Tuarascáil Wiki ar Ioncam Éagothroime sna Stáit Aontaithe

Éagothroime ioncaim sna Stáit Aontaithe

Ón Vicipéid, an chiclipéid shaor

Dáileadh ioncaim sna Stáit Aontaithe a bhí ina ábhar staidéir ag scoláirí agus institiúidí. Sonraí ó fhoinsí [1] le fios go bhfuil fás suntasach tagtha ar éagothroime ioncaim ó na 1970í luatha , [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] tar éis roinnt blianta d'cobhsaíocht . [7] [8] Cé éagothroime Tá méadú tagtha i measc an chuid is mó forbartha tíortha, agus go háirithe na cinn Béarla-labhairt, tá sé is airde sna Stáit Aontaithe. [9] [10] [11]

Staidéar le fios an fhoinse an bhearna a leathnú (uaireanta ar a dtugtar an dibhéirseacht Breataine ) nach raibh éagothroime inscne , a laghdú sna Stáit Aontaithe thar na fiche bliain anuas roinnt, [12]éagothroime idir Meiriceánaigh dubh agus bán , a bhfuil marbhánta le linn an ama sin , [13] ná go bhfuil an bhearna idir an rang lag agus lár curtha ar an mór-chúis-cé tá sé ag fás. [14] An chuid is mó den fhás a ​​bhí idir an rang lár agus saothraithe barr, leis an difríocht ag éirí níos mhór an ceann eile théann suas sa dáileadh ioncaim. [15]

Staidéar 2011 ag an CBO [16] go raibh an barr tuilleamh 1 faoin gcéad de na líonta tí a fuarthas thart ar 275% tar éis cánacha cónaidhme agus aistrithe ioncaim thar thréimhse idir 1979 agus 2007, i gcomparáid le gnóthachan de díreach faoi 40% don 60 faoin gcéad i lár dáilte ioncaim i Meiriceá. [16] Foinsí eile a aimsiú go bhfuil an treocht leanúnach ó shin i leith. [17] Mar sin féin, a cheapann ach 42% de na Meiriceánaigh ag éagothroime méadaithe le deich mbliana anuas. [18] Ní éagothroime ioncaim aonfhoirmeach i measc na stáit; mar atá tomhaiste ag an chomhéifeacht Gini : tar éis éagothroime ioncaim cánach i 2009 is mó i Texas agus is ísle i Maine . [19]

Difriúil Scoláirí agus daoine eile maidir leis na cúiseanna, réitigh, agus an tábhacht a bhaineann leis an treocht, [20] [21] i 2011 chabhraigh ignite an ghluaiseacht agóid "Áitiú" . Oideachas agus éileamh méadaithe ar shaothar oilte a luadh go minic mar cúiseanna, [22] roinnt tar éis béim ar an tábhacht atá le beartas poiblí; creideann daoine eile an chúis (í) éagothroime ar ardú nach bhfuil tuiscint mhaith orthu. [16] Tá éagothroime cur síos araon mar nach mbaineann le hábhar i bhfianaise na deiseanna eacnamaíochta (nó soghluaiseacht shóisialta ) i Meiriceá, agus mar chúis leis an meath sa an deis sin. [23] [24]

Stair

US neamhionannas from 1913-2008 [25] .

Scair de ioncam teaghlaigh réamh-cánach faighte ag an barr 1 faoin gcéad, barr 0.1 faoin gcéad agus barr 0.01 faoin gcéad, idir 1917 agus 2005. [26] [27]

Níor chuir an leibhéal comhchruinnithe ioncaim i Meiriceá bhí i gcónaí ar fud a stair. Ag dul ar ais go dtí tús an 20ú haois, nuair a thosaigh staitisticí ioncaim a bheith ar fáil, tá le "stua mór eacnamaíochta" ó éagothroime ard "chun comhionannas coibhneasta agus ar ais arís," i bhfocail an Nobel laureate eacnamaí Paul Krugman . [28] Sa bhliain 1915, ré ina bhfuil an Rockefellers agus Carnegies is mó tionscal Mheiriceá, thuill an saibhre 1% de na Meiriceánaigh thart ar 18% de gach ioncam. Faoi 2007, an cuntas barr 1 faoin gcéad do 24% de gach ioncam. [29] I idir, thit a sciar faoi bhun 10% ar feadh tríocha bliain.

An chéad ré éagothroime mhair go garbh ó ré cogadh iar-sibhialta ("an Aois gilded ") go dtí éigin timpeall 1937. Ach ó thart ar 1937-1947-tréimhse a fuair teideal an " Mór comhbhrúite " [30] éagothroime-ioncam i Meiriceá thit go mór. Fíor forásach Nua cánachas, neartú na ceardchumainn, agus rialáil na mBord Náisiúnta Chogaidh Labor linn an Dara Cogadh Domhanda II a ardaíodh an t-ioncam na mbocht agus lucht oibre agus ísliú go saothraithe barr. [31] Seo "sochaí rang lár" réasúnta leibhéal íseal éagothroime fhan cothrom seasta ar feadh thart ar tríocha bliain dar críoch i 1970 go luath, [7] [30] [32] an táirge pá réasúnta ard do na Stáit Aontaithe lucht oibre agus tacaíocht pholaitiúil d'ioncam beartais rialtais leibhéalta.

Pá fhan réasúnta ard mar gheall ar easpa iomaíochta coigríche le haghaidh monaraíochta Mheiriceá, easpa na n-oibrithe inimirceacha ar bheagán scileanna, [33] iomaíocht le haghaidh oibrithe US i gcoitinne, agus - ceardchumainn láidir - fhéadfaí a rá is tábhachtaí. Faoi 1947 bhí níos mó ná trian d'oibrithe neamh-fheirme baill na gceardchumann, [34] agus na ceardchumainn ar an meán pá as a gcomhaltas ardaíodh araon, agus go hindíreach, agus go pointe níos lú, ardaíodh pá d'oibrithe i ngairmeacha den chineál céanna nach bhfuil ionadaíocht ag na ceardchumainn. [35 ] Creidim Scoláirí tacaíocht pholaitiúil don chothromú polasaithe rialtais a bhí ar fáil ag tionól vótálaí ard ó thiomáineann aontas vótála, an tacaíocht an coimeádach a mhalairt Theas don Beart Nua, agus gradam go bhfuil an slógadh ollmhór agus bua na Cogadh Domhanda thug an rialtas. [ 36]

An toradh a ard-neamhionannas nó cad Krugman agus iriseoir Timothy Noah bhfuil dá dtagraítear mar an " Divergence Mór " [29] -thosaigh sna 1970í.

Na buntáistí a bhaineann le táirgiúlacht mhéadaithe thar na 35 bliain anuas nach bhfuil siad imithe go dtí an rang lár [37]

Staidéar a fuarthas amach ioncam fhás níos mhíchothrom beagnach go leanúnach ach amháin le linn na mheathlú eacnamaíoch i 1990-91 , 2001 ( mboilgeog Dot-com ), agus 2007 fophríomha bust . [38] [39]

Difríocht idir an dibhéirseacht Mór i roinnt bealaí as an éagothroime ré réamh-Storm. Roimh 1937 tháinig sciar níos mó den ioncam saothraithe barr ó chaipiteal (ús, díbhinní, ioncam ó chíos, na gnóthachain chaipitiúla). Iar 1970, a thagann ioncam na gcáiníocóirí ard-ioncam den chuid is mó ó "saothair", ie cúiteamh fostaíochta. [40]

Go dtí 2011, ní raibh an dibhéirseacht Great ceist mhór pholaitiúil i Meiriceá, cé go raibh marbhántacht ioncam rang lár. Sa bhliain 2009 an Barack Obama riarachán Teach Bán an Meán-Rang Teaghlaigh Oibre Tascfhórsa a tionóladh chun díriú ar shaincheisteanna eacnamaíochta a mbíonn tionchar sonrach Meiriceánaigh lár-ioncam. Sa bhliain 2011, an ghluaiseacht Áitriú tharraing aird mhór le éagothroime ioncaim sa tír.

