미국의 소득 불평등에 위키 보고서

미국의 소득 불평등

위키 백과 - 우리 모두의 백과 사전

배포 소득 에서 미국 학자들과 기관의 연구의 대상이되고있다. 소스에서 데이터 [1] 소득 불평등은 이후 크게 성장했음을 나타냅니다 1970 년대 초 , [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]안정성의 수십 년 . [7] [8] 동안 불평등 대부분의 사이에서 증가가 개발 도상국, 특히 사람을 영어, 그것은 미국에서 가장 높다. [9] [10] [11]

연구는 (때로는라는 괴리의 원인을 표시하는 것은 중대한 발산 )되지 않았습니다 성 불평등 , 지난 몇 년 동안 미국에서 감소했다, [12]흑인과 백인 미국인 사이의 불평등 그 시간 동안 정체하고있다, , [13] 도하고 가난하고 중산층 사이의 격차가 주요 IT가 성장 원인 -하지만. [14] 성장의 대부분은 격차가 더 하나 더 극단적되고있는 중산층과 상위 소득자 사이에있다 소득 분배에갑니다. [15]

에 의해 2011 년 연구 CBO [16] 가구의 1 %를 적립 위쪽이 60 %에 대한 바로 아래 40 %의 이득에 비해, 1979 년과 2007 년 사이의 기간 동안 연방 정부의 세금 및 수입 전송 후 275 % 상승 것을 발견 미국의 소득 분포의 중간. [16] 다른 소스 추세는 그 이후로 계속 것을 찾을 수 있습니다. [17] 그러나, 미국인의 단지 42 %는 불평등은 지난 10 년 동안 증가하고있다 생각합니다. [18] 소득 불평등 사이에 균일하지 미국,로 측정 한 지니 계수 : 2009 년 세금 소득 불평등은 텍사스에서 가장 큰 및 낮은했다 후 메인 . [19]

학자들과 다른 사람들이 원인, 솔루션 및 추세의 중요성에 대해 다른, [20] [21] 2011 년에 점화 도움이되는 "점령"항의 운동을 . 교육과 숙련 된 노동력에 대한 수요 증가는 종종 원인으로들 수있다, [22] 일부는 공공 정책의 중요성을 강조했다, 다른 사람은 불평등의 증가의 원인 (들)이 잘 이해되지 않습니다 생각합니다. [16] 불평등이 모두 같은 관련이없는 기술되었다 경제적 기회 (또는 얼굴의 사회적 이동성 미국), 그 기회의 감소의 원인으로. [23] [24]

역사

1913-2008 미국의 불평등 [25] .

1917 년과 2005 년 사이에, 상위 1 %, 최고 0.1 %와 최고 0.01 %로 수신 세전 가구 소득의 몫. [26] [27]

미국에서 소득의 농도의 수준은 그 역사를 통해 일정하지 않았다. 소득 통계를 사용할되기 시작하면 초기 20 세기에 다시 가서, 노벨상 수상자 경제학자의 말에 "다시 상대 평등과"하이 불평등에서 "큰 경제적 아크"가 있었다 폴 크루그먼 . [28] 1915 년, 한 시대 록펠러Carnegies은 미국의 산업 지배는, 미국의 가장 부유 한 1 %는 전체 소득의 약 18 %를 받았다. 2007 년, 모든 소득의 24 %에 대한 상위 1 % 계정. [29] 사이에서 그들의 점유율은 년간 10 % 이하로 떨어졌다.

불평등의 첫 번째 시대는 포스트 남북 전쟁 시대 ( "에서 대략 지속 도금 시대 언젠가 약 1937 "). 그러나 약 1937 "라는 별명을 갖고 1947-기간에 좋은 압축 " [30] 미국의 소득 불평등이 크게 떨어졌다. 매우 진보적 인 뉴딜 세무, 노동 조합의 강화 및 규제 국립 전쟁 노동위원회 차 세계 대전 동안은 가난하고 노동자 계급의 소득을 올리고 최고 소득자의를 하향 조정했다. [31] 상대적이 "중간 계급 사회" 불평등의 낮은 수준은 1970 년대 초에 끝나는 약 3 년 동안 상당히 안정 유지, [7] [30] [32] 미국에 대한 상대적으로 높은 임금의 제품 노동 계급 과 소득 평준화 정부 정책에 대한 정치적 지원.

임금 때문에 미국의 저 숙련 이주 노동자의 제조, 부족, 외국 경쟁의 부족으로 상대적으로 높은 유지 [33] 틀림없이 가장 중요한 - - 강력한 노동 조합 일반적으로 미국 노동자를위한 경쟁합니다. 1947 비농업 근로자 3 분의 1 이상의 조합원했다, [34] 와 노동 조합은 조합원의 평균 임금을 인상하고, 간접적으로 낮은 정도, 노동 조합에 의해 표현되지 유사한 직종 근로자의 임금을 올려 둘. [35 ] 학자들은 정부의 정책 동점 골에 대한 정치적지지가 노동 조합의 투표 드라이브, 그렇지 않으면 보수의 지원에서 높은 투표율에 의해 제공되었다 생각 사우스 대규모 동원과의 승리하는 뉴딜, 그리고 명성 차 세계 대전이 정부를 부여했다. [ 36]

에 반환 높은 불평등 또는 어떤 크루그먼과 기자 티모시 노아 "로 언급 한 위대한 발산 " [29] - 시작 1970 년대에.

지난 삼십오년을 통해 생산성 향상의 혜택이 중산층에 갔다하지 않은 [37]

연구는 소득의 경제 침체기를 제외하고 거의 지속적으로 불평등 한 성장 발견 1,990에서 91 사이 (2001 년 닷컴 거품 )과 2007 서브 프라임 흉상 . [38] [39]

위대한 발산은 사전 대공황 시대의 불평등에서 몇 가지 방법으로 다릅니다. 1937 전에 최고 소득자의 소득의 큰 몫 자본 (이자, 배당, 임대, 양도 소득)에서왔다. 포스트 1970, 고소득 납세자의 소득이 "노동", 즉 고용 보상에서 주로 온다. [40]

중산층 소득의 정체가 있었지만 2011 년까지, 위대한 발산는 미국의 주요 정치 문제되지 않았다. 2009 년 버락 오바마 행정부는 백악관 중산층 작동 가족 태스크 포스는 특히 중간 소득 미국인에 영향을 미치는 경제 문제에 초점을 소집. 2011 년, 점령 운동은 국가의 소득 불평등에 상당한 관심을 끌었다.

가장 최근의 통계

1992 년부터 2007 년까지 미국에서 최고 400 소득자 소득 392 % 증가보고의 평균 세율은 37 % 감소했습니다. [41] 미국은 연방 정부 이후 (미국 가구의 상위 1 %로가는 총 소득의 비중 세금 및 소득 전송)이 2007 년에 20.9 %로 1979 년 11.3 %에서 증가했다. [42] 동안 위대한 경기 침체 2007-2009, 불평등은 총 소득이 11.6 %로 감소 미국인의 하단 99 %에 가고 있지만, 떨어지는, 감소 상위 1 %를 (36.3 %) 빨리. [43] [44] 그러나 소득 격차는 소득과 자본 이득의 11.6 %를 캡처 소득자의 상위 1 %로, 2009 년에서 2010 년까지 복구 중에 다시 증가하고, 수입 다른 99 %는 0.2 %로 성장, 보합세. [45] [46]

측량

지표

인플레이션은 상위 1 %를 1979 년과 2005 년 사이에 세후 가계 소득의 증가를 조정하고 다섯 분위의 네. [47]

이 그래프는 2010 달러 1947년부터 2010년까지 주​​어진 백분위의 소득을 보여줍니다. 오른쪽 여백의 숫자의 2 열은 누적 성장 1970년부터 2010년까지 그 기간 동안 연간 성장률이다. 세로 크기는 일정 비율의 성장이 직선으로 표시하게하는, 로그입니다. 1947 년에서 1970 년까지 모든 백분위 수는 본질적으로 같은 비율로 증가, 그 동안의 다른 백분위의 빛, 직선 모두 같은 경사가있다. 그 이후로, 서로 다른 속도로 성장하고 소득 분배의 다른 백분위와 상당한 차이가 있었다. 평균 미국 가정의 경우,이 격차는 연간 39,000달러 (하루에 단지 100 달러 이상) : 그것은 1947년에서 1970년까지되면서이 기간 동안 경제 성장이 광범위하게 공유 되었다면, 평균 가계 소득이 높은 연간 39,000달러이었을 것입니다 그것은 2010 년보다. 이 음모는 미국 인구 조사국의 데이터를 결합하여 만든 [48] 미국 국세청을. [49] 이 두 소스 사이에 체계적인 차이가 있지만 그 차이는이 음모의 규모에 작은 기준으로합니다. [50]

미국이 다수의 연구 상무부 , 의회 예산 국 (CBO), 그리고 국세청은 가장 일반적으로 측정 - 미국의 소득 분배는 것을 발견했다 가정 또는 개인 - 1970 년대 이후 점점 더 불평등이되고있다 .

미국의 소득 불평등의 변화에 대한 가장 최근의 포괄적 인 연구 중 하나는에 의해 2011 년 연구했다 의회 예산 국 (CBO) - "1979 년과 2007 년 사이에 가구 소득의 분배 동향". (그들은 모두 경기 침체를 앞에 그래서 모두가 "유사한 전반적인 경제 활동"기간 이었기 때문에 그것은 그 이년 선택 [51] ). 이 보고서는 실제 가구 소득이 연방 세금과 후 정부의 전송을 포함하여 (에서 지급 한 것으로 나타났습니다 사회 보장 , 실업 보험[52] [53] ) 62 % 증가했다.

