhetoric”, [224] and may lead to policies that “reduce the well-being of wealthier individuals”. [71] [220]

Consumption and debt

Arguing that income inequality is not significant because inequality of consumption is less are Will Wilkinson of the libertarian Cato Institute and other conservatives. Wilkinson states that “the weight of the evidence shows that the run-up in consumption inequality has been considerably less dramatic than the rise in income inequality,” and consumption is more important than income. [227] According to Johnson, Smeeding, and Tory, consumption inequality was actually lower in 2001 than it was in 1986. [228] [229]

The CBO agrees that household consumption numbers show more equal distribution than household income but finds the data do not “adequately capture consumption by high-income households” as it does their income. [230] Other studies have not found consumption inequality less dramatic than household income inequality. [73] [231]

Others have disputed the importance of consumption over income, as consumption in excess of income usually means debt, [220] and a “growing body of work” suggests that income inequality has been the driving factor in the growing household debt [73] [232] as middle income earners go deeper into debt trying to maintain what once was a middle class lifestyle. Between 1983 and 2007, the top 5 percent saw their debt fall from 80 cents for every dollar of income to 65 cents, while the bottom 95 percent saw their debt rise from 60 cents for every dollar of income to $1.40. [73] Economist Krugman has found a strong correlation between inequality and household debt in America over the last hundred years. [233]

Deep debt may lead to bankruptcy and researchers Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi found a fivefold increase in the number of families filing for bankruptcy between 1980 and 2005. [234] The bankruptcies came not from increased spending “on luxuries”, but from an “increased spending on housing, largely driven by competition to get into good school districts.” Intensifying inequality may mean a dwindling number of ever more expensive school districts that compel middle class—or would-be middle class—to “buy houses they can't really afford, taking on more mortgage debt than they can safely handle”. [235]

Public attitudes

The growth of inequality has provoked a political protest movement—the Occupy movement —starting in Wall Street and spreading to 600 communities across the United States in 2011. Its main political slogan — “ We are the 99% ” — references its dissatisfaction with the concentration of income in the top 1%.

A 16 December 2011 Gallup poll found a decline in the number of Americans who felt reducing the gap in income and wealth between the rich and the poor was extremely or very important (21 percent of Republicans, 43 percent of independents, and 72 percent of Democrats). [236] In 2012, several surveys of voters attitudes toward growing income inequality found the issue ranked less important than other economic issues such as growth and equality of opportunity, and relatively low in affecting voters “personally”. [237] [238] In 1998 a Gallup poll found 52% of Americans agreeing that the gap between rich and the poor was a problem that needed to be fixed, while 45% regarded it as “an acceptable part of the economic system”. In 2011, those numbers are reversed: Only 45% see the gap as in need of fixing, while 52% do not. However, there was a large difference between Democrats and Republicans, with 71% of Democrats calling for a fix. [236]

In contrast, a national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, [239] found that respondents' sense of unfairness about taxes centered on the perception that wealthy Americans were not paying their fair share of taxes; 57% say this is what bothers them most about the tax system, an increase of 6% over a poll taken in March 2003. [240] A more recent poll found about two-thirds of Americans now believe there are “strong conflicts” between rich and poor in the United States. [241] [242]

Opinion surveys of what respondents thought was the right level of inequality have found Americans no more accepting of income inequality than other citizens of other nations, but more accepting of what they thought the level of inequality was in their country, being under the impression that there was less inequality than there actually was. [243] Dan Ariely and Michael Norton show in a study (2011) that US citizens across the political spectrum significantly underestimate the current US wealth inequality and would prefer a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. [244] Joseph Stiglitz in “The Price of Inequality” has argued that this sense of unfairness has led to distrust in government and business. [245]

Impact on democracy and society

A study by Larry Bartels found that Senate votes were more responsive to the opinions of high income groups and were less and even negatively responsive to the opinions of middle and lower class groups. [246]

Economists Jared Bernstein and Paul Krugman have attacked the concentration of income as variously “unsustainable” [218] and “incompatible” [219] with real democracy. American political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson quote a warning by Greek/Roman historian Plutarch : `An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics.` [217]

Two journalists concerned about social separation in the US are Robert Frank who notes that:

Today's rich had formed their own virtual country .. [T]hey had built a self-contained world unto themselves, complete with their own health-care system (concierge doctors), travel network (Net jets, destination clubs), separate economy. .... The rich weren't just getting richer; they were becoming financial foreigners, creating their own country within a country, their own society within a society, and their economy within an economy. [247]

and George Packer ,

Inequality hardens society into a class system … Inequality divides us from one another in schools, in neighborhoods, at work, on airplanes, in hospitals, in what we eat, in the condition of our bodies, in what we think, in our children's futures, in how we die. Inequality makes it harder to imagine the lives of others. [195]

Economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that hyper-inequality may explain political questions such as why America's infrastructure is deteriorating,as a result of the reduction in broadly beneficial public investment and support for public education, [248] or its recent relative lack of reluctance to engage in military conflicts such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Top earning families wealthy enough to buy their own education, medical care, personal security, and parks, have little interest in helping pay for such things for the rest of society, and the political influence to make sure they don't have to. So too, the lack of personal or family sacrifice involved for top earners in the military intervention of their country — their children being few and far between in the relatively low-paying all-volunteer military — may mean more willingness by the American government to wage war. [249]