An chuid is mó staitisticí le déanaí

Ó 1992-2007 an barr ar 400 saothraithe sna Stáit Aontaithe chonaic a n-ioncam a mhéadú 392% agus a n-meánráta cánach a laghdú faoi 37%. [41] An sciar den ioncam iomlán i Meiriceá ag dul go dtí an barr 1% de na teaghlaigh Mheiriceá (freisin tar éis cónaidhme Mhéadaigh cánacha agus aistrithe ioncaim) ó 11.3% i 1979 20.9% sa bhliain 2007. [42] Le linn an cúlú Mór de 2007-2009, tháinig laghdú ar éagothroime, a bhfuil ioncam iomlán ag dul go dtí an bun 99 faoin gcéad de na Meiriceánaigh laghdú 11.6%, ach ag titim níos tapúla (36.3%) don an barr 1%. [43] [44] Mar sin féin mhéadaigh difríocht i ioncam arís le linn na 2009-2010 a ghnóthú, leis an barr 1% de shaothraithe ioncaim a ghabháil 11.6% den ioncam agus gnóthachain chaipitiúla, agus an t-ioncam den pháirt eile 99% fhan árasán, atá ag fás ag amháin 0.2%. [45] [46]

Tomhas

Táscairí

Boilsciú choigeartú méadú in ioncam teaghlaigh i ndiaidh-cánach idir 1979 agus 2005 chun an barr 1% agus na ceithre cinn de na cúig quintiles. [47]

Léiríonn an graf seo an t-ioncam na peircintílí a thugtar 1947-2010 i 2010 dollar. Is iad na colúin 2 de uimhreacha san imeall ceart an 1970-2010 fás carnach agus an ráta fáis bliantúil thar an tréimhse sin. Is é an scála ingearach logartamach, a dhéanann fás céatadán tairiseach le feiceáil mar líne dhíreach. From 1947 to 1970, all percentiles grew at essentially the same rate; the light, straight lines for the different percentiles for those years all have the same slope. Since then, there has been substantial divergence, with different percentiles of the income distribution growing at different rates. For the median American family, this gap is $39,000 per year (just over $100 per day): If the economic growth during this period had been broadly shared as it was from 1947 to 1970, the median household income would have been $39,000 per year higher than it was in 2010. This plot was created by combining data from the US Census Bureau [48] and the US Internal Revenue Service. [49] There are systematic differences between these two sources, but the differences are small relative to the scale of this plot. [50]

A number of studies by the US Department of Commerce , Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Internal Revenue Service , have found that the distribution of income in the United States — most commonly measured by household or individual — has become increasingly unequal since the 1970s.

One of the most recent and comprehensive studies on the change in income inequality in America was a 2011 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) — “Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007″. (It chose those two years because they both preceded an economic recession and so both were periods of “similar overall economic activity” [51] ). The report found that real household income after federal taxes and including government transfers (payments from Social Security , unemployment insurance , etc. [52] [53] ) grew by 62%.

However, income of households in the top 1 percent of earners grew by 275%, compared to 65% for the next 19 percent, just under 40% for the next 60 percent, 18% for the bottom fifth of households. “As a result of that uneven income growth,” the report noted, “the share of total after-tax income received by the 1 percent of the population in households with the highest income more than doubled between 1979 and 2007, whereas the share received by low- and middle-income households declined … The share of income received by the top 1 percent grew from about 8% in 1979 to over 17% in 2007. The share received by the other 19 percent of households in the highest income quintile (one-fifth of the population as divided by income) was fairly flat over the same period, edging up from 35% to 36%.” [54]

According to CBO, [55] the major reason for observed rise in unequal distribution of after-tax income was an increase in market income, that is household income before taxes and transfers. Market income for a household is a combination of labor income (such as cash wages, employer-paid benefits, employer-paid payroll taxes), business income (such as income from businesses and farms operated solely by their owners), capital gains (profits realized from the sale of assets, stock options), capital income (such as interest from deposits, dividends, rental income), and other income. Of these, capital gains accounted for 80% of the increase in market income for the households in top 20%, in the 2000-2007 period. Even over 1991-2000 period, according to CBO, capital gains accounted for 45% of the market income for the top 20% households.

Pioneers in the use of IRS income data to analyze income distribution are Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty at the Paris School of Economics showed that the share of income held by the top 1 percent was as large in 2005 as in 1928. [5] Other sources that have noted the increased inequality included economist Janet Yellen who stated, “the growth [in real income] was heavily concentrated at the very tip of the top, that is, the top 1 percent.” [56]

Economist Timothy Smeeding summed up the current trend: [57]

Americans have the highest income inequality in the rich world and over the past 20–30 years Americans have also experienced the greatest increase in income inequality among rich nations. The more detailed the data we can use to observe this change, the more skewed the change appears to be … the majority of large gains are indeed at the top of the distribution.

United States Census Bureau studies on inequality of income measure both households [58] and individuals. [59] Their numbers show lower levels of inequality [60] but do not include data for the highest-income households where most of change in income distribution has occurred. [20] [61] [62] [63]

Data Total gain Percent gain 2003 2000 1997 1994 1991 1988 1985 1982 1979 1976 1973 1970 1967
20th percentile $3,982 28.4% $17,984 $19,142 $17,601 $16,484 $16,580 $17,006 $16,306 $15,548 $16,457 $15,615 $15,844 $15,126 $14,002
Median (50th) $9,980 29.9% $43,318 $44,853 $42,294 $39,613 $39,679 $40,678 $38,510 $36,811 $38,649 $36,155 $37,700 $35,832 $33,338
80th percentile $31,602 57.2% $86,867 $87,341 $81,719 $77,154 $74,759 $75,593 $71,433 $66,920 $68,318 $63,247 $64,500 $60,148 $55,265
95th percentile $65,442 73.8% $154,120 $155,121 $144,636 $134,835 $126,969 $127,958 $119,459 $111,516 $111,445 $100,839 $102,243 $95,090 $88,678
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2004 [64] (Page 44/45)

Demographic issues

Comparisons of income over time should adjust for changes in average age, family size, number of breadwinners, and other characteristics of a population. Measuring personal income ignores dependent children, but household income also has problems—a household of ten has a lower standard of living than one of two people, though the income of the two households may be the same. [65]

People's earnings tend to rise over their working lifetimes, so “snapshot measures of income inequality can be misleading.” [66] The inequality of a recent college graduate and a 55-year-old at the peak of his/her career is not an issue if the graduate has the same career path.