그러나, 근로자의 상위 1 퍼센트 가구의 소득은 가구의 바닥 다섯 번째에, 다음 60 %, 다음 19 %에 대한 65 %에 비해 275 % 나 18 % 바로 아래 40 % 증가했다. 공유를받은 반면, "그 고르지 소득 증가의 결과로,"이 보고서는, "더 이상 1979 년과 2007 년 사이에 두 배로 가장 높은 소득 가구에 인구의 1 %에 의해 수신 된 총 세후 소득의 점유율을 기록 낮은과 중간 소득 가구가 감소하여 ... 상위 1 %로받은 소득의 비중은 2007 년 17 % 이상으로 1979 년 8 %에서 증가했다. 최고 소득에서 가구의 다른 19 %에서 수신 점유율 분위 (소득으로 나눈 값으로 인구의 5 분의 1)이 36 %로 35 %에서 최대 테두리, 같은 기간에 비해 상당히 평평. " [54]

CBO에 따르면, [55] 세후 소득의 불평등 한 분포에서 관찰 된 상승의 주요 이유는 시장 소득의 증가했다, 그 세금 및 전송하기 전에 가구 소득입니다. 가구를위한 시장 소득 (예 : 자신의 소유자가 단독으로 운영하는 기업과 농장에서 소득) 사업 소득, 자본 이득 (이익 (예 : 현금 임금, 고용주가 지급 혜택을 고용주가 지불 급여세 등) 근로 소득의 조합입니다 자산 스톡 옵션), 자본 등의 예금, 배당, 임대 소득)에서 그와 같은 소득 (기타 소득의 판매에서 실현. 이들 중, 자본 이득은 2000에서 2007 사이 기간에, 상위 20 %의 가구의 시장 소득의 증가의 80 %를 차지했다. 심지어 1991에서 2000 사이 기간 동안, CBO에 따르면, 자본 이득은 상위 20 % 가구의 시장 소득의 45 %를 차지했다.

소득 분포를 분석하는 국세청 소득 자료의 사용에 개척자는 엠마누엘 사 에즈토마스 피케 티경제 파리 학교 상위 1 %의지지 소득의 비중이 1928 년으로 2005 년 큰 것으로 나타났다. [5] 다른 근원 그 증가 된 불평등 포함 경제학자 언급 한 자넷 Yellen 언급, "[실제 소득] 성장이 크게 상위 1 %가, 즉, 상단의 바로 팁에 집중했다." [56]

: 경제학자 티모시 Smeeding는 현재의 추세로 요약 [57]

미국인들은 풍부한 세계에서 가장 높은 소득 불평등이 지난 20~30년에 미국인은 풍부한 국가 중 소득 불평등에 가장 큰 증가를 경험했다. 보다 상세한 본 변화를 관찰하기 위해 사용할 수있는 데이터가 더 기울어 변경 될 것으로 보인다 ... 큰 이익의 대부분이 분포의 위쪽에 참이다.

미국 인구 의 소득 측정의 불평등에 대한 국의 연구 두 가구 [58] 개인. [59] 그들의 숫자는 불평등의 낮은 수준을 보여 [60] 그러나 소득 분배 변화의 대부분이 가장 높은 소득 가구에 대한 데이터를 포함하지 않는다 가 발생했습니다. [20] [61] [62] [63]

데이터 전체 이득 퍼센트 증가 2003 2000 1997 1994 1991 1988 1985 1982 1979 1976 1973 1970 1967
20 백분위 수 3,982달러 28.4 % 17,984달러 1만9천1백42달러 1만7천6백1달러 1만6천4백84달러 16,580달러 1만7천6달러 16,306달러 15,548달러 1만6천4백57달러 1만5천6백15달러 1만5천8백44달러 15,126달러 1만4천2달러
중간 (50) 9,980달러 29.9 % 4만3천3백18달러 44,853달러 42,294달러 3만9천6백13달러 3만9천6백79달러 4만6백78달러 3만8천5백10달러 3만6천8백11달러 38,649달러 3만6천1백55달러 3만7천7백달러 3만5천8백32달러 33,338달러
80 백분위 수 3만1천6백2달러 57.2 % 86,867달러 8만7천3백41달러 8만1천7백19달러 77,154달러 74,759달러 7만5천5백93달러 7만1천4백33달러 6만6천9백20달러 68,318달러 6만3천2백47달러 6만4천5백달러 60,148달러 5만5천2백65달러
95 % 6만5천4백42달러 73.8 % 154,120달러 155,121달러 14만4천6백36달러 13만4천8백35달러 12만6천9백69달러 12만7천9백58달러 119,459달러 111,516달러 111,445달러 100,839달러 10만2천2백43달러 9만5천90달러 8만8천6백78달러
SOURCE : 미국 센서스 국, 2004 [64] (페이지 45분의 44)

인구 문제

시간이 지남에 따라 소득의 비교는 평균 연령의 변화, 가족 크기, 생계의 수, 인구의 다른 특성을 조정해야합니다. 측정 개인 소득은 부양 자녀를 무시하지만 가계 소득도 문제 - 10의 가정이 낮은이가 생활의 표준 2 세대의 소득이 동일 할 수 있지만, 두 사람의 하나 이상을. [65]

사람들의 소득은 자신의 작업 수명에 상승하는 경향이있다, 그래서 "소득 불평등의 스냅 샷 조치가 오해의 소지가있을 수 있습니다." [66] 최근 대학 졸업생의 불평등과 그 / 그녀의 경력의 절정에서 55 세의는 아니다 졸업이 같은 경력 경로가있는 경우 발행.

보수적 연구자와 기업은 소득 불평등이 성장 과도한되고 또는 사회 문제를 포즈라고 주장을 반박하기 위해 생활 수준에 대한 척도로서 가구 소득의 결함에 초점을 맞추고있다. [67] 사회 학자 데니스 길버트에 따르면, 성장 불평등 여성 인력의 참여 증가에 의해 부분적으로 설명 될 수있다. 높은 소득 가구는 맞벌이 가구가 될 가능성이있다, [7] 그리고 별 소득 분위 데이터의 2004 년 분석에 따르면 헤리티지 재단 , 불평등은 가구 소득이 가구의 크기에 따라 조정 때 덜됩니다. 숫자는 가구 크기를 반영하여 조정하는 경우 상위 분위 (상위 20 %의 소득)에 의해 개최 소득의 총 점유율은 20.3 %로 감소한다. [68]

퓨 리서치 센터는 더 이상 자신의 주택을 감당할 수있는 사람들이 점점 더 소득자와 큰 가구를 만드는, 친척로 이동 되었기 때문에 가계 소득이 21 세기에 개인 소득보다 감소 할 것으로 나타났다 발견 그러나 그들. [69]

그 분위 사람들의 동일한 수,없는 가구의 동등한 수를 포함하도록 2011 CBO의 연구는이 문서에 언급 된 "가구 소득의 분배에있는 동향은"가구 크기 조정합니다. [70]

근로자 가구 소득 상승으로 높거나 낮은 분위로 이동하거나 년 동안 떨어지는 빈도의 문제를 보면, [71] CBO는 연간 소득보다 "겸손"더 평등 멀티 년 동안 소득 분배를 발견했다. [ 72] CBO의 연구는 이전 연구를 확인한다. [47]

전반적으로, 티모시 노아에 따르면, 인구 통계 학적 요인을 보정 (오늘날의 인구는 33 년 전보다 나이이며, 이혼 한 부모는 가구가 작게 한), 표준 측정에 의해 도시보다 그래도 덜 극단적 인 소득 불평등을 찾아 또한 빠른 표준 측정에 의해 도시보다 성장하고있다. [73]

임금 불평등

자넷 L. Yellen에 따르면, 사장 겸 CEO, 샌프란시스코의 연방 준비 은행,

... 90 번째 백분위 수 - 대부분의 사람들이 30 %이 상위 10 % 사이에서 ... 더 의한 대학 또는 학위 - 장미를 가지고있는 사람들의 실제 시간당 임금은, 성장은 크게, 즉, 상단의 매우 끝에서 농축 상위 1 %입니다. 이 스포츠와 엔터테인먼트 별, 투자 은행과 벤처 캐피탈, 기업 변호사, 그리고 경영자처럼 미국 경제에 매우 높은 급여를 적립 사람들을 포함한다. 대조적으로, 50 번째 백분위 수에 아래 - 여기서 많은 사람들은 5~10% 상승 대부분의 고등학교 졸업장 - 실질 임금에이 - [56]

리사 Shalett 메릴린치 자산 관리는 사실에도 불구하고, 미국의 실제 평균 시간당 수입이 "1970 년에 노동자에 의해 달성 된 것과 거의 같은 수준으로 현재의 인플레 조정 된 임금의 동일시로, 아래로 본질적으로 평면이다"고 발견 "지난 수십 년간, 특히 현재 기간에 대해"생산성 "급등"하고있다. 이주기 동안 생산성의 장점은 "기업과 그들의 매우 최고 경영진에 거의 독점적으로."갔다 [74]

지니 지수

추가 정보 : 지니 계수

지니 계수는 하나의 숫자에 소득 불평등을 요약하고 소득 불평등의 가장 일반적으로 사용되는 방법 중 하나입니다. 그것은 0-1 스케일을 사용 - 숫자보다 높은 부등식. 0은 완전한 평등 (모든 사람이 정확히 동일한 소득을 가진)를 나타내며, 1은 완벽한 불평등 (모든 소득을 가진 사람)을 나타냅니다. (인덱스 점수가 일반적으로 이해하기가 더 쉽게 100을 곱한있다. [75] ) 지니 지수 평가하기 전에 세금 후, (인종, 성별, 고용) 내 및 국가 간 불평등을 비교하는 데 사용할 수 있습니다. [76] [ 77] [78] [79] 다른 소스를 자주 측정 같은 국가 나 집단에 대해 서로 다른 지니 값을 제공합니다.