The relatively high rates of health and social problems ( obesity , mental illness , homicides , teenage births , Incarceration , child conflict, drug use) and lower rates of social goods ( life expectancy , educational performance, trust among strangers , women's status , social mobility , even numbers of patents issued per capita), in the US compared to other developed countries may be related to its high income inequality. Using statistics from 23 developed countries and the 50 states of the US, British researchers Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have found such a correlation which remains after accounting for ethnicity, [250] national culture [251] ), and occupational classes or education levels. [252] Their findings, based on UN Human Development Reports and other sources, locate the United States at the top of the list in regards to inequality and various social and health problems among developed countries. [253] The authors argue inequality leads to the social ills through the psychosocial stress , status anxiety it creates. [254]

Disagreeing with this focus on the top earning 1% and urging attention to the economic and social pathologies of lower income/lower education Americans, is conservative journalist David Brooks . Whereas in the 1970s, high school and college graduates had “very similar family structures”, today, high school grads are much less likely to get married and be active in their communities, and much more likely to smoke, be obese, get divorced, or have “a child out of wedlock.” [255]

The zooming wealth of the top one percent is a problem, but it's not nearly as big a problem as the tens of millions of Americans who have dropped out of high school or college. It's not nearly as big a problem as the 40 percent of children who are born out of wedlock. It's not nearly as big a problem as the nation's stagnant human capital, its stagnant social mobility and the disorganized social fabric for the bottom 50 percent. [255] [256]

Contradicting most of these arguments, classical liberals such as Friedrich Hayek have maintained that because individuals are diverse and different, state intervention to redistribute income is inevitably arbitrary and incompatible with the concept of general rules of law, and that “what is called 'social' or distributive' justice is indeed meaningless within a spontaneous order”. Those who would use the state to redistribute, “take freedom for granted and ignore the preconditions necessary for its survival.” It is not great wealth but government and that gives power to control others in liberal democracies such as the United States. [257] [258] [258]

Opportunity, growth and equality

Conservatives and libertarians such as economist Thomas Sowell , and Congressman Paul Ryan (R., Wisc.) [259] argue that more important than the level of equality of results is America's equality of opportunity, especially relative to other developed countries such as western Europe.

Economic growth and inequality

In response to the Occupy movement Richard A. Epstein defended inequality in a free market society, maintaining that “taxing the top one percent even more means less wealth and fewer jobs for the rest of us.” According to Epstein, “the inequalities in wealth … pay for themselves by the vast increases in wealth”, while “forced transfers of wealth through taxation … will destroy the pools of wealth that are needed to generate new ventures. [260] Stiglitz on the other hand concludes that moving money from the bottom to the top through income inequality lowers consumption because higher-income individuals consume a smaller proportion of their income than do lower-income individuals (those at the top save 15 to 25 percent of their income, those at the bottom spend all of their income). [261]

Some (while specifically advocating redistribution of income through taxation) have not found a “tradeoff” between greater equality and economic growth; but according to economist Branko Milanovic , while traditionally economists thought inequality was good for growth

“The view that income inequality harms growth—or that improved equality can help sustain growth—has become more widely held in recent years. … The main reason for this shift is the increasing importance of human capital in development. When physical capital mattered most, savings and investments were key. Then it was important to have a large contingent of rich people who could save a greater proportion of their income than the poor and invest it in physical capital. But now that human capital is scarcer than machines, widespread education has become the secret to growth.” [262]

“Broadly accessible education” is both difficult to achieve when income distribution is uneven and tends to reduce “income gaps between skilled and unskilled labor.”

Economic sociologist Lane Kenworthy has found no correlation between levels of inequality and economic growth among developed countries, among states of the US, or in the US over the years from 1947 to 2005. [263] Jared Bernstein found a nuanced relation he summed up as follows: “In sum, I'd consider the question of the extent to which higher inequality lowers growth to be an open one, worthy of much deeper research, perhaps along some of the lines noted above. [264]

Some researchers have found a connection between “leveling” higher marginal tax rates on high income earners, and higher rates of employment growth. [265] [266] [267]

Mobility during a lifetime

Strong “ intra-generational ” or individual economic mobility between the strata of rich, middle class and poor means both that (1) a high level of inequality of annual income is made irrelevant by a more even distribution of lifetime income, and (2) however extreme the earnings at the top, they are not out of reach for the poor (or middle income) but ambitious. [20]

Sowell claims mobility is robust.

An absolute majority of the people who were in the bottom 20 percent [of income] in 1975 have also been in the top 20 percent at some time since then. Most Americans don't stay put in any income bracket. At different times, they are both “rich” and “poor” — as these terms are recklessly thrown around in the media. [...] There are of course some people who remain permanently in the bottom 20 percent. But such people constitute less than one percent of the American population, according to data published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in its 1995 annual report. Perhaps the intelligentsia and the politicians have been too busy waxing indignant to be bothered by anything so mundane as facts. [21]

According to Thomas A. Garrett, studies examining quintiles of wealth levels may provide a misleading picture. [71] For example, a US Treasury study of the period from 1996 to 2005 found that “[l]ess than half (40% or 43% depending on the measure) of those in the top 1 percent in 1996 were still in the top 1 percent in 2005. Only about 25 percent of the individuals in the top 1/100th percent in 1996 remained in the top 1/100th percent in 2005.” [268]

Other have not found individual mobility so fluid. A 2007 study (by Kopczuk, Saez and Song in 2007) found the top population in America “very stable” and “not mitigated the dramatic increase in annual earnings concentration since the 1970s.” [269]

Economist Paul Krugman , attacks conservatives for resorting to “extraordinary series of attempts at statistical distortion”. He argues that while in any given year, some of the people with low incomes will be “workers on temporary layoff, small businessmen taking writeoffs, farmers hit by bad weather”—the rise in their income in succeeding years is not the same 'mobility' as poor people rising to middle class or middle income rising to wealth. It's the mobility of “the guy who works in the college bookstore and has a real job by his early thirties.”