Conservative researchers and organizations have focused on the flaws of household income as a measure for standard of living in order to refute claims that income inequality is growing, becoming excessive or posing a problem for society. [67] According to sociologist Dennis Gilbert, growing inequality can be explained in part by growing participation of women in the workforce. High earning households are more likely to be dual earner households, [7] And according to a 2004 analysis of income quintile data by the Heritage Foundation , inequality becomes less when household income is adjusted for size of household. Aggregate share of income held by the upper quintile (the top earning 20 percent) decreases by 20.3% when figures are adjusted to reflect household size. [68]

However the Pew Research Center found household income has appeared to decline less than individual income in the twenty-first century because those who are no longer able to afford their own housing have increasingly been moving in with relatives, creating larger households with more income earners in them. [69]

The 2011 CBO study “Trends in the Distribution of Household Income” mentioned in this article adjusts for household size so that its quintiles contain an equal number of people, not an equal number of households. [70]

Looking at the issue of how frequently workers or households move into higher or lower quintiles as their income rises or falls over the years, [71] the CBO found income distribution over a multi-year period “modestly” more equal than annual income. [72] The CBO study confirms earlier studies. [47]

Overall, according to Timothy Noah, correcting for demographic factors (today's population is older than it was 33 years ago, and divorce and single parenthood have made households smaller), you find that income inequality, though less extreme than shown by the standard measure, is also growing faster than shown by the standard measure. [73]

Wage inequality

According to Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,

…real hourly wages of those in the 90th percentile—where most people have college or advanced degrees—rose by 30% or more… among this top 10 percent, the growth was heavily concentrated at the very tip of the top, that is, the top 1 percent. This includes the people who earn the very highest salaries in the US economy, like sports and entertainment stars, investment bankers and venture capitalists, corporate attorneys, and CEOs. In contrast, at the 50th percentile and below—where many people have at most a high school diploma—real wages rose by only 5 to 10% – [56]

Lisa Shalett of Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, found that,real average hourly earnings in the US “are essentially flat to down, with today's inflation-adjusted wage equating to about the same level as that attained by workers in 1970″, despite the fact that “for the last two decades and especially in the current period”, productivity has “soared”. The benefits of productivity during this cycle had gone “almost exclusively to corporations and their very top executives.” [74]

Gini index

Further information: Gini coefficient

The Gini coefficient summarizes income inequality in a single number and is one of the most commonly used measures of income inequality. It uses a scale from 0 to 1 — the higher the number the more inequality. 0 represents perfect equality (everyone having exactly the same income), and 1 represents perfect inequality (one person having all income). (Index scores are commonly multiplied by 100 to make them easier to understand. [75] ) Gini index ratings can be used to compare inequality within (by race, gender, employment) and between countries, before and after taxes. [76] [77] [78] [79] Different sources will often give different gini values for the same country or population measured.

Comparisons by state

This Gini Index map shows regional and county level variation in pre-tax income inequality Gini index. The 2010 Gini index value range from 0.207 for Loving County ( Texas ) to 0.645 to East Carroll Parish ( Louisiana ). [80]

The household income Gini index for the United States was 0.468 in 2009, according to the US Census Bureau , [81] though it varied significantly between states . The states of Utah, Alaska and Wyoming have a pre-tax income inequality Gini coefficient that is 10% lower than the average, while Washington DC and Puerto Rico 10% higher. After including the effects of federal and state taxes, the US Federal Reserve estimates 34 states in the USA have a Gini coefficient between 0.30 and 0.35, with the state of Maine the lowest. [19] At the county and municipality levels, the pre-tax Gini index ranged from 0.21 to 0.65 in 2010 across the United States, according to Census Bureau estimates. [80]

OECD estimates the pre-tax Gini index for the United States was 0.49, and after-tax Gini index was 0.38, in 2008-2009. The average pre-tax Gini index for OECD countries was 0.46, while the average after-tax Gini index was 0.31. [76]

International comparisons

The UN , CIA World Factbook , [82] and OECD have used the gini index to compare inequality between countries, and as of 2006, the United States had one of the highest levels of income inequality among similar developed or high income countries , as measured by the index. [9] While inequality has increased since 1981 in two-thirds of OECD countries [12] [83] most developed countries are in the lower, more equal, end of the spectrum, with a Gini coefficient in the high twenties to mid thirties. [84]

The gini rating of the United States is sufficiently high, however, to put it among less developed countries. The US ranks above (more unequal than) South American countries such Guyana, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and roughly on par with Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, according to the CIA. [85] (although some developed countries have higher gini ratings before taxes and transfers. [10] )

Between 1985 and 2008 the OECD-24 countries with the fastest-rising Gini coefficients were Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, Israel, Germany, and Luxembourg. [86]

Organization US gini
rating
International range US ranking in
income equality
Year(s) rated
Most equal
(lowest gini)
Least equal
(highest gini)
UN [87] [88] 0.408 0.168 ( Azerbaijan ) 0.743 ( Namibia ) 77th out of 146 2000-2010
The World Factbook
(CIA) [82]
0.45 0.23 ( Sweden , 2005) 0.707 (Namibia, 2003) 100th out of 140 [89] 1994–2009
OECD [10]
(after taxes and transfers)
0.378 0.236 ( Slovenia ) 0.494 ( Chile ) 31st out of 34
(in OECD)
“late 2000s”
OECD [10]
(before taxes and transfers)
0.486 0.344 ( South Korea ) 0.534 ( Italy ) 26th out of 33
(in OECD)
“late 2000s”

Among the 34 “developed” countries of the OECD the US gini rank in income equality (27th) is higher before taxes and “transfers” are measured, [90] then after (31st) [91] —ie, the US has less income redistribution by government than some other post-industrial economies. However some developed countries, such as the Netherlands and Greece, have less inequality simply because incomes are more equal than in the US even before taxes. [92]

Some have argued that inequality is higher in other countries than official statistics indicate because of unreported income. European countries have higher amounts of wealth in offshore holdings. [93] [94] [95] [96]

Income levels

High income

60% of earners in the top 0.1 percent are executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals. More than half of them work in closely held businesses. [97] The top 1 percent is composed of many professions, the five most common professions being managers , [98] physicians , administrators , lawyers , and financial specialists. Doctors are more likely than any other profession to be in the 1 percent. [99]

Causes

Inequality in general

Expertise, productiveness and work experience, inheritance, gender, and race have had a strong influence on distribution of personal income [100] [101] in the United States as in other countries.

Race and gender disparities

Income levels vary by gender and race with median income levels considerably below the national median for females compared to men with certain racial demographics. [102]

Median personal income by gender and race in 2005.

Despite considerable progress in pursuing gender and racial equality, some social scientists attribute these discrepancies in income to continued discrimination. [103] Others argue that the majority of the wage gap is due to women's choices and preferences. Women are more likely to consider factors other than salary when looking for employment. On average, women are less willing to travel or relocate, take more hours off and work fewer hours, and choose college majors that lead to lower paying jobs. Women are also more likely to work for governments or non-profits, that pay less than the private sector. [104] [105] According to this perspective certain ethnic minorities and women receive fewer promotions and opportunities for occupation and economic advancement than others. In the case of women this concept is referred to as the glass ceiling keeping women from climbing the occupational ladder.