국가 별 비교

이 지니 인덱스지도는 세전 소득 불평등 지니 지수의 지역 및 카운티 수준의 변화를 보여줍니다. 카운티 (사랑에 대한 0.207에서 2010 년 지니 지수 값의 범위 텍사스 이스트 캐롤 교구 (에 0.645에) 루이지애나 ). [80]

대한 가구 소득 지니 지수 미국 에 따르면, 2009 년에 0.468이었다 미국 인구 조사국 , [81] 그래도 상태 사이에서 크게 변화 . The states of Utah, Alaska and Wyoming have a pre-tax income inequality Gini coefficient that is 10% lower than the average, while Washington DC and Puerto Rico 10% higher. After including the effects of federal and state taxes, the US Federal Reserve estimates 34 states in the USA have a Gini coefficient between 0.30 and 0.35, with the state of Maine the lowest. [19] At the county and municipality levels, the pre-tax Gini index ranged from 0.21 to 0.65 in 2010 across the United States, according to Census Bureau estimates. [80]

OECD estimates the pre-tax Gini index for the United States was 0.49, and after-tax Gini index was 0.38, in 2008-2009. The average pre-tax Gini index for OECD countries was 0.46, while the average after-tax Gini index was 0.31. [76]

International comparisons

The UN , CIA World Factbook , [82] and OECD have used the gini index to compare inequality between countries, and as of 2006, the United States had one of the highest levels of income inequality among similar developed or high income countries , as measured by the index. [9] While inequality has increased since 1981 in two-thirds of OECD countries [12] [83] most developed countries are in the lower, more equal, end of the spectrum, with a Gini coefficient in the high twenties to mid thirties. [84]

The gini rating of the United States is sufficiently high, however, to put it among less developed countries. The US ranks above (more unequal than) South American countries such Guyana, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and roughly on par with Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, according to the CIA. [85] (although some developed countries have higher gini ratings before taxes and transfers. [10] )

Between 1985 and 2008 the OECD-24 countries with the fastest-rising Gini coefficients were Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, Israel, Germany, and Luxembourg. [86]

조직 US gini
rating
International range US ranking in
income equality
Year(s) rated
Most equal
(lowest gini)
Least equal
(highest gini)
UN [87] [88] 0.408 0.168 ( Azerbaijan ) 0.743 ( Namibia ) 77th out of 146 2000-2010
The World Factbook
(CIA) [82]
0.45 0.23 ( Sweden , 2005) 0.707 (Namibia, 2003) 100th out of 140 [89] 1994–2009
OECD [10]
(after taxes and transfers)
0.378 0.236 ( Slovenia ) 0.494 ( Chile ) 31st out of 34
(in OECD)
“late 2000s”
OECD [10]
(before taxes and transfers)
0.486 0.344 ( South Korea ) 0.534 ( Italy ) 26th out of 33
(in OECD)
“late 2000s”

Among the 34 “developed” countries of the OECD the US gini rank in income equality (27th) is higher before taxes and “transfers” are measured, [90] then after (31st) [91] —ie, the US has less income redistribution by government than some other post-industrial economies. However some developed countries, such as the Netherlands and Greece, have less inequality simply because incomes are more equal than in the US even before taxes. [92]

Some have argued that inequality is higher in other countries than official statistics indicate because of unreported income. European countries have higher amounts of wealth in offshore holdings. [93] [94] [95] [96]

Income levels

High income

60% of earners in the top 0.1 percent are executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals. More than half of them work in closely held businesses. [97] The top 1 percent is composed of many professions, the five most common professions being managers , [98] physicians , administrators , lawyers , and financial specialists. Doctors are more likely than any other profession to be in the 1 percent. [99]

원인

Inequality in general

Expertise, productiveness and work experience, inheritance, gender, and race have had a strong influence on distribution of personal income [100] [101] in the United States as in other countries.

Race and gender disparities

Income levels vary by gender and race with median income levels considerably below the national median for females compared to men with certain racial demographics. [102]

Median personal income by gender and race in 2005.

Despite considerable progress in pursuing gender and racial equality, some social scientists attribute these discrepancies in income to continued discrimination. [103] Others argue that the majority of the wage gap is due to women's choices and preferences. Women are more likely to consider factors other than salary when looking for employment. On average, women are less willing to travel or relocate, take more hours off and work fewer hours, and choose college majors that lead to lower paying jobs. Women are also more likely to work for governments or non-profits, that pay less than the private sector. [104] [105] According to this perspective certain ethnic minorities and women receive fewer promotions and opportunities for occupation and economic advancement than others. In the case of women this concept is referred to as the glass ceiling keeping women from climbing the occupational ladder.

In terms of race, Asian Americans are far more likely to be in the highest earning 5 percent than the rest of Americans. [106]

However studies have shown that African Americans are less likely to be hired than European-Americans with the same qualifications. [107] The continued prevalence of traditional gender roles and ethnic stereotypes may partially account for current levels of discrimination. [103] In 2005, median income levels were highest among Asian and White males and lowest among females of all races, especially those identifying as African American or Hispanic. Despite closing gender and racial gaps, considerable discrepancies remain among racial and gender demographics, even at the same level of educational attainment. [108] The success of Asian Americans may come from how parents and children spend much longer hours on education than their peers. Asian American have significantly higher college graduation rates than their peers and are much more likely to enter high status occupations. [109]

Median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers, by sex, race, and ethnicity, 2009. [110]

Since 1953 the income gap between male and female workers has decreased considerably but remains relatively large. [111] Women currently earn significantly more Associate's, Bachelor's, and Master's degrees than men and almost as many Doctorates. [112] Women are projected to have passed men in Doctorates earned in 2006–2007, and to earn nearly two thirds of Associate's, Bachelor's, and Master's degrees by 2016. [113] Despite this, some [ who? ] still argue that male workers still hold higher educational attainment, as the success of women in academia is a relatively new phenomenon. [100]

Though it is important to note that income inequality between sexes remained stark at all levels of educational attainment. [102] Between 1953 and 2005 median earnings as well as educational attainment increased, at a far greater pace for women than for men. Median income for female earners male earners increased 157.2% versus 36.2% for men, over four times as fast. Today the median male worker earns roughly 68.36% more than their female counterparts, compared to 176.25% in 1953. The median income of men in 2005 was 2% higher than in 1973 compared to a 74.6% increase for female earners. [111]

Racial differences remained stark as well, with the highest earning sex-gender demographic of workers aged 25 or older, Asian males (who were roughly tied with white males ) earning slightly more than twice as much as the lowest-earning demographic, Hispanic females. [114] [115] As mentioned above, inequality between races and gender persisted at similar education levels. [115] [116] Racial differences were overall more pronounced among male than among female income earners. In 2009, Hispanics were more than twice as likely to be poor than non-Hispanic whites, research indicates. [117] Lower average English ability, low levels of educational attainment, part-time employment, the youthfulness of Hispanic household heads, and the 2007–09 recession are important factors that have pushed up the Hispanic poverty rate relative to non-Hispanic whites.

During the early 1920s, median earnings decreased for both sexes, not increasing substantially until the late 1990s. Since 1974 the median income for workers of both sexes increased by 31.7% from $18,474 to $24,325, reaching its high-point in 2000. [118]

인구 통계학의 Median personal income
Overall Median High school graduate 일부 대학 Bachelor's degree or higher 학사 학위 석사 학위 박사 학위
화이트 Male [119] $40,432 $33,805 $40,427 $61,175 $55,129 $67,903 $77,818
Female [120] $26,636 $21,306 $25,190 $40,161 $36,076 $45,555 $56,759
Both sexes [121] $32,919 $27,291 $31,510 $49,879 $43,841 $52,244 $71,184
검정 Male [122] $30,549 $25,747 $32,758 $46,474 $41,889 $52,488 N / A
Female [122] $25,435 $20,366 $25,574 $42,461 $41,263 $45,830 N / A
Both sexes [123] $27,110 $22,328 $27,589 $44,460 $41,565 $47,407 $61,993
아시아의 Male [116] $42,217 $28,486 $34,548 $61,165 $51,448 $70,979 $81,676
Female [124] $30,332 $21,057 $23,523 $41,442 $37,057 $48,177 $53,659
Both sexes [125] $36,152 $25,285 $29,982 $51,481 $42,466 $61,452 $69,653
스페인 Male [126] $26,162 $26,579 $33,617 $48,282 $43,791 $60,194 N / A
Female [127] $20,133 $18,886 $25,088 $37,405 $34,302 $47,052 N / A
Both sexes [128] $23,613 $22,941 $28,698 $41,596 $37,819 $50,901 $67,274
All racial/ethnic demographics Male [129] $39,403 $32,085 $39,150 $60,493 $52,265 $67,123 $78,324
Female [130] $26,507 $21,117 $25,185 $40,483 $36,532 $45,730 $54,666
Both sexes [131] $32,140 $26,505 $31,054 $49,303 $43,143 $52,390 $70,853
NOTE: The highest median for each level of educational attainment is highlighted in green, the lowest in orange.
SOURCE: US Bureau of Census, 2006

Household income levels and gains for different percentiles in 2003 dollars. [132]

교육 및 기술

Median personal and household income according to different education levels. [131] [133]

Income differences between the varying levels of educational attainment (usually measured by the highest degree of education an individual has completed) have increased. Expertise and skill certified through an academic degree translates into increased scarcity of an individual's occupational qualification which in turn leads to greater economic rewards. [134] As the United States has developed into a post-industrial society more and more employers require expertise that they did not a generation ago, while the manufacturing sector which employed many of those lacking a post-secondary education is decreasing in size. [135]

In the resulting economic job market the income discrepancy between the working class and the professional with the higher academic degrees, [100] who possess scarce amounts of certified expertise, may be growing.

Households in the upper quintiles are generally home to more, better educated and employed working income earners, than those in lower quintiles. [68] Among those in the upper quintile, 62% of householders were college graduates, 80% worked full-time and 76% of households had two or more income earners, compared to the national percentages of 27%, 58% and 42%, respectively. [100] [101] [136] Upper-most sphere US Census Bureau data indicated that occupational achievement and the possession of scarce skills correlates with higher income. [136]

Average earnings in 2002 for the population 18 years and over were higher at each progressively higher level of education… This relationship holds true not only for the entire population but also across most subgroups. Within each specific educational level, earnings differed by sex and race. This variation may result from a variety of factors, such as occupation, working full- or part-time, age, or labor force experience. – [100] [137]
인구 통계학의 High school graduate 일부 대학 Bachelor's degree or higher 학사 학위 Master's degree First professional degree Doctorate degree
중앙값 % +/- national median 중앙값 % +/- national median 중앙값 % +/- national median 중앙값 % +/- national median 중앙값 % +/- national median 중앙값 % +/- national median 중앙값 % +/- national median
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings
(2005)
Both sexes $26,505 −17.5% $31,054 −3.5% $49,303 +53.4% $43,143 +34.2% $52,390 +63.0% $82,473 +156.6% $70,853 +120.4%
남성 $32,085 −18.6% $39,150 −0.6% $60,493 +53.5% $52,265 +32.6% $67,123 +70.3% 100,000달러 +153.8% $78,324 +98.8%
여성 $21,117 −20.3% $25,185 −5.0% $40,483 +52.7% $36,532 +37.82% $45,730 +72.5% $66,055 +149.2% $54,666 +106.2%
Both sexes employed full-time $31,539 −19.8% $37,135 -5.6 % $56,078 +42.5% $50,944 +29.5% $61,273 +55.8% 100,000달러 +154.2% $79,401 +101.8%
Households
(2003)
$36,835 −20.5% $45,854 −0.8% $73,446 +58.8% $68,728 +48.6 $78,541 +69.9% 100,000달러 +116.2% $96,830 +109.4%
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2004/06 [131] [133]

인센티브

Percent of households with 2+ income earners, and full-time workers by income. [136]