Studies by the Urban Institute and the US Treasury have both found that about half of the families who start in either the top or the bottom quintile of the income distribution are still there after a decade, and that only 3 to 6% rise from bottom to top or fall from top to bottom. [20]

On the issue of whether most Americans do not stay put in any one income bracket, Krugman quotes from 2011 CBO distribution of income study

Household income measured over a multi-year period is more equally distributed than income measured over one year, although only modestly so. Given the fairly substantial movement of households across income groups over time, it might seem that income measured over a number of years should be significantly more equally distributed than income measured over one year. However, much of the movement of households involves changes in income that are large enough to push households into different income groups but not large enough to greatly affect the overall distribution of income. Multi-year income measures also show the same pattern of increasing inequality over time as is observed in annual measures. [16]

In other words, “many people who have incomes greater than $1 million one year fall out of the category the next year — but that's typically because their income fell from, say, $1.05 million to 0.95 million, not because they went back to being middle class.” [16] [270]

Mobility between generations

Several studies have found the ability of children from poor or middle-class families to rise to upper income — known as “upward relative intergenerational mobility” — is lower in the US than in other developed countries [271] — and at least two economist have found lower mobility linked to income inequality. [23] [24]

The Great Gatsby Curve.png

In their “Great Gatsby” curve, [23] White House Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Alan B. Krueger and labor economist Miles Corak show a negative correlation between inequality and social mobility. The curve plotted “intergenerational income elasticity”—ie the likelihood that someone will inherit their parents' relative position of income level—and inequality for a number of countries. [24] [272]

In the words of journalist Timothy Noah

you can't really experience ever-growing income inequality without experiencing a decline in Horatio Alger -style upward mobility because (to use a frequently-employed metaphor) it's harder to climb a ladder when the rungs are farther apart. [24]

Aside from the proverbial distant rungs, the connection between income inequality and low mobility can be explained by the lack of access for un-affluent children to better (more expensive) schools and preparation for schools crucial to finding high-paying jobs; the lack of health care that may lead to obesity and diabetes and limit education and employment. [271]

Krueger estimates that “the persistence in the advantages and disadvantages of income passed from parents to the children” will “rise by about a quarter for the next generation as a result of the rise in inequality that the US has seen in the last 25 years.” [24]

Income at a glance

Median income levels
Households Persons, age 25 or older with earnings Household income by race
All households Dual earner
husholdningene
Per household
member
Males Females Both sexes Asian White,
non-hispanic
Hispanic Svart
$46,326 $67,348 $23,535 $39,403 $26,507 $32,140 $57,518 $48,977 $34,241 $30,134
Median personal income by educational attainment
Measure Some High School High school graduate Noen college Associate's degree Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Master's degree Professional degree Doctorate degree
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings $20,321 $26,505 $31,054 $35,009 $49,303 $43,143 $52,390 $82,473 $70,853
Male, age 25+ w/ earnings $24,192 $32,085 $39,150 $42,382 $60,493 $52,265 $67,123 $ 100,000 $78,324
Female, age 25+ w/ earnings $15,073 $21,117 $25,185 $29,510 $40,483 $36,532 $45,730 $66,055 $54,666
Persons, age 25+, employed full-time $25,039 $31,539 $37,135 $40,588 $56,078 $50,944 $61,273 $ 100,000 $79,401
Husholdningenes $22,718 $36,835 $45,854 $51,970 $73,446 $68,728 $78,541 $ 100,000 $96,830
Household income distribution
Bottom 10% Bottom 20% Bottom 25% Middle 33% Middle 20% Top 25% Top 20% Top 5% Top 1.5% Top 1%
$0 to $10,500 $0 to $18,500 $0 to $22,500 $30,000 to $62,500 $35,000 to $55,000 $77,500 and up $92,000 and up $167,000 and up $250,000 and up $350,000 and up
Source: US Census Bureau, 2006; income statistics for the year 2005