In terms of race, Asian Americans are far more likely to be in the highest earning 5 percent than the rest of Americans. [106]

However studies have shown that African Americans are less likely to be hired than European-Americans with the same qualifications. [107] The continued prevalence of traditional gender roles and ethnic stereotypes may partially account for current levels of discrimination. [103] In 2005, median income levels were highest among Asian and White males and lowest among females of all races, especially those identifying as African American or Hispanic. Despite closing gender and racial gaps, considerable discrepancies remain among racial and gender demographics, even at the same level of educational attainment. [108] The success of Asian Americans may come from how parents and children spend much longer hours on education than their peers. Asian American have significantly higher college graduation rates than their peers and are much more likely to enter high status occupations. [109]

Median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers, by sex, race, and ethnicity, 2009. [110]

Since 1953 the income gap between male and female workers has decreased considerably but remains relatively large. [111] Women currently earn significantly more Associate's, Bachelor's, and Master's degrees than men and almost as many Doctorates. [112] Women are projected to have passed men in Doctorates earned in 2006–2007, and to earn nearly two thirds of Associate's, Bachelor's, and Master's degrees by 2016. [113] Despite this, some [ who? ] still argue that male workers still hold higher educational attainment, as the success of women in academia is a relatively new phenomenon. [100]

Though it is important to note that income inequality between sexes remained stark at all levels of educational attainment. [102] Between 1953 and 2005 median earnings as well as educational attainment increased, at a far greater pace for women than for men. Median income for female earners male earners increased 157.2% versus 36.2% for men, over four times as fast. Today the median male worker earns roughly 68.36% more than their female counterparts, compared to 176.25% in 1953. The median income of men in 2005 was 2% higher than in 1973 compared to a 74.6% increase for female earners. [111]

Racial differences remained stark as well, with the highest earning sex-gender demographic of workers aged 25 or older, Asian males (who were roughly tied with white males ) earning slightly more than twice as much as the lowest-earning demographic, Hispanic females. [114] [115] As mentioned above, inequality between races and gender persisted at similar education levels. [115] [116] Racial differences were overall more pronounced among male than among female income earners. In 2009, Hispanics were more than twice as likely to be poor than non-Hispanic whites, research indicates. [117] Lower average English ability, low levels of educational attainment, part-time employment, the youthfulness of Hispanic household heads, and the 2007–09 recession are important factors that have pushed up the Hispanic poverty rate relative to non-Hispanic whites.

During the early 1920s, median earnings decreased for both sexes, not increasing substantially until the late 1990s. Since 1974 the median income for workers of both sexes increased by 31.7% from $18,474 to $24,325, reaching its high-point in 2000. [118]

Demographic Median personal income
Overall Median High school graduate Some college Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Masters degree Doctorate degree
Bán Male [119] $40,432 $33,805 $40,427 $61,175 $55,129 $67,903 $77,818
Female [120] $26,636 $21,306 $25,190 $40,161 $36,076 $45,555 $56,759
Both sexes [121] $32,919 $27,291 $31,510 $49,879 $43,841 $52,244 $71,184
Dubh Male [122] $30,549 $25,747 $32,758 $46,474 $41,889 $52,488 N / A
Female [122] $25,435 $20,366 $25,574 $42,461 $41,263 $45,830 N / A
Both sexes [123] $27,110 $22,328 $27,589 $44,460 $41,565 $47,407 $61,993
Na hÁise Male [116] $42,217 $28,486 $34,548 $61,165 $51,448 $70,979 $81,676
Female [124] $30,332 $21,057 $23,523 $41,442 $37,057 $48,177 $53,659
Both sexes [125] $36,152 $25,285 $29,982 $51,481 $42,466 $61,452 $69,653
Hispanic Male [126] $26,162 $26,579 $33,617 $48,282 $43,791 $60,194 N / A
Female [127] $20,133 $18,886 $25,088 $37,405 $34,302 $47,052 N / A
Both sexes [128] $23,613 $22,941 $28,698 $41,596 $37,819 $50,901 $67,274
All racial/ethnic demographics Male [129] $39,403 $32,085 $39,150 $60,493 $52,265 $67,123 $78,324
Female [130] $26,507 $21,117 $25,185 $40,483 $36,532 $45,730 $54,666
Both sexes [131] $32,140 $26,505 $31,054 $49,303 $43,143 $52,390 $70,853
NOTE: The highest median for each level of educational attainment is highlighted in green, the lowest in orange.
SOURCE: US Bureau of Census, 2006

Household income levels and gains for different percentiles in 2003 dollars. [132]

Education and technology

Median personal and household income according to different education levels. [131] [133]

Income differences between the varying levels of educational attainment (usually measured by the highest degree of education an individual has completed) have increased. Expertise and skill certified through an academic degree translates into increased scarcity of an individual's occupational qualification which in turn leads to greater economic rewards. [134] As the United States has developed into a post-industrial society more and more employers require expertise that they did not a generation ago, while the manufacturing sector which employed many of those lacking a post-secondary education is decreasing in size. [135]

In the resulting economic job market the income discrepancy between the working class and the professional with the higher academic degrees, [100] who possess scarce amounts of certified expertise, may be growing.

Households in the upper quintiles are generally home to more, better educated and employed working income earners, than those in lower quintiles. [68] Among those in the upper quintile, 62% of householders were college graduates, 80% worked full-time and 76% of households had two or more income earners, compared to the national percentages of 27%, 58% and 42%, respectively. [100] [101] [136] Upper-most sphere US Census Bureau data indicated that occupational achievement and the possession of scarce skills correlates with higher income. [136]

Average earnings in 2002 for the population 18 years and over were higher at each progressively higher level of education… This relationship holds true not only for the entire population but also across most subgroups. Within each specific educational level, earnings differed by sex and race. This variation may result from a variety of factors, such as occupation, working full- or part-time, age, or labor force experience. – [100] [137]
Demographic High school graduate Some college Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Master's degree First professional degree Doctorate degree
Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median Median % +/- national median
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings
(2005)
Both sexes $26,505 −17.5% $31,054 −3.5% $49,303 +53.4% $43,143 +34.2% $52,390 +63.0% $82,473 +156.6% $70,853 +120.4%
Males $32,085 −18.6% $39,150 −0.6% $60,493 +53.5% $52,265 +32.6% $67,123 +70.3% $100,000 +153.8% $78,324 +98.8%
Females $21,117 −20.3% $25,185 −5.0% $40,483 +52.7% $36,532 +37.82% $45,730 +72.5% $66,055 +149.2% $54,666 +106.2%
Both sexes employed full-time $31,539 −19.8% $37,135 −5.6% $56,078 +42.5% $50,944 +29.5% $61,273 +55.8% $100,000 +154.2% $79,401 +101.8%
Households
(2003)
$36,835 −20.5% $45,854 −0.8% $73,446 +58.8% $68,728 +48.6 $78,541 +69.9% $100,000 +116.2% $96,830 +109.4%
SOURCE: US Census Bureau, 2004/06 [131] [133]

Dreasachtaí

Percent of households with 2+ income earners, and full-time workers by income. [136]

In the context of concern over income inequality a number of economists, such as Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernake, have talked about the importance of incentives: “… without the possibility of unequal outcomes tied to differences in effort and skill, the economic incentive for productive behavior would be eliminated, and our market-based economy … would function far less effectively.” [134] [138] Yale economist Arthur Okun argues there is a trade-off between economic growth and economic redistribution. [139] [140]

Since abundant supply decreases market value, the possession of scarce skills considerably increases income. [100] Among the American lower class , the most common source of income was not occupation, but government welfare. [141]

Taxation

Average tax rate percentages for the highest-income US taxpayers, 1945-2009

Another factor in income inequality/equality is the effective rate at which income is taxed coupled with the progressivity of the tax system. A progressive tax is a tax by which the tax rate increases as the taxable base amount increases. [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] Overall income tax rates in the United States are below the OECD average, and until 2005 have been declining. [147]

Post-1980 rise in inequality

Most current discussion of income inequality in America centers on its rise since the mind to late 1970s, the so-called “ Great Divergence “. According to the United States Census Bureau , it reported that the income inequality between the richest and poorest people grew to its widest in 2011, as the census recorded 46.2 million people living in poverty . [148]

Broad breakdown

Breaking down how much of the increase in income inequality between 1979 and 2007 came from distribution of pre-tax income and how much from taxes and “government transfers”, the CBO data shows that the 33% increase in inequality [149] came from a

  • 23% increase in inequality from changes in distribution of “market income” to households (top earners received a larger share of salaries, interest, dividends, capital gains, business income, etc.); a
  • 6% increase from changes in “government transfers” (social security, unemployment, the end of AFDC welfare, etc.); and a
  • 4% increase from changes in federal taxation (overall decline in the average federal tax rate and shift in federal revenues from income taxes to less progressive payroll taxes, etc.).