In the context of concern over income inequality a number of economists, such as Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernake, have talked about the importance of incentives: “… without the possibility of unequal outcomes tied to differences in effort and skill, the economic incentive for productive behavior would be eliminated, and our market-based economy … would function far less effectively.” [134] [138] Yale economist Arthur Okun argues there is a trade-off between economic growth and economic redistribution. [139] [140]

Since abundant supply decreases market value, the possession of scarce skills considerably increases income. [100] Among the American lower class , the most common source of income was not occupation, but government welfare. [141]

과세

Average tax rate percentages for the highest-income US taxpayers, 1945-2009

Another factor in income inequality/equality is the effective rate at which income is taxed coupled with the progressivity of the tax system. A progressive tax is a tax by which the tax rate increases as the taxable base amount increases. [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] Overall income tax rates in the United States are below the OECD average, and until 2005 have been declining. [147]

Post-1980 rise in inequality

Most current discussion of income inequality in America centers on its rise since the mind to late 1970s, the so-called “ Great Divergence “. According to the United States Census Bureau , it reported that the income inequality between the richest and poorest people grew to its widest in 2011, as the census recorded 46.2 million people living in poverty . [148]

Broad breakdown

Breaking down how much of the increase in income inequality between 1979 and 2007 came from distribution of pre-tax income and how much from taxes and “government transfers”, the CBO data shows that the 33% increase in inequality [149] came from a

  • 23% increase in inequality from changes in distribution of “market income” to households (top earners received a larger share of salaries, interest, dividends, capital gains, business income, etc.); a
  • 6% increase from changes in “government transfers” (social security, unemployment, the end of AFDC welfare, etc.); and a
  • 4% increase from changes in federal taxation (overall decline in the average federal tax rate and shift in federal revenues from income taxes to less progressive payroll taxes, etc.).

[150] [151]

Of the 23% increase in inequality from changes in pre-tax “market” income, most of that (79%) came from a shift to top earners in different types of income across the board. A smaller amount of inequality increase (21%) came from a shift from wages and salaries to more concentrated income sources—ie interest, dividends, business income and especially capital gains, which are more concentrated toward top earners than income from salaries/wages. [152]

According to Michael Cembalest, the chief investment officer of JPMorgan Chase , [153] as of 2011, corporate “profit margins have reached levels not seen in decades,” and “reductions in wages and benefits explain the majority of the net improvement. … US labor compensation is now at a 50-year low relative to both company sales and US GDP” [154]

Lisa Shalett, chief investment officer at Merrill Lynch Wealth Management noted that, “for the last two decades and especially in the current period, … productivity soared … [but] US real average hourly earnings are essentially flat to down, with today's inflation-adjusted wage equating to about the same level as that attained by workers in 1970. … So where have the benefits of technology-driven productivity cycle gone? Almost exclusively to corporations and their very top executives.” [74]

Explanations

According to the CBO and others, “the precise reasons for the [recent] rapid growth in income at the top are not well understood”, [40] [85] but “in all likelihood,” an “interaction of multiple factors” was involved. [155] “Researchers have offered several potential rationales.” [40] [56] Some of these rationales conflict, some overlap. [156] They include:

  • the globalization hypothesis—low skilled American workers have been losing ground in the face of competition from low-wage workers in Asia and other “emerging” economies; [157]
  • skill-biased technological change — the rapid pace of progress in information technology has increased the demand for the highly skilled and educated so that income distribution favored brains rather than brawn; [157]
  • the superstar hypothesis—modern technologies of communication often turn competition into a tournament in which the winner is richly rewarded, while the runners-up get far less than in the past; [157] [158]
  • immigration of less-educated workers — relatively high levels of immigration of low skilled workers since 1965 may have reduced wages for American-born high school dropouts; [159]
  • policy and politics — soaring executive compensation , stagnating middle income pay and more regressive taxation resulting from political decisions, not market forces. Decision such as not intervening to stop executive capture of corporate boards, the crushing of labor unions, etc.

Analyzing the top three hypotheses, economist Paul Krugman found them to be “increasingly inadequate” as more evidence accumulated.

Globalization can explain part of the relative decline in blue-collar wages, but it can't explain the 2,500 percent rise in CEO incomes. Technology may explain why the salary premium associated with a college education has risen, but it's hard to match up with the huge increase in inequality among the college-educated, with little progress for many but gigantic gains at the top. The superstar theory works for Jay Leno , but not for the thousands of people who have become awesomely rich without going on TV. [157]

Immigration was also found wanting as an explanation. [160]

Other scholars [161] questioning the explanation of educational attainment and workplace skills point out that other countries with similar education levels and economies have not gone the way of the US, and that concentration of income in the US hasn't followed a pattern of “the 29% of Americans with college degrees pulling away” from those who have less education. [57] [162] [163] [164] [165] [9]

Skill-biased technological change

As of the mid- to late- decade of the 2000s, the most common explanation for income inequality in America was “skill-biased technological change” [166] — “a shift in the production technology that favors skilled over unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its relative demand “. [167] For example, one scholarly colloquium on the subject that included many prominent labor economists estimated that technological change was responsible for over 40% of the increase in inequality. Other factors like international trade, decline in real minimum wage, decline in unionization and rising immigration, were each responsible for 10-15% of the increase. [168] [169]

Numbers show the strength of education's influence on income distribution. [170] In 2005, roughly 55% of income earners with doctorate degrees — the most educated 1.4% — were among the top 15 percent earners. Among those with Masters degrees — the most educated 10% — roughly half had incomes among the top 20 percent of earners. [131] Only among households in the top quintile were householders with college degrees in the majority. [101]

But while the higher education commonly translates into higher income, [170] and the highly educated are disproportionately represented in upper quintile households , differences in educational attainment fail to explain income discrepancies between the top 1 percent and the rest of the population. Large percentages of individuals lacking a college degree are present in all income demographics, including 33% of those with heading households with six figure incomes . [101] From 2000 to 2010, the 1.5% of Americans with an MD, JD, or MBA and the 1.5% with a PhD saw median income gains of approximately 5%. Among those with a college or master's degree (about 25% of the American workforce) average wages dropped by about 7%, (though this was less than the decline in wages for those who had not completed college). [171]

Approaching the issue from occupations that have been replaced or downgraded since the late 1970s, one scholar found that jobs that “require some thinking but not a lot” — or moderately skilled middle-class occupations such as cashiers, typists, welders, farmers, appliance repairmen — declined the furthest in wage rates and/or numbers. Employment requiring either more skill or less has been less affected. [172] However the timing of the great technological change of the era—internet use by business starting in the late 1990s—does not match that of the growth of income inequality (starting in the early 1970s but slackening somewhat in the 1990s). Nor does the introduction of technologies that increase the demand for more skilled workers seem to be generally associated with a divergence in household income among the population. Inventions of the 20th century such as AC electric power , the automobile, airplane, radio, television, the washing machine, Xerox machine, each had an economic impact the equal of computers/microprocessors/internet but did not coincide with greater inequality. [172]

교육

또 다른 설명은 숙련공에 대한 수요 이러한 숙련공에 충분한 상승을 제공하는 미국 교육 시스템의 고장을 증가 기술의 도입의 조합이 그 근로자 급여 낙찰 내용이다. 보통 사람들이 1975 년에 태어난 동안 (그레이트 발산이 시작하면서 그 같은시기에 시작) 미국의 교육 성장 둔화의 예는, 1945 년에 태어난 보통 사람들이 자신의 부모보다 학교 교육의 두 년 이상을 받고 있다는 사실이다 학교 교육에만 반년 이상을 받았다. [173] "내와 토론과 다양한 경제학자들과 정치 학자의 독서의 합성"에 따라 저자 티모시 노아의 "백 - 중 - 봉투"추정하다 "다양한 실패" 미국의 교육 시스템에서 불평등 후 1978 년 증가 "30 %에 대한 책임"이다. [173]

세계화

세계화를 연구 한 경제학자는 수입이 효과가 있었 동의하지만, 수입 성장의시기는 소득 불평등의 성장과 일치하지 않습니다. 중국은입니다 세계 최대의 수출국 제조 된 제품과 메이커하지만 2007 년 인당 수입이 있었다 7 분의 1, 미국의. 1995 년 저임금 국가에서 제조 된 제품의 수입은 미국 국내 총생산 (GDP)의 3 % 미만을 망가 뜨 렸어요. [174]

그것은 미국이 고임금 (고급) 경제에서보다 낮은 임금 (개발) 개국에서 제조 된 물품을 수입 한 것을 2006 년까지 없었습니다. [175] 불평등 때문이 아니라에 대한 임금 정체의 2000-2010 년 동안 증가 덜 그러나 때문에 상위 0.1 %의 소득을 가속화 숙련 노동자가. [174] 저자 티모시 노아는 "무역", 수입의 증가가 소득 분배의 "위대한 발산"단지 10 %에 대한 책임 것으로 추정하고있다. [173]

이주

1965 년 이민 및 국적 법 , 특히 비 유럽으로, 미국으로 이민을 증가 시켰습니다. [85] 1970 년부터 2007 년까지 미국 인구의 외국 태생 비율은 누구의 대부분은 낮은 교육 수준을했다, 11 %로 5 %에서 성장하고 토박이 미국인보다 소득. 그러나 저 기술 노동 공급의 증가의 기여도는 상대적으로 소극적이었던 것으로 보인다. 한 추정치는 이민 1980-2000 7.4 %로 ( "대략 인력의 극빈층에 해당") 토박이 "고등학교 중퇴자"의 평​​균 연간 소득을 감소 밝혔다. 더 나은 교육을 근로자의 소득 감소가 훨씬 덜했다. [85] 저자 티모시 노아는 "이민은"소득 분배의 "위대한 발산"단지 5 %에 대한 책임 것으로 추정하고있다. [173]

소득 계산의 변화

가구 소득 불평등이 될 것을 거부 한 관찰자는 앨런 레이놀즈 , 수석 동료 카토 연구소 . Reyonlds 소득 불평등 통계 환상 소득에보고되는 것을 변경 세법의 기술 변경 사항에 대해 가져온 것을 선언했다 국세청 어떤 소득이.하지 않습니다 [67] [176] 이 주장이 "로 비판을 받아왔다 , 따라 할 수있는 하드 종종 관련이없는, 때로는 완전히 잘못된 통계 quibbles "의 산 [177] 또는 "지적 세 카드 몬테 . " [178]