See also

Merknader

  1. ^ the US Department of Commerce , Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Internal Revenue Service
  2. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2001). Historical Income Tables – Income Equality.” . Archived from the original on 2007-02-08. Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  3. ^ “Weinberg, DH (June 1996). A Brief Look At Postwar US Income Inequality. US Census Bureau .” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  4. ^ “Burtless, G. (January 11, 200). Has US Income Inequality Really Increased?. The Brookings Institute .” . Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  5. ^ a b “Johnston, D. (March 29, 2007). Income Gap Is Widening, Data Shows. The New York Times . 2007-03-29. Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  6. ^ “Shaprio, E. (October 17, 2005). New IRS Data Show Income Inequality Is Again of The Rise. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities” . Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  7. ^ a b c Gilbert, Dennis (2002). American Class Structure in an Age of Growing Inequality . Wadsworth.
  8. ^ Beeghley, Leonard (2004). The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States . Boston, MD: Pearson, Allyn & Bacpn.
  9. ^ a b c Weeks, J. (2007). Inequality Trends in Some Developed OECD countries . In JKS & J. Baudot (Ed.), Flat World, Big Gaps (159–174). New York: ZED Books (published in association with the United Nations).
  10. ^ a b c d Income distribution – Inequality — OECD Stats
  11. ^ Can Domestic Policy Affect Income Distribution? Timothy Noah| tnr.com| 13 March 2012]
    • “Among the industrial democracies where income inequality is increasing, it's much worse in the United States than it is almost anywhere else. Among 34 nations recently surveyed by the OECD, the United States got beat only by Turkey, Mexico, and Chile. That's as measured by the Gini coefficient, and including taxes and government transfer payments.”
    • note: inequality is higher in less economically developed countries such as Turkey, Mexico, Chile, which are also members of the OECD
  12. ^ a b Growing Unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries (summary) OECD (2008)
  13. ^ The United States of Inequality, Entry 2: The Usual Suspects Are Innocent By Timothy Noah| slate.com| 6 September 2010
  14. ^ What's So Bad About Inequality? Timothy Noah| tnr.com| January 30, 2012
  15. ^ The United States of Inequality Entry 8: The Stinking Rich and the Great Divergence | By: Timothy Noah] Slate.com | 14 September 2010
  16. ^ a b c d e Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011.
  17. ^ More Bad News For The Middle Class by Timothy Noah| tnr.com| September 12, 2012
  18. ^ Stiglitz, JE (June 14, 2012) “We've been brainwashed” Salon
  19. ^ a b Daniel H. Cooper, Byron F. Lutz, and Michael G. Palumbo (September 22, 2011). “Quantifying the Role of Federal and State Taxes in Mitigating Income Inequality” . Federal Reserve, Boston, United States.
  20. ^ a b c d Krugman, Paul. “ The Rich, the Right, and the Facts: Deconstructing the Income Distribution Debate “prospect.org, December 19, 2001
  21. ^ a b c Sowell, Thomas. “ Perennial Economic Fallacies ,” Jewish World Review 07 February 2000, URL accessed 03 November 2011.
  22. ^ a b “CIA. (June 14, 2007). United States: Economy. World Factbook.” . Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  23. ^ a b c Here is the source for the “Great Gatsby Curve” in the Alan Krueger speech at the Center for American Progress on January 12
  24. ^ a b c d e f g h i White House: Here's Why You Have To Care About Inequality Timothy Noah | tnr.com| January 13, 2012
  25. ^ Chart was made using data initially published as Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez (2003), Quarterly Journal of Economics , 118(1), 2003, 1-39. Data (and updates) shown at http://inequality.org/income-inequality
  26. ^ Saez, E. & Piketty, T. (2003). Income inequality in the United States: 1913–1998. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 1–39.
  27. ^ “Saez, E. (October, 2007). Table A1: Top fractiles income shares (excluding capital gains) in the US, 1913–2005.” . Retrieved 2008-01-17.
  28. ^ Krugman, Paul (2007). The Conscience of a Liberal . New York: WW Norton. p.5
  29. ^ a b Noah, Timothy. “The United States of Inequality” . Slate . Retrieved 2011-03-20.
  30. ^ a b “Bartles, LM (February, 2004). Partisan Politics and the US Income Distribution. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  31. ^ Paul Krugman , The Conscience of a Liberal , p.47-52
  32. ^ “Johnston, D. (June 5, 2005). Richest Are Leaving Even the Richest Far Behind. The New York Times . Retrieved 2007-06-20.
  33. ^ immigration restrictions of the Immigration Act of 1924
  34. ^ Paul Krugman , The Conscience of a Liberal , p.49
  35. ^ “According to a wide range of scholarly research, unions have two main effects relevant to the Great Compression.” Paul Krugman , The Conscience of a Liberal , p.51
  36. ^ Paul Krugman , The Conscience of a Liberal , p.52, 64, 66
  37. ^ Productivity and real median family income growth, 1947-2011 . Chart comparing productivity growth and real median family income growth in the United States from 1947-2009. Source: EPI Authors' analysis of Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement Historical Income Tables, (Table F-5) and Bureau of Labor Statistics Productivity – Major Sector Productivity and Costs Database (2012)
  38. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. px
  39. ^ Saez & Piketty, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” .
  40. ^ a b c Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.xi
  41. ^ It's the Inequality, Stupid By Dave Gilson and Carolyn Perot in Mother Jones, March/April 2011 Issue
  42. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. Fig 2 & 3, Page 45.
  43. ^ “The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2008 and 2009″ . Congressional Budget Office, US Government. July 2012.
  44. ^ “Surveying the Aftermath of the Storm: Changes in Family Finances from 2007 to 2009″ . Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs. Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC p. 16.