[150] [151]

Of the 23% increase in inequality from changes in pre-tax “market” income, most of that (79%) came from a shift to top earners in different types of income across the board. A smaller amount of inequality increase (21%) came from a shift from wages and salaries to more concentrated income sources—ie interest, dividends, business income and especially capital gains, which are more concentrated toward top earners than income from salaries/wages. [152]

According to Michael Cembalest, the chief investment officer of JPMorgan Chase , [153] as of 2011, corporate “profit margins have reached levels not seen in decades,” and “reductions in wages and benefits explain the majority of the net improvement. … US labor compensation is now at a 50-year low relative to both company sales and US GDP” [154]

Lisa Shalett, chief investment officer at Merrill Lynch Wealth Management noted that, “for the last two decades and especially in the current period, … productivity soared … [but] US real average hourly earnings are essentially flat to down, with today's inflation-adjusted wage equating to about the same level as that attained by workers in 1970. … So where have the benefits of technology-driven productivity cycle gone? Almost exclusively to corporations and their very top executives.” [74]

Explanations

According to the CBO and others, “the precise reasons for the [recent] rapid growth in income at the top are not well understood”, [40] [85] but “in all likelihood,” an “interaction of multiple factors” was involved. [155] “Researchers have offered several potential rationales.” [40] [56] Some of these rationales conflict, some overlap. [156] They include:

  • the globalization hypothesis—low skilled American workers have been losing ground in the face of competition from low-wage workers in Asia and other “emerging” economies; [157]
  • skill-biased technological change — the rapid pace of progress in information technology has increased the demand for the highly skilled and educated so that income distribution favored brains rather than brawn; [157]
  • the superstar hypothesis—modern technologies of communication often turn competition into a tournament in which the winner is richly rewarded, while the runners-up get far less than in the past; [157] [158]
  • immigration of less-educated workers — relatively high levels of immigration of low skilled workers since 1965 may have reduced wages for American-born high school dropouts; [159]
  • policy and politics — soaring executive compensation , stagnating middle income pay and more regressive taxation resulting from political decisions, not market forces. Decision such as not intervening to stop executive capture of corporate boards, the crushing of labor unions, etc.

Analyzing the top three hypotheses, economist Paul Krugman found them to be “increasingly inadequate” as more evidence accumulated.

Globalization can explain part of the relative decline in blue-collar wages, but it can't explain the 2,500 percent rise in CEO incomes. Technology may explain why the salary premium associated with a college education has risen, but it's hard to match up with the huge increase in inequality among the college-educated, with little progress for many but gigantic gains at the top. The superstar theory works for Jay Leno , but not for the thousands of people who have become awesomely rich without going on TV. [157]

Immigration was also found wanting as an explanation. [160]

Other scholars [161] questioning the explanation of educational attainment and workplace skills point out that other countries with similar education levels and economies have not gone the way of the US, and that concentration of income in the US hasn't followed a pattern of “the 29% of Americans with college degrees pulling away” from those who have less education. [57] [162] [163] [164] [165] [9]

Skill-biased technological change

As of the mid- to late- decade of the 2000s, the most common explanation for income inequality in America was “skill-biased technological change” [166] — “a shift in the production technology that favors skilled over unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its relative demand “. [167] For example, one scholarly colloquium on the subject that included many prominent labor economists estimated that technological change was responsible for over 40% of the increase in inequality. Other factors like international trade, decline in real minimum wage, decline in unionization and rising immigration, were each responsible for 10-15% of the increase. [168] [169]

Numbers show the strength of education's influence on income distribution. [170] In 2005, roughly 55% of income earners with doctorate degrees — the most educated 1.4% — were among the top 15 percent earners. Among those with Masters degrees — the most educated 10% — roughly half had incomes among the top 20 percent of earners. [131] Only among households in the top quintile were householders with college degrees in the majority. [101]

But while the higher education commonly translates into higher income, [170] and the highly educated are disproportionately represented in upper quintile households , differences in educational attainment fail to explain income discrepancies between the top 1 percent and the rest of the population. Large percentages of individuals lacking a college degree are present in all income demographics, including 33% of those with heading households with six figure incomes . [101] From 2000 to 2010, the 1.5% of Americans with an MD, JD, or MBA and the 1.5% with a PhD saw median income gains of approximately 5%. Among those with a college or master's degree (about 25% of the American workforce) average wages dropped by about 7%, (though this was less than the decline in wages for those who had not completed college). [171]

Approaching the issue from occupations that have been replaced or downgraded since the late 1970s, one scholar found that jobs that “require some thinking but not a lot” — or moderately skilled middle-class occupations such as cashiers, typists, welders, farmers, appliance repairmen — declined the furthest in wage rates and/or numbers. Employment requiring either more skill or less has been less affected. [172] However the timing of the great technological change of the era—internet use by business starting in the late 1990s—does not match that of the growth of income inequality (starting in the early 1970s but slackening somewhat in the 1990s). Nor does the introduction of technologies that increase the demand for more skilled workers seem to be generally associated with a divergence in household income among the population. Inventions of the 20th century such as AC electric power , the automobile, airplane, radio, television, the washing machine, Xerox machine, each had an economic impact the equal of computers/microprocessors/internet but did not coincide with greater inequality. [172]

Oideachas

Is ea an míniú go bhfuil an teaglaim de thabhairt isteach na dteicneolaíochtaí a mhéadaíonn an t-éileamh ar oibrithe oilte, agus an teip ar an gcóras oideachais Mheiriceá chun méadú go leor sna oibrithe oilte a chur ar fáil tairiscint suas thuarastail na hoibrithe '. Is sampla an moilliú i bhfás oideachas i Meiriceá (Thosaigh go bhfuil thart ar an am céanna mar a thosaigh an dibhéirseacht Breataine) ar an bhfíric go bhfuair an duine ar an meán a rugadh i 1945 dhá bhliain níos mó de scolaíocht ná a thuismitheoirí, agus an duine ar an meán a rugadh i 1975 Fuair ​​ach leath na bliana níos mó de scolaíocht. [173] Tá Údar Timothy Noah ar "ar ais-ar-an-clúdach" meastachán bunaithe ar ábhair "chomhchodacha de mo plé le agus léamh na eacnamaithe éagsúla agus eolaithe polaitiúla" go bhfuil an "teipeanna éagsúla" sa chóras oideachais i Meiriceá atá "freagrach as 30%" den mhéadú iar-1978 éagothroime. [173]

Domhandú

Cé go n-aontaíonn eacnamaithe a rinne staidéar ar an domhandú allmhairí raibh tionchar, nach bhfuil an t-am ar fhás allmhairí comhoiriúnach leis an bhfás ar éagothroime ioncaim. Is é an tSín an domhain onnmhaireoir is mó agus déantóir na táirgí a mhonaraítear ach bhí ioncam per capita i 2007 ar cheann-seachtú go na Stát Aontaithe. Faoi 1995 allmhairí earraí monaraithe ó thíortha íseal-phá iomlán de níos lú ná 3% de US olltáirgeacht intíre. [174]