레이놀즈는 모든 데이터가 소득 불평등이 연방 정부의 세금 환급을 기준으로 계산하기 위해 모여 있다고 지적했다. 세금 반환에없는 소득은 데이터에 포함되지 않습니다. 당연히 어떤 소득이 필요하고 변경보고 할 필요가 없습니다. 이전 1980 년대에, 지방채 및 임원 스톡 옵션에 관심이 과세 소득으로보고 할 필요가 없습니다. [179] 또한, C-기업과로 제출 많은 기업 그러므로 소득은 개인 세금 보고서에 표시되지 않았다. 1986 년 세금 개혁 법안과 레이건 대통령에서 세금 감면 후, 많은 기업은 S-법인 인으로 전환하기 때문에 오히려 법인 세율보다 개인 소득 세율을 지불했다. [180] 이들과 다른 변화의 결과로,시와 1980 년대 이후 새로운 수익을 많이 정말 모두 함께 적립되었다 상위 소득자의 세금 반환에 표시하기 시작했다. 이러한 이유로 Pikkety / 에즈와 다른 사람에 의해 수행 연구는 1,986에서 1,988 사이 기간에 발생하는 연간 소득 상위 1 % '의 점유율의 증가의 대부분을 보여 것은 놀라운 일이 아니다. 또한, 세금 이연 계정들은 1980 년대에 나타난대로 계정의 소유자의 반환에서 소득 사라지는을 표시하기 시작했다. 2001 연방 준비 은행의 연구는 50 - 95 번째 백분위 수의 자산의 14.5 %는 세금 이연 계정에서 개최하는 동안 상위 1 %의 자산의 단지 5.5 %는 세금 이연 계정에서 개최 된 것으로 나타났다. [181] 이전 지출이다 또한 크게 대부분의 연구에 의해 무시되지만 흡수 소득의 비율이 2004 년 14.2 %로 1970 년 5.9 %에서 상승했다. [182] 이 지급은 일반적으로 가족 소득이 낮은 이동하기 때문에 그들의 부재는 꾸준히 통계가 더 많은 결함했다 지난 몇 년 동안. 레이놀즈 '인수는 통계적으로 상황을 악화시키고 있지만, 실제로는 아무것도 약간의 변경, 정상에 소득을 추가하는 동안 변경 사항이 중간 소득을 제거했다는 것이다.

정치 규범, 제도

미국에서 소득 수준의 "위대한 발산"에 대한 설명으로 기술 변화의 비판 [22] 공공 정책과 정당 정치를 가리거나 "정부가 한, 또는하지 않은 물건". [183] ​​그들은 다음은이 주장 노동 조합 가입 비율을 감소하고 정치적 영향력을 감소 결과의 경향을 주도, 사회 서비스에 대한 지출을 감소하고, 작은 정부의 재분배.

정당 및 대통령

정치 학자 래리 바텔은 1948 년 이후 대통령과 미국의 소득 불평등의 당사자 사이에 강한 상관 관계가 있음을 발견했다. (아래 참조) [164] [184]

1,948에서 2,005 사이 연평균 세전 소득 증가를 검사, [185] Bartel은은 (에서 민주당 대통령 아래에서 보여줍니다 해리 트루먼 앞으로), 가장 큰 소득 이익은 소득 규모의 하단에하고 소득이 상승으로 테이퍼 해제했다. 공화당 대통령에서 대조적으로, 이익이 훨씬 덜했다하지만 성장이가 당신이 소득 규모를 넘어 졌을 때 테이터, 상단을 향해 집중되었다. [151] [186]

바텔의 연구 결과를 요약, 기자 티모시 노아는 "민주당의 세계"로 민주당 대통령의 행정이라고하며, "공화당의 세계"와 같은 GOP 행정 :

민주당 세계에서, 세전 이익은 상위 중산층과 풍부한 매년 가난하고 낮은 중산층 및 2.12 %를 매년 2.64 % 증가했다. 더 그레이트 발산가 없었다. 대신, 덜 빠르게 이전보다 수렴 소득 불구하고, 현재까지 - 계속 1960 년대, 1940 년대, 1950 년대, 그리고 극복을 통해 위대한 압축 - 평등 한 소득 동향. 공화당의 세계에서, 한편, 세전 이익은 상위 중산층과 부자 0.43 가난한 매년 %와 하위 중산층 및 1.90 % 증가했다. 위대한 발산이 발생 했뿐만 아니라, 그것은 더 크게 발산했다. 또한 노트 : 민주당 세계에서 세전 소득이 20 백분위 수에 대한뿐만 아니라 40, 60 및 80에 그냥 빨리 현실 세계에서보다 증가했다. 우리는보다 풍부하고 있었 읍니다! 그러나 공화당 세계에서, 세전 이익은 20​​ 백분위 수에 대한뿐만 아니라 40, 60 및 80에 대한뿐만 아니라 현실 세계에서보다 느리게 증가했다. 우리는 가난하고 덜 있었 읍니다! 민주당은 또한 95 %에서 공화당보다 소폭 빠른 소득 증가를 생산하지만, 그 차이는 통계적으로 유의하지 않았다. [183]

성장의 분포 패턴은 정책의 전체 호스트의 결과로 나타납니다,

세금과 이익의 분배뿐만 아니라 노동 조합을 향한 정부의 자세, 최저 임금이 상승 여부, 정부가 너무 높은 금리 대 인플레이션에 대한 프렛 정도, 등, 등뿐만 아니라 포함 [151]

노아는이 상관 관계의 증거가 "오히려 직접보다 정황"인정한다,하지만 너무하다 "흡연이 폐암의 주요 원인이라는 증거." [183]

비 당사국 정치적 행동
추가 정보 : 미국의 집행 지불

CEO와 생산 노동자, 1,965에서 2,009 사이의 평균 보상 비율. 출처 : 경제 정책 연구원. 2011. 월스트리트 저널 / 머서, 헤이 그룹은 2010 년 데이터에 근거 함. [187]

책에있는 정치 학자 제이콥 해커와 폴 피어슨의 기록에 따르면, 승자 독식의 정치 , 특히 중요한 정책 변화는 공화당이 아니라 현대, 효율적인 정치 체제의 발전에 의해하지에 끌려, 로비를 ,에 의해 최고 소득자 - 특히 기업의 경영진과 금융 서비스 산업. [188] 1970 년대 말까지는 새로운, 훨씬 더 효과적, 공격적이고 잘 자금 로비스트 및 압력 단체와의 중산층에 초점에서 미국 정치의 변화를 보았다 상위 소득 계층의 역할을 대신 수행. 경영진은 성공적으로 기업 관리자의 상계 전원 또는 감독을 제거 (개인 소송에서, 이사 및 주주의 보드 증권 거래위원회 또는 노동 조합). [189]

금융 산업의 성공은 성공적으로 금융 시장의 규제 완화를 추진하고 훨씬 더 유리한 수 있지만, 더 많은 정부의 구제 금융과 손실을 사회화하면서 이익을 민영화되는 위험한 투자에서왔다. [190] (두 그룹의 약 60 %를 형성 소득자의 상위 0.1 %입니다.) 모든 상위 소득자 깊은 부동산 및 자본 이득에 세금을 삭감하고, 소득의 높은 수준에 대한 세율에 의해 도움이되었다.

2007 년 경기 침체 이전 250X 이상의 평균 임금을 1978 년에 35 배의 평균 노동자 임금의 증가 - 기업 임원에 대한 급여의 폭발 제안에 대해 논쟁 [191] , 성능에 따라 부족한 인력에 대한 수요 증가에 의해 구동 및 설정 - 크루그먼은 경영진의 통제 이외의 여러 요인이 특히 같은 회사의 머리 단기적으로는 기업의 수익성을 관리하는 것을 지적 엔론이 큰 성공처럼 보일 수 있습니다. 감독 자신이 호화로운 지불에 동의 경우에도 "금융 시장이 누구의 CEO를 아낌없이 지불하지 않는 회사의 의심스러운 것입니다 부분적으로 있기 때문에, 부분적으로 그들이 충분한 고려 임원을 유치 할 수 있습니다."또한, 기업 보드는 임금을 설정하는 다른 회사를 따라 마지막으로 자연스럽게 자신의 고용주를 기쁘게하고 싶다 "크게 CEO가 선택한 기업 보드는 거의 항상 CEO로 선정, 보상 전문가를 고용". [192]

루시 Arye Bebchuk, 제시 M. 튀김, 성능, 비판없이 지불의 저자 임원 급여 , 기업 지배 구조의 임원 캡처는 공공 관계, 즉 공개`분노`, 그들의 임금을 제한되도록 완전 함을 주장한다. [193] 이 결국 과도한 지불 등 (민중의 분노를 능가 가장 부유 한에서 캠페인 기부금에 필요한) 정치인, 미디어 (비즈니스 천재를 찬양), 노동 조합 (분쇄) 등의 전통적인 비평가로 감소되었다 -. 지금 침묵 [194]

정치뿐만 아니라, 크루그먼은 기업 문화의 규범의 변화를 가정은 요인을했다. 1950 년대와 60 년대, 기업 임원은 이사의 회사 보드의 제어를 통해 자신에게 매우 높은 보상을 지불 할 수있는 능력을 가지고 있었다 (또는 개발할 수), 그들은 스스로를 구속. 그러나 1990 년대 말까지, 100 대 CEO의 평균 실제 연간 보수는 2002 년에 1백30만달러-39 시간 평균 노동자에 37,500,000달러, 1982 년부터 일반 근로자의 1000 회 이상 급여의 급여에서 급증. [157] 저널리스트 조지 패커 도 (자신의 견해에) 특별한 관심 그룹에 사회의 기둥에서 자신을 전환 한 미국의 엘리트의 태도에 변화의 제품으로 미국에서 불평등의 극적인 증가를보고있다. [195 ] 저자 티모시 노아는 그가 가장 높은 소득 0.1 %의 "월가 기업 보드 '웰빙'이라고 부르는 것을하는 것은 불평등 후 1978 년 증가의"30 %에 대한 책임 "임을 알려드립니다. [173]

노동 조합의 쇠퇴

에서 미국의 노조 가입 대공황 현재 하루. (출처 : 미국의 연합 회원 동향 , 1930년에서 2000년까지 표 A-1 부록 A; 노동 통계의 국 . 2005 년과 2010 년)

불평등 성장의 시대는 2007 년 약 12 %로 1983 년에 노동 인구의 20 %에서 노동 조합 회원의 급격한 감소와 일치하고있다. [196] 경제는 전통적으로 노동 조합의 주요 목적 때문에 극대화하는 것입니다 생각 회원의 이익은 강하지 만 모두 포괄하지 조합 운동이 증가 소득 불평등되었다. Given the increase in income inequality of the past few decades, either the sign of the effect must be reversed, the magnitude of the effect small, or a much larger opposing force overridden it, since unionization has decreased in that period. [197] [198]

However more recently research has shown that unions' ability to reduce income disparities among members outweighed other factors and its net effect has been to reduce national income inequality. [198] [199] The decline of unions has hurt this leveling effect among men, and one economist (Berkeley economist David Card ) estimating about 15-20% of the “Great Divergence” among that gender is the result of declining unionization. [198] [200]

Still other researchers think it is the labor movement's loss of national political power to promote equalizing “government intervention and changes in private sector behavior” has had the greatest impact on inequality in the US. [198] [201] Timothy Noah estimates the “decline” of labor union power “responsible for 20%” of the Great Divergence. [173]

과세

How much tax policy change over the last thirty years has contributed to income inequality is disputed. In their comprehensive 2011 study of income inequality ( Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 ), [150] the CBO found that,

The top fifth of the population saw a 10-percentage-point increase in their share of after-tax income. Most of that growth went to the top 1 percent of the population. All other groups saw their shares decline by 2 to 3 percentage points. In 2007, federal taxes and transfers reduced the dispersion of income by 20 percent, but that equalizing effect was larger in 1979. The share of transfer payments to the lowest-income households declined. The overall average federal tax rate fell.