  45. ^ Emmanuel Saez (March, 2012). “Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States” .
  46. ^ Income Inequality From Generation To Generation | forbes.com 3/26/2012| Robert Lenzner
  47. ^ a b “Aron-Dine, A. & Sherman, A. (January 23, 2007). New CBO Data Show Income Inequality Continues to Widen: After-tax-income for Top 1 Percent Rose by $146,000 in 2004.” . Retrieved 2007-11-24.
  48. ^ “Table F-1. Income Limits for Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families (All Races): 1947 to 2010″ . Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements . United States Census Bureau . Retrieved 2012-01-24. [median computed as the geometric mean of the 20th and 40th percentiles Lay summary].
  49. ^ Piketty, Thomas ; Saez, Emmanuel, Atkinson, AB; Piketty, Thomas, eds., Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-2002 , retrieved 2012-02-08
  50. ^ The differences between the Census and Internal Revenue Service Data can be seen most easily in the 95th percentile, present in both data sets. For more details see the Summary associated with { http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IncomeInequality7.svg Wikimedia Commons File:IncomeInequality7.svg}.
  51. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.ix
  52. ^ (payments from Social Security , unemployment insurance , SSI (Supplemental Security Income), AFDC , veterans benefits, etc., and in-kind benefits such as food stamps and housing assistance
  53. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.iii, ix
  54. ^ “Trends in the Distribution of House Income Between 1979 and 2007″ . Journalist's Resource.org.
  55. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. see p. ix-x, with definitions on ii-iii, and pages 10-12
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  60. ^ a gini index increase of 15% as opposed to CBO's increase in gini index of 33% (cbo “Trends in Distribution” study p.7)
  61. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.6-7
  62. ^ A 2010 census study showed the top 20 percent of Americans earned 49.4% of the nation's income, compared with the 3.4% earned by Americans living below the poverty line (roughly 15 percent of the population). This earnings ratio of 14.5 to 1 was an increase from the 13.6 to 1 ratio just two years earlier, and a significant rise from the historic low of 7.69 to 1 in 1968
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  66. ^ Hassett and Mathur: Consumption and the Myths of Inequality | BY KEVIN A. HASSETT AND APARNA MATHUR| online.wsj.com| October 24, 2012
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  70. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.2
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  72. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.4
  73. ^ a b c d Conservative Inequality Denialism | Timothy Noah| tnr.com| October 25, 2012
  74. ^ a b Wall Street Bolshevism, Part 3 | Timothy Noah| tnr.com| 5 October 2011 |]
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  80. ^ a b Adam Bee (February 2012). “Household Income Inequality Within US Counties: 2006–2010″ . Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce.
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  84. ^ EurLIFE – Gini index. Eurofound
  85. ^ a b c d e The Great Divergence By Timothy Noah
  86. ^ OECD Factbook 2011: Income inequality
  87. ^ “The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development (2010 Human Development Report – see Stat Tables)” . United Nations Development Program. 2011. pp. 152–156.
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  89. ^ “The World Factbook. Country Comparison :: Distribution of family income – Gini index” . CIA World Factbook.
  90. ^ Based on Income distribution – Inequality — OECD Stats , Chile (.526) Germany (.504) Israel (.498) Italy (.534) Mexico (.494) Portugal (.521) Turkey (.409), have higher gini index than the US (.486) for the “late 2000s” before taxes and transfers.
  91. ^ Based on Income distribution – Inequality — OECD Stats , only Chile (.494) Mexico (.476) and Turkey (.409) have higher gini index than the US (.378) after taxes and transfers for the “late 2000s”.
  92. ^ Inequality and taxes: Equality doesn't always mean redistribution | The Economist
  93. ^ For example, Ingvar Kamprad 's family is one of the richest in the world (by some accounts with wealth between 50 and 90 billion US dollars. but because of offshore arrangements the family's wealth and income never shows up in Swedish statistics. (see: “Who's really the world's richest?” CNNMoney.com, April 6, 2004)
  94. ^ Peter Baldwin (2009). The narcissism of minor differences: how America and Europe are alike. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-539120-6
  95. ^ Tax evasion is a national pastime afflicting southern Europe . CNN . November 02, 2011
  96. ^ Low-Income Italians Own An Awful Lot Of Supercars, Private Jets And Yachts . Business Insider . January 12, 2012
  97. ^ Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from US Tax Return Data. Jon Bakija, Adam Cole, Bradley T. Heim. November, 2010
  98. ^ The Top 1 Percent – What Jobs Do They Have? . New York Times January 14, 2012
  99. ^ Among the Wealthiest 1 Percent, Many Variations . The New York Times . January 14, 2012
  100. ^ a b c d e f “Stoops, N. (June, 2004). Educational Attainment in the United States: 2003. US Census Bureau .” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-06-21.
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  102. ^ a b “US Census Bureau. (2006). People 18 Years Old and Over, by Total Money Earnings in 2005, Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  103. ^ a b Schaeffer, Richard (2005). Racial and Ethnic Groups . New York, NY: Prentice Hall. 013192897X.
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  105. ^ The Truth About the Pay Gap: Feminist politics and bad economics – Reason Magazine
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  107. ^ Hine, Darlene; William C. Hine, Stanley Harrold (2006). The African American Odyssey . Boston, MA: Pearson. 0-12-182217-3.