Ní raibh sé go dtí 2006 gur allmhairíodh an US-earraí a mhonaraítear níos mó ó íseal-pá (mbéal forbartha) tíortha ná ó ard-pá (cinn) geilleagair. [175] Éagothroime méadú i rith na deich mbliana 2000-2010 mar gheall ar pá stagnating ar feadh níos lú- oibrithe oilte, ach mar gheall ar ioncam an barr 0.1% luathú. [174] meastacháin Údar Timothy Noah sin, tá méaduithe i allmhairí "trádáil" atá freagrach as ach 10% de na "Divergence Mór" i dáileadh ioncaim. [173]

Inimirce

An tAcht um Inimirce agus Náisiúntacht 1965 mhéadaigh inimirce go Meiriceá, go háirithe neamh-nEorpach. [85] Ó 1970 go 2007, d'fhás an cion coigríche a rugadh de dhaonra Mheiriceá ó 5% go 11%, an chuid is mó díobh a bhí leibhéil oideachais níos ísle agus ioncaim ná Meiriceánaigh dúchasacha a rugadh. Ach is cosúil leis an méid a chuireann an méadú i soláthar saothair íseal-scileanna a bheith réasúnta measartha. Dúirt meastachán amháin gur laghdaigh inimirce an t-ioncam meán bliantúil de "dropouts ard-scoil" dúchais a rugadh ("a fhreagraíonn garbh don deichiú is boichte an lucht oibre") ag 7.4% 1980-2000. Ba é an laghdú ar ioncam na n-oibrithe níos fearr oideachas i bhfad níos lú. [85] meastacháin Údar Timothy Noah go bhfuil "inimirce" atá freagrach as ach 5% de na "Divergence Mór" i dáileadh ioncaim. [173]

Athruithe i ríomh ioncaim

Is bhreathnadóir amháin a dhiúltaíonn go bhfuil ioncam teaghlaigh a bheith níos mhíchothrom Alan Reynolds , comhaltachta sinsearaí leis an Institiúid Cato . Reyonlds dhearbhaigh go bhfuil éagothroime ioncaim illusion staidrimh a tharlaíonn de bharr athruithe teicniúla ar an dlí cánach a athrú cad a fhaigheann ioncam a tuairiscíodh don tSeirbhís Ioncaim Inmheánach agus cén t-ioncam nach bhfuil. [67] [176] leis an éileamh seo curtha Cáineadh mar " sliabh na quibbles staidrimh crua-le-a leanúint, go minic nach mbaineann le hábhar, agus uaireanta go hearráideach go hiomlán " [177] nó "intleachtúil monte trí chárta . " [178]

Reynolds pointí amach gur bailíodh na sonraí go léir a ríomh go bhfuil éagothroime ioncaim bunaithe ar thuairisceáin chánach cónaidhme. Níl ioncam nach bhfuil ar tuairisceáin cánach atá ar áireamh sna sonraí. Ní nach ionadh, tá cén t-ioncam ag teastáil agus ní cheanglaítear a thuairisciú tar éis athrú. Roimh na 1980í, ní raibh spéis i bannaí bardasacha agus roghanna stoc feidhmiúcháin gá iad a thuairisciú mar ioncam inchánach. [179] Ina theannta sin, go leor corparáidí a comhdaíodh mar C-Bardais agus dá bhrí sin a n-ioncam nár léirigh suas ar thuairisceáin chánach ar leith. Tar éis an 1986 an reachtaíocht athchóiriú cánach agus ciorruithe cánach faoi Uachtarán Reagan, aistrigh go leor corparáidí a bheith S-Bardais agus dá bhrí sin d'íoc an ráta cánach ioncaim phearsanta seachas an ráta cánach corparáide. [180] Mar thoradh ar na hathruithe agus eile, le linn agus tar éis na 1980í go leor de ioncam nua a thosaigh a thaispeáint suas ar an tuairisceáin chánach na saothraithe barr a bhí tuillte i ndáiríre go léir chomh maith. Ar an ábhar sin ní haon ionadh é go léiríonn staidéir atá déanta ag Pikkety / SAEZ agus daoine eile an chuid is mó den mhéadú ar an sciar 1% 's barr ioncam bliantúil a tharlaíonn sa tréimhse 1986-1988. Ina theannta sin, thosaigh cuntais cánach iarchurtha a thaispeáint i ndísc ioncam ó na tuairisceáin a bheidh ag sealbhóirí cuntais mar a bhí siad sna 1980í. Léirigh 2001 Cúlchiste Feidearálach staidéar go raibh díreach 5.5% de na sócmhainní is fearr 1% 's a bhí i gcuntais cánach iarchurtha, agus bhí 14.5% de shócmhainní an peircintíl 50-95 a bhí i gcuntais cánach iarchurtha. [181] Íocaíochtaí Aistrithe freisin den chuid is mó neamhaird ag formhór na staidéar, ach tá an cion den ioncam ar an ionsú ardaithe ó 5.9% i 1970 chun 14.2% i 2004. [182] Téann na híocaíochtaí go ginearálta do theaghlaigh ar ioncam níos ísle-agus dá bhrí sin tá siad as láthair a rinneadh go seasta staitisticí níos mó agus níos mó lochtach thar na blianta. Tá argóint Reynolds 'go bhfuil na hathruithe a dhíchur ioncam ó lár agus cur ioncam go dtí an barr, ag cur le an staid go staitistiúil ach i ndáiríre athrú beag le rud ar bith.

Polaitiúil, normatach, institiúideach

Léirmheastóirí an athrú teicneolaíochta mar míniú ar an "Divergence Mór" ar leibhéil ioncaim i Meiriceá [22] pointe bheartas poiblí agus ar pholaitíocht páirtí, nó "stuif a rinne an rialtas, nó ní raibh a dhéanamh". [183] ​​Áitíonn siad seo a bheith mar thoradh ar an treocht ag meath rátaí ballraíocht aontas saothair agus mar thoradh air ag laghdú tionchair polaitiúil, laghdú caiteachas ar sheirbhísí sóisialta, agus níos lú athdháileadh rialtais.

Páirtithe polaitiúla agus uachtaráin

Eolaí Polaitiúil Larry Bartels d'aimsigh comhghaol láidir idir an páirtí an uachtarán agus éagothroime ioncaim i Meiriceá ó 1948. (Féach thíos) [164] [184]

Meánfhás bliantúil ioncam réamh-cháin Scrúdú a dhéanamh 1948-2005, [185] Léiríonn Bartel go faoi uachtaráin Daonlathach (ó Harry Truman ar aghaidh), tá na gnóthachain ioncaim is mó a bhí ag bun an scála ioncaim agus barrchaolaithe amach mar a d'ardaigh ioncam. Faoi uachtaráin Poblachtach, i gcodarsnacht leis sin, bhí gnóthachain i bhfad níos lú, ach cad a bhí ann fás dírithe i dtreo an barr, barrchaolaithe amach mar a chuaigh tú síos ar an scála ioncaim. [151] [186]

Achoimre ar thorthaí Bartels ar, iriseoir Timothy Noah dá dtagraítear riaracháin na uachtaráin Daonlathach mar "Democrat-domhan", agus riaracháin GOP mar "Poblachtach-domhan":