According to journalist Timothy Noah, “you can't really demonstrate that US tax policy had a large impact on the three-decade income inequality trend one way or the other. The inequality trend for pre-tax income during this period was much more dramatic.” [183] Noah estimates tax changes account for 5% of the Great Divergence. [173]

But many — such as economist Paul Krugman — emphasize the effect of changes in taxation — such as the 2001 and 2003 Bush administration tax cuts which cut taxes far more for high-income households than those below — on increased income inequality. [202]

Part of the growth of income inequality under Republican administrations (described by Larry Bartels) has been attributed to tax policy. A study by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez found that

Large reductions in tax progressivity since the 1960s took place primarily during two periods: the Reagan presidency in the 1980s and the Bush administration in the early 2000s. [203]

During Republican President Ronald Reagan 's tenure in office the top marginal income tax rate was reduced from over 70 to 28 percent, high top marginal rates like 70% being the sort in place during much of the period of great income equality following the “Great Compression”. [183] While the bottom marginal rate for the bottom fell from 14 to 11 percent. [204] However the effective rate on top earners before Reagan's tax cut was much lower because of loopholes and charitable contributions. (See Saez & Piketty, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” </ref> [205] President Ronald Reagan's 1981 cut in the top regular tax rate on unearned income reduced the maximum capital gains rate to only 20% — its lowest level since the Hoover administration. [206]

During the Republican George W. Bush administration, the tax rate on capital gains and qualifying dividends — a disproportionate source of income for top earners — fell to 15% — less than half the 35% top rate on ordinary income. [207] President Bush's veto of tax harmonization has also been attributed to rising inequality, as this would have shut down offshore tax havens. [208]

The highest earning 0.01% income group (“99.99-100% income group”) saw the greatest tax rate reductions since 1960.
Source: Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, [209]

One study [210] found reductions of total effective tax rates were most significant for individuals with highest incomes. (see “Federal Tax Rate by Income Group” chart) For those with incomes in the top 0.01 percent, overall rates of Federal tax fell from 74.6% in 1970, to 34.7% in 2004 (the reversal of the trend in 2000 with a rise to 40.8% came after the 1993 Clinton deficit reduction tax bill ), the next 0.09 percent falling from 59.1% to 34.1%, before leveling off with a relatively modest drop of 41.4 to 33.0% for the 99.5–99.9 percent group. Although the tax rate for low-income earners fell as well (though not as much), these tax reductions compare with virtually no change—23.3% tax rate in 1970, 23.4% in 2004—for the US population overall. [210]

The study found the decline in progressivity since 1960 was due to the shift from allocation of corporate income taxes among labor and capital to the effects of the individual income tax. [210] [211] Paul Krugman also supports this claim saying, “The overall tax rate on these high income families fell from 36.5% in 1980 to 26.7% in 1989.” [212]

From the White House's own analysis, the tax burden for those making greater than $250,000 fell considerably during the late 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, from an effective tax of 35% in 1980, down to under 30% from the late 1980s to present. [213]

Many studies argue that tax changes of S-type Corporations confound the statistics prior to 1990. However, even after these changes inflation-adjusted average after-tax income grew by 25% between 1996 and 2006 (the last year for which individual income tax data is publicly available). This average increase, however, obscures a great deal of variation. The poorest 20% of tax filers experienced a 6% reduction in income while the top 0.1 percent of tax filers saw their income almost double. Tax filers in the middle of the income distribution experienced about a 10% increase in income. Also during this period, the proportion of income from capital increased for the top 0.1 percent from 64% to 70%. [214]

Effects of race and gender

The black/white gap in median family income is about 3% smaller today than it was in 1979, a lack of progress that may be dismaying but excludes the disparity from explaining any part of the 30-year growth of inequality. [24]

Gender disparity in income has also improved in during the last three decades. The gap in the median annual income between men and women working full-time has declined from 40% to 23%. [24]

Median income for male and female workers from 1953 to 2005 in constant dollars. [111]

Year or change Gini index, Persons, age 25+, employed full-time [59] Gini index,
Households [58]
남성 여자들 Both sexes
1967 31.4 29.8 34.0 39.7
2005 42.4 35.7 40.9 46.​​9
증가 35.0% 19.8% 20.3 % 18.1%
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2006 [215]

Since 1967 inequality has risen for households and for full-time workers of both sexes, but especially for male workers. (see table above) Personal income has risen considerably for female workers since 1953, less so for male workers, whose income stagnated during the 1970s 1980s, and 1990s. [111]

It is unclear whether the dramatic increase of women in the workforce and women's income has led to greater inequality (eg dual earner families causing greater inequality). According to the Census Bureau, as of 2005, 42% of all US households and 76% of those in the top quintile had two or more income earners . [132] [136] But looking at empirical studies, the CBO study “Trends in the Distribution of Household Income”, found “mixed results” of the effect of dual earner families “with estimates depending on the period studied and the methodology use.” The study also found that the level of inequality for household with children and (nonelderly) households without children was “virtually identical”. [216] The growth of single parent households may have led to lower incomes but most of it occurred before 1980 and in recent years the percentage of women who are actually working who are single parents has increased. [85]

Significance of inequality

Commentators, economists, politicians do not agree on the issue of increase in inequality in America or its importance. Among economists and other experts most agree that America's growing income inequality is “deeply worrying”, [24] unjust, [157] a danger to democracy/social stability, [217] [218] [219] and/or even a sign of national decline. [195] Concern extends even to such supporters (or former supporters) of laissez-faire economics and private sector financiers.

Former Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan , has stated reference to growing inequality: “This is not the type of thing which a democratic society — a capitalist democratic society — can really accept without addressing.” [24] Some economists (David Moss, Paul Krugman) believe the Great Divergence may be connected to the financial crisis of 2008. [220] [221] Money manager William H. Gross , managing director of PIMCO , criticized the shift in distribution of income from labor to capital behind some of the growth in inequality as unsustainable, saying:

“even conservatives must acknowledge that return on capital investment, and the liquid stocks and bonds that mimic it, are ultimately dependent on returns to labor in the form of jobs and real wage gains. If Main Street is unemployed and undercompensated, capital can only travel so far down Prosperity Road.”

He concluded: “Investors/policymakers of the world wake up – you're killing the proletariat goose that lays your golden eggs.” [222] [223]

On the other side of the issue are those who have claimed that the increase is not significant, [224] that it doesn't matter [219] because America's economic growth and/or equality of opportunity are what's important, [21] that it is a global phenomenon which would be foolish to try to change through US domestic policy, [225] that it “has many economic benefits and is the result of … a well-functioning economy”, [220] [226] and has or may become an excuse for “class-warfare rhetoric”, [224] and may lead to policies that “reduce the well-being of wealthier individuals”. [71] [220]

Consumption and debt

Arguing that income inequality is not significant because inequality of consumption is less are Will Wilkinson of the libertarian Cato Institute and other conservatives. Wilkinson states that “the weight of the evidence shows that the run-up in consumption inequality has been considerably less dramatic than the rise in income inequality,” and consumption is more important than income. [227] According to Johnson, Smeeding, and Tory, consumption inequality was actually lower in 2001 than it was in 1986. [228] [229]

The CBO agrees that household consumption numbers show more equal distribution than household income but finds the data do not “adequately capture consumption by high-income households” as it does their income. [230] Other studies have not found consumption inequality less dramatic than household income inequality. [73] [231]

Others have disputed the importance of consumption over income, as consumption in excess of income usually means debt, [220] and a “growing body of work” suggests that income inequality has been the driving factor in the growing household debt [73] [232] as middle income earners go deeper into debt trying to maintain what once was a middle class lifestyle. Between 1983 and 2007, the top 5 percent saw their debt fall from 80 cents for every dollar of income to 65 cents, while the bottom 95 percent saw their debt rise from 60 cents for every dollar of income to $1.40. [73] Economist Krugman has found a strong correlation between inequality and household debt in America over the last hundred years. [233]

Deep debt may lead to bankruptcy and researchers Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi found a fivefold increase in the number of families filing for bankruptcy between 1980 and 2005. [234] The bankruptcies came not from increased spending “on luxuries”, but from an “increased spending on housing, largely driven by competition to get into good school districts.” Intensifying inequality may mean a dwindling number of ever more expensive school districts that compel middle class—or would-be middle class—to “buy houses they can't really afford, taking on more mortgage debt than they can safely handle”. [235]

Public attitudes

The growth of inequality has provoked a political protest movement—the Occupy movement —starting in Wall Street and spreading to 600 communities across the United States in 2011. Its main political slogan — “ We are the 99% ” — references its dissatisfaction with the concentration of income in the top 1%.