  108. ^ “People 18 Years Old and Over, by Total Money Income in 2005, Work Experience in 2005, Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  109. ^ Asian-American Parenting and Academic Success . Miller-McCune . December 13, 2010
  110. ^ US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Highlights of Women's Earnings in 2009. Report 1025, June 2010.
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  112. ^ Historical summary of faculty, students, degrees, and finances in degree-granting institutions: Selected years, 1869–70 through 2005–06
  113. ^ Degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions, by level of degree and sex of student: Selected years, 1869–70 through 2016–17
  114. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Income distribution among Asian males, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
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  116. ^ a b “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution among Asian males, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  117. ^ Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Trends in Poverty and Inequality among Hispanics , June 2011
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  119. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for white males, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  120. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for white females, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  121. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for whites, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  122. ^ a b “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for Black males, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  123. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for Blacks, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  124. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for Asian females, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  125. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for Asians, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  126. ^ “US Census Bureau. (2006). Personal income distribution for Hispanic males, age 25+ according to educational attainment.” . Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  127. ^ Princeton University WordNet : (n) progressive tax (any tax in which the rate increases as the amount subject to taxation increases)
  128. ^ Sommerfeld, Ray M., Silvia A. Madeo, Kenneth E. Anderson, Betty R. Jackson (1992), Concepts of Taxation , Dryden Press: Fort Worth, TX
  129. ^ Growing Unequal?: Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries , OECD Publishing, ISBN 978-92-64-04418-0 , 2008, pgs. 103, 104.
  130. ^ Cathrine Dodge; Mike Dorning (12 September 2012). “Rich-Poor Gap Widens to Most Since 1967 as Income Falls” . Bloomberg . Retrieved 6 November 2012.
  131. ^ 33% increase in gini index rating
  132. ^ a b Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.20 and figure 12. “Between 1979 and 2007, the Gini index for market income increased by 23 percent, the index for market income after transfers increased by 29 percent, and the index for income measured after transfers and federal taxes increased by 33 percent.”
  133. ^ a b c Paul Ryan: Inequality, Take Two | Timothy Noah |tnr.com| November 18, 2011
  134. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.12-13 and table 1
  135. ^ written in in a clients-only July 2011 JPMorgan Chase newsletter obtained by Washington Post columnist Harold Meyerson An economic recovery that leaves workers further behind Harold Meyerson| April 10, 2012
  136. ^ Brooks Brothers Bolshevism Timothy Noah| tnr.com September 14, 2011
  137. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.13
  138. ^ Inequality in America. The rich, the poor and the growing gap between them June 15, 2006
  139. ^ a b c d e f Krugman, Paul (October 20, 2002). “For Richer” . The New York Times .
  140. ^ the superstar hypothesis was coined by the Chicago economist Sherwin Rosen ) used the example of the passing of the hundreds of comedians that made a modest living at live shows in the borscht belt and other places in bygone days that have been replaced by a handful of superstar TV comedians.
  141. ^ estimate by economist George Borjas , quoted in Conscience of a Liberal , p.34
  142. ^ The United States of Inequality. Entry 3 : By Timothy Noah| 7 September 2010, Did the post-1965 immigration surge cause the Great Divergence?
  143. ^ such as political scientists Jacob S. Hacker , Paul Pierson , Larry Bartels and Nathan Kelly, and economist Timothy Smeeding
  144. ^ American politics, Democracy in America Winner-Take-All Politics . It's a pretty good book. economist.com Democracy in America. 21 September 2010]
  145. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.39, Figure 3
  146. ^ a b Bartels, LM (2008). Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  147. ^ Krugman, P. (2007). The conscience of a liberal . New York: WW Norton.
  148. ^ Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson (2011) Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington made the rich richer — and turned its back on the middle class.
  149. ^ Dictionary of economics online
  150. ^ Economic Report of the President 1997 mentions “colloquium on this topic at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York” (1995?)
  151. ^ Experts' Consensus on Earnings Inequality . Economic Report of the President 1997
  152. ^ a b “New York Times. (June 7, 2007). The Rewards of Education” . The New York Times . 2007-06-09. Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  153. ^ CNN-Travis Waldon-Only Advanced Degree Holders Saw Wage Gains in the Past Decade
  154. ^ a b The United States of Inequality Entry 4: Did Computers Create Inequality?| By Timothy Noah| 8 September 2010
  155. ^ a b c d e f g The United States of Inequality. Entry 9: How the Decline in K-12 Education Enriches College Graduates| By: Timothy Noah Slate.com | 15 September 2010
  156. ^ a b The United States of Inequality Entry 7: Trade Didn't Create Inequality, and Then It Did| By Timothy Noah| 14 September 2010
  157. ^ TRADE AND WAGES, RECONSIDERED | Paul Krugman| February 2008]