I Democrat-domhain, mhéadaigh ioncam réamh-cháin 2.64% in aghaidh na bliana do na boicht agus níos ísle-lár-rang agus 2.12% in aghaidh na bliana le haghaidh an uachtair-lár-rang agus saibhir. Ní raibh aon Divergence Breataine. Ina áit sin, an comhbhrú an treocht ioncaim Breataine ar bhonn cothrom a bhí ann tríd na 1940í, 1950í, 1960í agus lean-dtí an lá inniu, cé go bhfuil ioncam inréimneach níos lú go tapa ná riamh. I Poblachtach-domhain, Idir an dá linn, mhéadaigh ioncam réamh-cháin 0.43 faoin gcéad in aghaidh na bliana do na boicht agus níos ísle-lár-rang agus 1.90 faoin gcéad do na uachtair-lár-rang agus saibhir. Ní amháin go raibh an dibhéirseacht Mór tarlú; bhí sé níos mór éagsúla. Chomh maith leis sin ar nóta: I Democrat-domhan mhéadaigh ioncam réamh-cháin níos tapúla ná mar a sa saol mór ní hamháin ar an 20ú peircintíl ach freisin le haghaidh an 40ú, an 60ú, agus 80 bliain. Bhí muid ar fad níos saibhre agus níos comhionainne! Ach i Poblachtach-domhain, mhéadaigh ioncam réamh-cháin níos moille ná sa saol mór ní hamháin ar an 20ú peircintíl ach freisin le haghaidh an 40ú, an 60ú, agus 80 bliain. Bhí muid ar fad níos boichte agus níos lú comhionann! Páirtí Daonlathach a tháirgtear freisin fás ioncaim beagán níos tapúla ná Poblachtánaigh ag an peircintíl 95, ach ní raibh an difríocht suntasach go staitistiúil. [183]

An chuma ar an patrún dáileadh fáis a bheith mar thoradh ar a lán iomlán de pholasaithe,

lena n-áirítear ní amháin ar an dáileadh na cánacha agus sochair, ach freisin ar an rialtais seasamh i dtreo ceardchumainn, cibé acu ardaíonn an pá íosta, a mhéid a frets an rialtas faoi bhoilsciú i gcoinne rátaí úis ró-ard, etc, etc [151]

Noah admhaíonn go bhfuil an fhianaise seo comhghaoil ​​"imthoisceach seachas díreach", ach mar sin tá "an fhianaise go bhfuil caitheamh tobac an chúis ailse scamhóg." [183]

Gníomh Neamh-pháirtí polaitíochta

Cóimheas cúitimh an meán de CEOs agus oibrithe a tháirgeadh, 1965-2009. Foinse: An Institiúid um Beartas Eacnamaíoch. 2011. Bunaithe ar shonraí ó Wall Street Journal / Mercer, Grúpa Hay 2010. [187]

Dar leis na heolaithe polaitiúla Jacob Hacker agus Paul Pierson scríobh sa leabhar Buaiteoir-Tóg-Gach Polaitíocht , tugadh na hathruithe tábhachtacha beartais ar nach bhfuil ag an Páirtí Poblachtach, ach ag forbairt, córas polaitiúil éifeachtach nua-aimseartha, go háirithe stocaireacht , ag saothraithe barr agus go háirithe-feidhmeannaigh corparáideacha agus tionscal na seirbhísí airgeadais. [188] deireadh na 1970í chonaic athrú de pholaitíocht Mheiriceá ar shiúl ó fhócas ar an rang lár, le nua, i bhfad níos éifeachtaí, brústocairí ionsaitheach agus dea-mhaoinithe agus grúpaí brú gníomhú thar ceann ghrúpaí ar ioncam uachtair. Feidhmeannaigh dhíchur go rathúil aon chumhacht nó frithchúitimh maoirseacht bainisteoirí corparáideach (príobháideach ó dlíthíochta, boird na stiúrthóirí agus na scairshealbhóirí, an Coimisiún um Urrúis agus Malartú nó ceardchumainn saothair). [189]

Tháinig rath an tionscal airgeadais ó go rathúil ag brú ar son dírialú na margaí airgeadais, rud a ligeann bhfad níos brabúsaí, ach i bhfad níos mó infheistíochtaí risky as a phríobháidiú sé na gnóthachain agus a sóisialú na caillteanais le fóirithintí rialtais. [190] (an dá ghrúpa le chéile thart ar 60% de na barr 0.1 faoin gcéad de na saothraithe.) Rinneadh chabhraigh gach saothraithe barr ag laghduithe domhain i cánacha eastát agus gnóthachain chaipitiúla, agus rátaí cánach ar leibhéil arda ioncaim.

Ag argóint i gcoinne an moladh go bhfuil an pléascadh i bpá d'fheidhmeannaigh corparáideach - a d'fhás ó 35X pá oibrí meán i 1978 go dtí os cionn 250X pá meán roimh an cúlú 2007 [191] - tiomáinte ag éileamh méadaithe ar thallann gann agus síos i gcomhréir le feidhmíocht, Krugman pointí amach go rialaíonn fachtóirí éagsúla lasmuigh de smacht feidhmeannaigh 'brabúsacht corparáideach, go háirithe sa ghearrthéarma nuair a bheidh an ceann na cuideachta cosúil Enron féidir breathnú cosúil le éirigh go hiontach. Thairis sin, boird corparáideach a leanúint cuideachtaí eile i pá a leagan síos, fiú má easaontaíonn na stiúrthóirí iad féin le pá lavish "go páirteach le feidhmeannaigh a mheasann siad leordhóthanach a mhealladh, i bpáirt mar go mbeidh an margadh airgeadais a bheith amhrasach cuideachta a bhfuil a POF nach bhfuil íoctha lavishly." Mar fhocal scoir "boird corparáideach, roghnaigh den chuid is mó ag an POF, cíos saineolaithe cúiteamh, beagnach i gcónaí atá roghnaithe ag an POF" ar mian leo go nádúrtha le do thoil a bhfostóirí. [192]

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, an údair Pá Gan Feidhmíochta, léirmheas ar phá feidhmiúcháin , a mhaíomh go bhfuil a ghabháil feidhmiúcháin de rialachas corparáideach sin a chomhlánú go mbeidh ach caidrimh phoiblí, ie poiblí `` outrage shrianta, a n-íoc. [193] seo i ndiaidh laghdaithe mar léirmheastóirí traidisiúnta iomarcach íoc-mar shampla polaiteoirí (nuair is gá do ranníocaíochtaí fheachtas ón saibhre níos tábhachtaí ná fearg populist), na meáin (lauding genius gnó), ceardchumainn (brúite) -. anois adh [194]

Chomh maith le polaitíocht, postulated Krugman athrú noirm de chultúr corparáideach a bhí ina fhachtóir. Sna 1950í agus na 60s, bhí feidhmeannaigh corparáideach (nó a d'fhéadfadh a fhorbairt) an cumas cúitimh an-ard a íoc iad féin a rialú trí na boird corparáideach na stiúrthóirí, srianta siad iad féin. Ach faoi dheireadh na 1990í, ar an meán cúiteamh bliantúil fíor de na 100 POF barr an skyrocketed ó $ 1,300,000-39 uair an pá meán oibrí-go $ 37,500,000, níos mó ná 1,000 uair an pá na n-oibrithe gnáth 1982-2002. [157] Iriseoir George Pacálaí Feiceann freisin an méadú suntasach i éagothroime i Meiriceá mar a táirge ar an athrú dearcaidh an mionlach Meiriceánach, a (ina thuairim féin) tar éis transitioning féin ó philéar na sochaí a chur ar ghrúpa sainspéise. [195 ] meastacháin Údar Timothy Noah go bhfuil an méid a iarrann sé "Wall Street agus pampering boird corparáideach '" ar an tuilleamh is airde 0.1% é "freagrach as 30%" den mhéadú iar-1978 éagothroime. [173]