A 16 December 2011 Gallup poll found a decline in the number of Americans who felt reducing the gap in income and wealth between the rich and the poor was extremely or very important (21 percent of Republicans, 43 percent of independents, and 72 percent of Democrats). [236] In 2012, several surveys of voters attitudes toward growing income inequality found the issue ranked less important than other economic issues such as growth and equality of opportunity, and relatively low in affecting voters “personally”. [237] [238] In 1998 a Gallup poll found 52% of Americans agreeing that the gap between rich and the poor was a problem that needed to be fixed, while 45% regarded it as “an acceptable part of the economic system”. In 2011, those numbers are reversed: Only 45% see the gap as in need of fixing, while 52% do not. However, there was a large difference between Democrats and Republicans, with 71% of Democrats calling for a fix. [236]

In contrast, a national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, [239] found that respondents' sense of unfairness about taxes centered on the perception that wealthy Americans were not paying their fair share of taxes; 57% say this is what bothers them most about the tax system, an increase of 6% over a poll taken in March 2003. [240] A more recent poll found about two-thirds of Americans now believe there are “strong conflicts” between rich and poor in the United States. [241] [242]

Opinion surveys of what respondents thought was the right level of inequality have found Americans no more accepting of income inequality than other citizens of other nations, but more accepting of what they thought the level of inequality was in their country, being under the impression that there was less inequality than there actually was. [243] Dan Ariely and Michael Norton show in a study (2011) that US citizens across the political spectrum significantly underestimate the current US wealth inequality and would prefer a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. [244] Joseph Stiglitz in “The Price of Inequality” has argued that this sense of unfairness has led to distrust in government and business. [245]

Impact on democracy and society

A study by Larry Bartels found that Senate votes were more responsive to the opinions of high income groups and were less and even negatively responsive to the opinions of middle and lower class groups. [246]

Economists Jared Bernstein and Paul Krugman have attacked the concentration of income as variously “unsustainable” [218] and “incompatible” [219] with real democracy. American political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson quote a warning by Greek/Roman historian Plutarch : `An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics.` [217]

Two journalists concerned about social separation in the US are Robert Frank who notes that:

Today's rich had formed their own virtual country .. [T]hey had built a self-contained world unto themselves, complete with their own health-care system (concierge doctors), travel network (Net jets, destination clubs), separate economy. .... The rich weren't just getting richer; they were becoming financial foreigners, creating their own country within a country, their own society within a society, and their economy within an economy. [247]

and George Packer ,

Inequality hardens society into a class system … Inequality divides us from one another in schools, in neighborhoods, at work, on airplanes, in hospitals, in what we eat, in the condition of our bodies, in what we think, in our children's futures, in how we die. Inequality makes it harder to imagine the lives of others. [195]

Economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that hyper-inequality may explain political questions such as why America's infrastructure is deteriorating,as a result of the reduction in broadly beneficial public investment and support for public education, [248] or its recent relative lack of reluctance to engage in military conflicts such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Top earning families wealthy enough to buy their own education, medical care, personal security, and parks, have little interest in helping pay for such things for the rest of society, and the political influence to make sure they don't have to. So too, the lack of personal or family sacrifice involved for top earners in the military intervention of their country — their children being few and far between in the relatively low-paying all-volunteer military — may mean more willingness by the American government to wage war. [249]

The relatively high rates of health and social problems ( obesity , mental illness , homicides , teenage births , Incarceration , child conflict, drug use) and lower rates of social goods ( life expectancy , educational performance, trust among strangers , women's status , social mobility , even numbers of patents issued per capita), in the US compared to other developed countries may be related to its high income inequality. Using statistics from 23 developed countries and the 50 states of the US, British researchers Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have found such a correlation which remains after accounting for ethnicity, [250] national culture [251] ), and occupational classes or education levels. [252] Their findings, based on UN Human Development Reports and other sources, locate the United States at the top of the list in regards to inequality and various social and health problems among developed countries. [253] The authors argue inequality leads to the social ills through the psychosocial stress , status anxiety it creates. [254]

Disagreeing with this focus on the top earning 1% and urging attention to the economic and social pathologies of lower income/lower education Americans, is conservative journalist David Brooks . Whereas in the 1970s, high school and college graduates had “very similar family structures”, today, high school grads are much less likely to get married and be active in their communities, and much more likely to smoke, be obese, get divorced, or have “a child out of wedlock.” [255]

The zooming wealth of the top one percent is a problem, but it's not nearly as big a problem as the tens of millions of Americans who have dropped out of high school or college. It's not nearly as big a problem as the 40 percent of children who are born out of wedlock. It's not nearly as big a problem as the nation's stagnant human capital, its stagnant social mobility and the disorganized social fabric for the bottom 50 percent. [255] [256]

Contradicting most of these arguments, classical liberals such as Friedrich Hayek have maintained that because individuals are diverse and different, state intervention to redistribute income is inevitably arbitrary and incompatible with the concept of general rules of law, and that “what is called 'social' or distributive' justice is indeed meaningless within a spontaneous order”. Those who would use the state to redistribute, “take freedom for granted and ignore the preconditions necessary for its survival.” It is not great wealth but government and that gives power to control others in liberal democracies such as the United States. [257] [258] [258]

Opportunity, growth and equality

Conservatives and libertarians such as economist Thomas Sowell , and Congressman Paul Ryan (R., Wisc.) [259] argue that more important than the level of equality of results is America's equality of opportunity, especially relative to other developed countries such as western Europe.

Economic growth and inequality

In response to the Occupy movement Richard A. Epstein defended inequality in a free market society, maintaining that “taxing the top one percent even more means less wealth and fewer jobs for the rest of us.” According to Epstein, “the inequalities in wealth … pay for themselves by the vast increases in wealth”, while “forced transfers of wealth through taxation … will destroy the pools of wealth that are needed to generate new ventures. [260] Stiglitz on the other hand concludes that moving money from the bottom to the top through income inequality lowers consumption because higher-income individuals consume a smaller proportion of their income than do lower-income individuals (those at the top save 15 to 25 percent of their income, those at the bottom spend all of their income). [261]

Some (while specifically advocating redistribution of income through taxation) have not found a “tradeoff” between greater equality and economic growth; but according to economist Branko Milanovic , while traditionally economists thought inequality was good for growth

“The view that income inequality harms growth—or that improved equality can help sustain growth—has become more widely held in recent years. … The main reason for this shift is the increasing importance of human capital in development. When physical capital mattered most, savings and investments were key. Then it was important to have a large contingent of rich people who could save a greater proportion of their income than the poor and invest it in physical capital. But now that human capital is scarcer than machines, widespread education has become the secret to growth.” [262]

“Broadly accessible education” is both difficult to achieve when income distribution is uneven and tends to reduce “income gaps between skilled and unskilled labor.”

Economic sociologist Lane Kenworthy has found no correlation between levels of inequality and economic growth among developed countries, among states of the US, or in the US over the years from 1947 to 2005. [263] Jared Bernstein found a nuanced relation he summed up as follows: “In sum, I'd consider the question of the extent to which higher inequality lowers growth to be an open one, worthy of much deeper research, perhaps along some of the lines noted above. [264]

Some researchers have found a connection between “leveling” higher marginal tax rates on high income earners, and higher rates of employment growth. [265] [266] [267]

Mobility during a lifetime

Strong “ intra-generational ” or individual economic mobility between the strata of rich, middle class and poor means both that (1) a high level of inequality of annual income is made irrelevant by a more even distribution of lifetime income, and (2) however extreme the earnings at the top, they are not out of reach for the poor (or middle income) but ambitious. [20]

Sowell claims mobility is robust.

An absolute majority of the people who were in the bottom 20 percent [of income] in 1975 have also been in the top 20 percent at some time since then. Most Americans don't stay put in any income bracket. At different times, they are both “rich” and “poor” — as these terms are recklessly thrown around in the media. [...] There are of course some people who remain permanently in the bottom 20 percent. But such people constitute less than one percent of the American population, according to data published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in its 1995 annual report. Perhaps the intelligentsia and the politicians have been too busy waxing indignant to be bothered by anything so mundane as facts. [21]

According to Thomas A. Garrett, studies examining quintiles of wealth levels may provide a misleading picture. [71] For example, a US Treasury study of the period from 1996 to 2005 found that “[l]ess than half (40% or 43% depending on the measure) of those in the top 1 percent in 1996 were still in the top 1 percent in 2005. Only about 25 percent of the individuals in the top 1/100th percent in 1996 remained in the top 1/100th percent in 2005.” [268]

Other have not found individual mobility so fluid. A 2007 study (by Kopczuk, Saez and Song in 2007) found the top population in America “very stable” and “not mitigated the dramatic increase in annual earnings concentration since the 1970s.” [269]

Economist Paul Krugman , attacks conservatives for resorting to “extraordinary series of attempts at statistical distortion”. He argues that while in any given year, some of the people with low incomes will be “workers on temporary layoff, small businessmen taking writeoffs, farmers hit by bad weather”—the rise in their income in succeeding years is not the same 'mobility' as poor people rising to middle class or middle income rising to wealth. It's the mobility of “the guy who works in the college bookstore and has a real job by his early thirties.”

Studies by the Urban Institute and the US Treasury have both found that about half of the families who start in either the top or the bottom quintile of the income distribution are still there after a decade, and that only 3 to 6% rise from bottom to top or fall from top to bottom. [20]

On the issue of whether most Americans do not stay put in any one income bracket, Krugman quotes from 2011 CBO distribution of income study

Household income measured over a multi-year period is more equally distributed than income measured over one year, although only modestly so. Given the fairly substantial movement of households across income groups over time, it might seem that income measured over a number of years should be significantly more equally distributed than income measured over one year. However, much of the movement of households involves changes in income that are large enough to push households into different income groups but not large enough to greatly affect the overall distribution of income. Multi-year income measures also show the same pattern of increasing inequality over time as is observed in annual measures. [16]

In other words, “many people who have incomes greater than $1 million one year fall out of the category the next year — but that's typically because their income fell from, say, $1.05 million to 0.95 million, not because they went back to being middle class.” [16] [270]

Mobility between generations

Several studies have found the ability of children from poor or middle-class families to rise to upper income — known as “upward relative intergenerational mobility” — is lower in the US than in other developed countries [271] — and at least two economist have found lower mobility linked to income inequality. [23] [24]

The Great Gatsby Curve.png

In their “Great Gatsby” curve, [23] White House Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Alan B. Krueger and labor economist Miles Corak show a negative correlation between inequality and social mobility. The curve plotted “intergenerational income elasticity”—ie the likelihood that someone will inherit their parents' relative position of income level—and inequality for a number of countries. [24] [272]

In the words of journalist Timothy Noah

you can't really experience ever-growing income inequality without experiencing a decline in Horatio Alger -style upward mobility because (to use a frequently-employed metaphor) it's harder to climb a ladder when the rungs are farther apart. [24]

Aside from the proverbial distant rungs, the connection between income inequality and low mobility can be explained by the lack of access for un-affluent children to better (more expensive) schools and preparation for schools crucial to finding high-paying jobs; the lack of health care that may lead to obesity and diabetes and limit education and employment. [271]