  158. ^ Tax Rates, Inequality and the 1% By ALAN REYNOLDS 6 December 2011
  159. ^ Alan Reynolds Vs. Inequality | Timothy Noah | December 6, 2011
  160. ^ Intellectual Garbage Collection: The Unreliability of Alan Reynolds
  161. ^ Reynolds, Alan. Income and Wealth. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006. 108. Print.
  162. ^ Alan J Auerbach, “Who Bears the Corporate Tax?” NBER Working Paper 11686 (October 2005), p. 4
  163. ^ Arthur B. Kennickell, “A Rolling Tide: changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the US, 1989-2001” (Federal Reserve Board, September 2003), tables 10 and 11.
  164. ^ Economic Report of the President (2005), table B-29.
  165. ^ a b c d e Noah, Timothy. “Can We Blame Income Inequality on Republicans” in the multi-part series “The United States of Inequality.” Slate , Sept. 9, 2010.
  166. ^ Kelly, NJ (2009). The Politics of Income Inequality in the United States . New York: Cambridge University Press.
  167. ^ which encompassed most of the egalitarian Great Compression and the entire inegalitarian Great Divergence (up until the time he did his research) and published his findings in the book Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton University Press: 2008)
  168. ^ chart of Income Growth Rates 1948-2005 under Democratic presidents and under Republican presidents. Graphics by Catherine Mulbrandon
  169. ^ More compensation heading to the very top: 1965-2009 . May 16, 2011.
  170. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.7
  171. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.115, 219, 228
  172. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.66
  173. ^ More compensation heading for the very top EPI 2010
  174. ^ Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal , WW Norton & Company, 2007, p.143-44
  175. ^ Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation By Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried]
  176. ^ Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal , 2007, p.145
  177. ^ a b c “The Broken Contract”, By George Packer, Foreign Affairs , November/December 2011
  178. ^ UNION MEMBERS IN 2007 US Bureau of Labor Statistics. January 25, 2008
  179. ^ Unions and wage inequality | David Card, Thomas Lemieux and W. Craig Riddell| Journal of Labor Research Volume 25, Number 4, 519-559, doi : 10.1007/s12122-004-1011-z
  180. ^ a b c d The United States of Inequality, Entry 6: The Great Divergence and the death of organized labor. By Timothy Noah| slate.com| 12 September 2010
  181. ^ UNIONISM AND THE DISPERSION OF WAGES by RICHARD B. FREEMAN, National Bureau of Economic Research 1980
  182. ^ The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the US Labor Market | David Card| Industrial and Labor Relations Review , Vol. 54, No. 2. (Jan., 2001), pp. 296-315.
  183. ^ Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America Frank Levy and Peter Temin] Revised June 27, 2007
  184. ^ New CBO Data Show Income Inequality Continues to Widen After-Tax-Income for Top 1 Percent Rose by $146,000 in 2004 | By Aviva Aron-Dine and Arloc Sherman| cbpp.org| January 23, 2007
  185. ^ How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, p.23
  186. ^ Silliman, BR (2008). Will the next president reform the tax code? A historical examination. The CPA Journal, 78(11), 23-27. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com
  187. ^ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec11/makingsense_12-12.html
  188. ^ “The Hidden Entitlements” . CTJ .
  189. ^ Kocieniewski, David (2012-01-18). “Since 1980s, the Kindest of Tax Cuts for the Rich” . New York Times . Retrieved 2012-01-21.
  190. ^ Dickinson, Tom (2011-11-09). “How the GOP Became the Party of the Rich” . Rolling Stone . Retrieved 2012-01-02.
  191. ^ “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007 (p.13) Table 2. Federal Tax Rates by Income Group from 1960
  192. ^ a b c Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” . Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007
  193. ^ “Even after exploiting all possible deductions and credits, the typical high-income taxpayer during the Great Prosperity paid a federal tax of well over 50 percent of his earnings.” Clinton Administration Secretary of labor Robert Reich In his book Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future
  194. ^ Krugman, Paul (1995). Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations . New York: WW Norton & Company. p. 155. ISBN 978-0-393-31292-8 . Retrieved 2-03-12.
  195. ^ “FactChecking Obama's Budget Speech” . FactCheck.org . 2011-04-15. Retrieved 2011-01-04.
  196. ^ Thomas L. Hungerford “Changes in the Distribution of Income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy.” Congressional Research Service, Dec. 29, 2011. http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/crs-1.pdf
  197. ^ As an alternative to the Census Bureau's estimate of the Gini index, a Gini index based on Adjusted Gross Income from IRS Tax Returns can be computed. In 1990, the IRS AGI Gini was 0.529 and increased to 0.584 by 2008.
  198. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.15 and figure 8
  199. ^ a b Winner-Take-All Politics (book) by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson p.75
  200. ^ a b “CBO Report Shows Rich Got Richer, As Did Most Americans: View” . businessweek.com. October 31, 2011.
  201. ^ a b c Oligarchy, American Style By PAUL KRUGMAN . 3 November 2011
  202. ^ a b c d The United States of Inequality, Entry 10: Why We Can't Ignore Growing Income Inequality By: Timothy Noah. slate.com| 16 September 2010
  203. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman
  204. ^ Investment Outlook | October 2011 |Six Pac(k)in'
  205. ^ Wall Street Bolshies Watch Timothy Noah| tnr.com| October 3, 2011
  206. ^ a b Two Americas: One Rich, One Poor? Understanding Income Inequality in the United States By Rea Hederman, Jr. and Robert Rector| Heritage Foundation. August 24, 2004]
  207. ^ A Look at the Global One Percent By ALLAN H. MELTZER| wsj.com| 9 March 2012
  208. ^ US Income Inequality: It's Not So Bad By Thomas A. Garrett| Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis| Spring 2010
  209. ^ “Thinking Clearly About Economic Inequality” , Will Wilkinson, Cato Institute 2009
  210. ^ Johnson, Smeeding, Tory, “Economic Inequality” in Monthly Labor review of April 2005, table 3.
  211. ^ see also Hassett and Mathur: Consumption and the Myths of Inequality | BY KEVIN A. HASSETT AND APARNA MATHUR| online.wsj.com| October 24, 2012
  212. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.5
  213. ^ The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in The US, 1980-2010 |Orazio Attanasio| Erik Hurst| Luigi Pistaferri| National Bureau of Economic Research| NBER Working Papers #17982| Apr 2012
  214. ^ The Way Forward | By Daniel Alpert, Westwood Capital; Robert Hockett, Professor of Law, Cornell University; and Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics, New York University| New America Foundation| October 10, 2011
  215. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman (see last chart: Inequality and household debt)
  216. ^ Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience Elizabeth Warren*
  217. ^ Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal , WW Norton & Company, 2007, (p.246-7)
  218. ^ a b Why Obama's New Populism May Sink His Campaign William Galston | tnr.com| 17 December 2011]
  219. ^ Why the President's Campaign Shouldn't Focus on Inequality William Galston| tnr.com| 3 May 2012| accessed 5 May 2012
  220. ^ NBC/WSJ: Americans prefer message focused on fairness over anti-government or inequality argument by Jed Lewison dailykos.com 20 April 2012
  221. ^ conducted Dec. 7-11 among 1,521 adults
  222. ^ Tax System Seen as Unfair, in Need of Overhaul, Wealthy Not Paying Fair Share Top Complaint pewresearch.org 20 December 2011]
  223. ^ Survey Finds Rising Perception of Class Tension | By SABRINA TAVERNISE| 11 January 2012
  224. ^ Rising Share of Americans See Conflict Between Rich and Poor by Rich Morin| 11 January 2012
  225. ^ Lars Osberg and Timothy Smeeding. “Fair Inequality? Attitudes Toward Pay Dfferentials: The United States in Comparative Perspective, ” American Sociological Review, 71, 2006, pp. 450 – 473.
  226. ^ Norton, MI, & Ariely , D., “Building a Better America – One Wealth Quintile at a Time” , Perspectives on Psychological Science , January 2011 6: 9-12
  227. ^ Joseph E. Stiglitz (2012) The Price of Inequality. New York: WWNorton
  228. ^ Based on Larry Bartels's study Economic Inequality and Political Representation , Table 1: Differential Responsiveness of Senators to Constituency Opinion.
  229. ^ Richistan: A Journey Through the American Wealth Boom and the Lives of the New Rich … By Robert Frank
  230. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 92). Norton. Kindle Edition.
  231. ^ Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1% | vanityfair.com| May 2010
  232. ^ A study confined to non-Hispanic whites in US and England also showed the effect. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.177)
  233. ^ Countries of similar cultures and different levels of equality — Spain and Portugal — showed difference in the index, while countries with very different cultures and ways of achieving equality — Nordic countries and Japan — charted closer to each other. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.183)
  234. ^ The effect was worse among low class/education level in high inequality countries, but continued through all occupational classes and was still significant among the highest. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.178-9)
  235. ^ Statistics and graphs from Wilkinson and Pickett research.
  236. ^ The Spirit Level: how 'ideas wreckers' turned book into political punchbag | Robert Booth| The Guardian| 13 August 2010
  237. ^ a b The Wrong Inequality By David Brooks | nyt.com |31 October 2011.
  238. ^ see also The White Underclass By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF| 8 February 2012
  239. ^ Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976. 33. Print.
  240. ^ a b Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960. 231. Print.
  241. ^ Paul Ryan on Income Inequality and Upward Mobility Diane Ellis, Ed. · 28 November 2011
  242. ^ Three Cheers for Income Inequality
  243. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 85). Norton. Kindle Edition. See also: Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes, “Do the Rich Save More?,” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 2 (2004): 397– 444.
  244. ^ More or Less | Branko Milanovic| Finance & Development | September 2011| Vol. 48, No. 3
  245. ^ Kenworthy, Lane (December 3, 2007). “Does More Equality Mean Less Economic Growth?” .
  246. ^ Does inequality prevent economic growth? | By Jared Bernstein, On the Economy| 1 October 2012
  247. ^ Corley-Coulibaly, Marva; Prasadm, Naren ; Sekerler Richiardi, Pelin (October 2011). “Tax reform for improving job recovery and equity” . World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 97–120. doi : 10.1002/wow3.28 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  248. ^ Escudero, Verónica; López Mourelo, Elva (2012). “Chapter 3, Fiscal consolidation and employment growth” . In Torres, Raymond (ed.). World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 59–80. ISBN 978-92-9251-010-7 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  249. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph (July 2, 2012). Interview with Ben Chu. “Stiglitz: the full transcript” . The Independent . Retrieved September 8, 2012.
  250. ^ Income Mobility in the US from 1996 to 2005. Report of the DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. November 13, 2007. p.4. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/incomemobilitystudy03-08revise.pdf
  251. ^ Uncovering the American Dream: Inequality and Mobility in Social Security Earnings Data since 1937 Wojciech Kopczuk, Emmanuel Saez, Jae Song, September 15, 2007, Figure 4B
  252. ^ Millionaire For A Day Paul Krugman. 3 November 2011,
  253. ^ a b Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs | By JASON DePARLE | January 4, 2012 ]
  254. ^ Corak graphs 25 countries, Krueger limits his to developed countries and lists 10

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