Krueger estimates that “the persistence in the advantages and disadvantages of income passed from parents to the children” will “rise by about a quarter for the next generation as a result of the rise in inequality that the US has seen in the last 25 years.” [24]

Income at a glance

Median income levels
Households Persons, age 25 or older with earnings Household income by race
All households Dual earner
households
Per household
회원
남성 여성 Both sexes 아시아의 White,
non-hispanic
스페인 검정
$46,326 $67,348 $23,535 $39,403 $26,507 $32,140 $57,518 $48,977 $34,241 $30,134
Median personal income by educational attainment
측정 Some High School High school graduate 일부 대학 Associate's degree Bachelor's degree or higher 학사 학위 Master's degree Professional degree Doctorate degree
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings $20,321 $26,505 $31,054 $35,009 $49,303 $43,143 52,390달러 $82,473 $70,853
Male, age 25+ w/ earnings $24,192 $32,085 $39,150 $42,382 $60,493 $52,265 $67,123 100,000달러 $78,324
Female, age 25+ w/ earnings $15,073 $21,117 $25,185 $29,510 $40,483 $36,532 $45,730 $66,055 $54,666
Persons, age 25+, employed full-time $25,039 $31,539 $37,135 $40,588 $56,078 $50,944 $61,273 100,000달러 $79,401
가정 $22,718 $36,835 $45,854 $51,970 $73,446 $68,728 $78,541 100,000달러 $96,830
Household income distribution
Bottom 10% Bottom 20% Bottom 25% Middle 33% Middle 20% Top 25% Top 20% Top 5% Top 1.5% Top 1%
$0 to $10,500 $0 to $18,500 $0 to $22,500 $30,000 to $62,500 $35,000 to $55,000 $77,500 and up $92,000 and up $167,000 and up $250,000 and up $350,000 and up
Source: US Census Bureau, 2006; income statistics for the year 2005

참조

주의 사항

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  199. ^ UNIONISM AND THE DISPERSION OF WAGES by RICHARD B. FREEMAN, National Bureau of Economic Research 1980
  200. ^ The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the US Labor Market | David Card| Industrial and Labor Relations Review , Vol. 54, No. 2. (Jan., 2001), pp. 296-315.
  201. ^ Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America Frank Levy and Peter Temin] Revised June 27, 2007
  202. ^ New CBO Data Show Income Inequality Continues to Widen After-Tax-Income for Top 1 Percent Rose by $146,000 in 2004 | By Aviva Aron-Dine and Arloc Sherman| cbpp.org| January 23, 2007
  203. ^ How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, p.23
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  205. ^ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec11/makingsense_12-12.html
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  208. ^ Dickinson, Tom (2011-11-09). “How the GOP Became the Party of the Rich” . Rolling Stone . Retrieved 2012-01-02.
  209. ^ “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007 (p.13) Table 2. Federal Tax Rates by Income Group from 1960
  210. ^ a b c Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” . Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007
  211. ^ “Even after exploiting all possible deductions and credits, the typical high-income taxpayer during the Great Prosperity paid a federal tax of well over 50 percent of his earnings.” Clinton Administration Secretary of labor Robert Reich In his book Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future
  212. ^ Krugman, Paul (1995). Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations . New York: WW Norton & Company. P. 155. ISBN 978-0-393-31292-8 . Retrieved 2-03-12.
  213. ^ “FactChecking Obama's Budget Speech” . FactCheck.org . 2011-04-15. Retrieved 2011-01-04.
  214. ^ Thomas L. Hungerford “Changes in the Distribution of Income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy.” Congressional Research Service, Dec. 29, 2011. http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/crs-1.pdf
  215. ^ As an alternative to the Census Bureau's estimate of the Gini index, a Gini index based on Adjusted Gross Income from IRS Tax Returns can be computed. In 1990, the IRS AGI Gini was 0.529 and increased to 0.584 by 2008.
  216. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.15 and figure 8
  217. ^ a b Winner-Take-All Politics (book) by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson p.75
  218. ^ a b “CBO Report Shows Rich Got Richer, As Did Most Americans: View” . businessweek.com. October 31, 2011.
  219. ^ a b c Oligarchy, American Style By PAUL KRUGMAN . 3 November 2011
  220. ^ a b c d The United States of Inequality, Entry 10: Why We Can't Ignore Growing Income Inequality By: Timothy Noah. slate.com| 16 September 2010
  221. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman
  222. ^ Investment Outlook | October 2011 |Six Pac(k)in'
  223. ^ Wall Street Bolshies Watch Timothy Noah| tnr.com| October 3, 2011
  224. ^ a b Two Americas: One Rich, One Poor? Understanding Income Inequality in the United States By Rea Hederman, Jr. and Robert Rector| Heritage Foundation. August 24, 2004]
  225. ^ A Look at the Global One Percent By ALLAN H. MELTZER| wsj.com| 9 March 2012
  226. ^ US Income Inequality: It's Not So Bad By Thomas A. Garrett| Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis| Spring 2010
  227. ^ “Thinking Clearly About Economic Inequality” , Will Wilkinson, Cato Institute 2009
  228. ^ Johnson, Smeeding, Tory, “Economic Inequality” in Monthly Labor review of April 2005, table 3.
  229. ^ see also Hassett and Mathur: Consumption and the Myths of Inequality | BY KEVIN A. HASSETT AND APARNA MATHUR| online.wsj.com| October 24, 2012
  230. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.5
  231. ^ The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in The US, 1980-2010 |Orazio Attanasio| Erik Hurst| Luigi Pistaferri| National Bureau of Economic Research| NBER Working Papers #17982| Apr 2012
  232. ^ The Way Forward | By Daniel Alpert, Westwood Capital; Robert Hockett, Professor of Law, Cornell University; and Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics, New York University| New America Foundation| October 10, 2011
  233. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman (see last chart: Inequality and household debt)
  234. ^ Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience Elizabeth Warren*
  235. ^ Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal , WW Norton & Company, 2007, (p.246-7)
  236. ^ a b Why Obama's New Populism May Sink His Campaign William Galston | tnr.com| 17 December 2011]
  237. ^ Why the President's Campaign Shouldn't Focus on Inequality William Galston| tnr.com| 3 May 2012| accessed 5 May 2012
  238. ^ NBC/WSJ: Americans prefer message focused on fairness over anti-government or inequality argument by Jed Lewison dailykos.com 20 April 2012
  239. ^ conducted Dec. 7-11 among 1,521 adults
  240. ^ Tax System Seen as Unfair, in Need of Overhaul, Wealthy Not Paying Fair Share Top Complaint pewresearch.org 20 December 2011]
  241. ^ Survey Finds Rising Perception of Class Tension | By SABRINA TAVERNISE| 11 January 2012
  242. ^ Rising Share of Americans See Conflict Between Rich and Poor by Rich Morin| 11 January 2012
  243. ^ Lars Osberg and Timothy Smeeding. “Fair Inequality? Attitudes Toward Pay Dfferentials: The United States in Comparative Perspective, ” American Sociological Review, 71, 2006, pp. 450 – 473.
  244. ^ Norton, MI, & Ariely , D., “Building a Better America – One Wealth Quintile at a Time” , Perspectives on Psychological Science , January 2011 6: 9-12
  245. ^ Joseph E. Stiglitz (2012) The Price of Inequality. New York: WWNorton
  246. ^ Based on Larry Bartels's study Economic Inequality and Political Representation , Table 1: Differential Responsiveness of Senators to Constituency Opinion.
  247. ^ Richistan: A Journey Through the American Wealth Boom and the Lives of the New Rich … By Robert Frank
  248. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 92). 노턴. Kindle Edition.
  249. ^ Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1% | vanityfair.com| May 2010
  250. ^ A study confined to non-Hispanic whites in US and England also showed the effect. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.177)
  251. ^ Countries of similar cultures and different levels of equality — Spain and Portugal — showed difference in the index, while countries with very different cultures and ways of achieving equality — Nordic countries and Japan — charted closer to each other. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.183)
  252. ^ The effect was worse among low class/education level in high inequality countries, but continued through all occupational classes and was still significant among the highest. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.178-9)
  253. ^ Statistics and graphs from Wilkinson and Pickett research.
  254. ^ The Spirit Level: how 'ideas wreckers' turned book into political punchbag | Robert Booth| The Guardian| 13 August 2010
  255. ^ a b The Wrong Inequality By David Brooks | nyt.com |31 October 2011.
  256. ^ see also The White Underclass By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF| 8 February 2012
  257. ^ Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976. 33. 인쇄.
  258. ^ a b Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960. 231. 인쇄.
  259. ^ Paul Ryan on Income Inequality and Upward Mobility Diane Ellis, Ed. · 28 November 2011
  260. ^ Three Cheers for Income Inequality
  261. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 85). 노턴. Kindle Edition. See also: Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes, “Do the Rich Save More?,” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 2 (2004): 397– 444.
  262. ^ More or Less | Branko Milanovic| Finance & Development | September 2011| Vol. 48, No. 3
  263. ^ Kenworthy, Lane (December 3, 2007). “Does More Equality Mean Less Economic Growth?” .
  264. ^ Does inequality prevent economic growth? | By Jared Bernstein, On the Economy| 1 October 2012
  265. ^ Corley-Coulibaly, Marva; Prasadm, Naren ; Sekerler Richiardi, Pelin (October 2011). “Tax reform for improving job recovery and equity” . World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 97–120. doi : 10.1002/wow3.28 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  266. ^ Escudero, Verónica; López Mourelo, Elva (2012). “Chapter 3, Fiscal consolidation and employment growth” . In Torres, Raymond (ed.). World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 59–80. ISBN 978-92-9251-010-7 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  267. ^ 스티글리츠, 조셉 (2012년 7월 2일). Interview with Ben Chu. “Stiglitz: the full transcript” . The Independent . Retrieved September 8, 2012.
  268. ^ Income Mobility in the US from 1996 to 2005. Report of the DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. November 13, 2007. p.4. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/incomemobilitystudy03-08revise.pdf
  269. ^ Uncovering the American Dream: Inequality and Mobility in Social Security Earnings Data since 1937 Wojciech Kopczuk, Emmanuel Saez, Jae Song, September 15, 2007, Figure 4B
  270. ^ Millionaire For A Day Paul Krugman. 3 November 2011,
  271. ^ a b Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs | By JASON DePARLE | January 4, 2012 ]
  272. ^ Corak graphs 25 countries, Krueger limits his to developed countries and lists 10

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