Meath na ceardchumainn

Bhallraíocht san Aontas sna Stáit Aontaithe ón Spealadh Mór go lá atá ann faoi láthair. (Foinse: Aontas Treochtaí Ballraíocht sna Stáit Aontaithe , Tábla A-1 Aguisín A haghaidh 1930-2000; Biúró na Staitisticí Labor . do 2005 agus 2010)

Tá an ré fáis éagothroime an am céanna le laghdú suntasach tagtha ar tuairiscíodh ballraíocht aontas saothair ó 20% den lucht saothair i 1983 go dtí thart ar 12% sa bhliain 2007. [196] tá Eacnamaithe shíl go traidisiúnta go bhfuil toisc nach é cuspóir príomhfheidhmeannach aontas é a uasmhéadú ioncam a chomhaltaí, faoi stiúir gluaiseacht láidir ach ní chuimsíonn gach-aontas le éagothroime ioncaim méadaithe. Mar gheall ar an méadú ar éagothroime ioncaim de na blianta beaga anuas, ní mór ceachtar an comhartha an éifeacht a aisiompú, méid an éifeacht bheag, nó fórsa i gcoinne i bhfad níos mó shárú air, ós rud é go bhfuil unionization laghdú sa tréimhse sin. [197] [ 198]

Mar sin féin le déanaí tá sé léirithe ag taighde go bhfuil cumas ceardchumainn 'chun éagothromaíochtaí ioncaim a laghdú i measc bhaill níos tábhachtaí ná fachtóirí eile agus tá a tionchar glan chun éagothroime ioncaim náisiúnta a laghdú. [198] [199] Tá an meath na ceardchumainn Gortaítear an éifeacht leibhéalta i measc na bhfear, agus eacnamaí amháin (Berkeley eacnamaí David Cárta é) a mheas thart ar 15-20% de na "Divergence Mór" i measc an inscne thoradh ar meath unionization. [198] [200]

Fós cheapann taighdeoirí eile go bhfuil sé caillteanas an ghluaiseacht saothair de chumhacht pholaitiúil náisiúnta a chur chun cinn chothromú "idirghabháil rialtais agus athruithe in iompar earnáil phríobháideach" Bhí an tionchar is mó ar éagothroime sna Stáit Aontaithe. [198] [201] meastacháin Timothy Noah an "meath "na cumhachta aontas saothair" is cúis le 20% "an dibhéirseacht Breataine. [173]

Cánachas

Cén chaoi a bhfuil athrú polasaí cánach i bhfad thar na tríocha bliain anuas chuidigh leis éagothroime ioncaim a bhfuil agóid fúithi. I gcuid 2011 staidéar cuimsitheach éagothroime ioncaim (Treochtaí i Dáileadh Ioncaim Teaghlaigh Idir 1979 agus 2007), [150] an CBO fuarthas amach go,

An cúigiú barr an daonra a chonaic méadú 10-céatadáin-phointe i n-sciar den ioncam ina dhiaidh cánach. An chuid is mó den fhás chuaigh go dtí an barr 1 faoin gcéad den daonra. Gach grúpa eile a chonaic a gcuid scaireanna meath ag 2 go 3 pointe céatadáin. Sa bhliain 2007, cánacha cónaidhme agus aistrithe laghdaithe an scaipeadh ioncaim ag 20 faoin gcéad, ach go raibh éifeacht chothromú níos mó i 1979. An sciar na n-íocaíochtaí a aistriú chuig na teaghlaigh is ísle-ioncam laghdú. Thit an ráta cánach cónaidhme meán foriomlán.

Dar leis an iriseoir Timothy Noah, "ní féidir leat a thaispeáint i ndáiríre go raibh tionchar mór ar na trí-deich mbliana treocht éagothroime ioncaim ar bhealach amháin nó an duine eile polasaí cánach US. An treocht éagothroime d'ioncam réamh-cánach le linn na tréimhse seo bhí i bhfad níos drámatúla. " [183] ​​meastacháin Noah athruithe cánach cuntas a 5% den Divergence Breataine. [173]

Ach go leor - mar shampla eacnamaí Paul Krugman - béim ar an éifeacht na n-athruithe i gcánachas - mar shampla an 2001 agus 2003 laghduithe cánach Bush riarachán a ghearradh cánacha i bhfad níos mó do theaghlaigh ardioncaim ná iad siúd thíos -. ar éagothroime ioncaim mhéadaithe [202]

Tá cuid de an fás ar éagothroime ioncaim faoi riaracháin Poblachtach (cur síos ag Larry Bartels) curtha i leith beartas cánach. Rinneadh staidéar ag Thomas Piketty agus Emmanuel SAEZ fuarthas amach go

Laghduithe móra i gcáin progressivity ghlac ó na 1960idí ar siúl go príomha le linn dhá thréimhse:. an uachtaránacht Reagan sna 1980í agus an riarachán Bush sa 2000í luatha [203]

Le linn an tUachtarán Poblachtach Ronald Reagan laghdaíodh an ráta cánach ioncaim imeallach barr seilbhe 's in oifig ó níos mó ná 70-28 faoin gcéad, rátaí imeallacha barr ard cosúil le 70% a bheith ar an saghas i bhfeidhm le linn cuid mhór den tréimhse chomhionannais ioncam mór tar éis an "Great Comhbhrúite ". [183] ​​Cé gur thit an ráta imeallach bun do na bun 14-11 faoin gcéad. [204] Mar sin féin ba é an ráta éifeachtach ar saothraithe barr roimh ghearradh cánach Reagan i bhfad níos ísle mar gheall ar na bealaí éalaithe agus ranníocaíochtaí carthanachta. (Féach SAEZ & Piketty, "Cén chaoi a bhfuil Progressive na Stáit Aontaithe gCóras Cánach Chónaidhme? A Stairiúil agus Peirspictíocht Idirnáisiúnta" </ ref> [205] Uachtarán Ronald Reagan 1981 gearrtha sa ráta cánach barr rialta ar ioncam neamhthuillte laghdaíodh an uasráta gnóchan caipitiúil a ach 20% -. leibhéal is ísle ó riarachán Hoover [206]

Le linn an Poblachtach George W. Bush riarachán, an ráta cánach ar ghnóchain chaipitiúla agus díbhinní cáilitheacha - foinse díréireach ioncaim do saothraithe barr - Thit go 15% - níos lú ná leath an ráta is airde 35% ar ioncam gnáth. [207] Uachtaráin Bush Tá crosta an comhchuibhiú cánach curtha síos freisin chun ardú éagothroime, mar a bheadh ​​sé seo a bheith t síos tearmainn cánach amach ón gcósta. [208]

Chonaic an tuilleamh is airde grúpa ioncaim 0.01% ("grúpa ioncaim 99.99-100%") na laghduithe ráta cánach is mó ó 1960.
Foinse: Thomas Piketty agus Emmanuel SAEZ, [209]

Staidéar amháin [210] fuair go raibh laghduithe ar rátaí cánach éifeachtúla iomlán is suntasaí do dhaoine aonair a bhfuil ioncam is airde. (Féach "Ráta Cánach Chónaidhme Grúpa Ioncaim" chairt) Dóibh siúd a bhfuil ioncam i barr 0.01 faoin gcéad, thit rátaí foriomlán cánach Cónaidhme ó 74.6% i 1970, go dtí 34.7% i 2004 (an malartú sa treocht i 2000 le méadú go dtí 40.8% a tháinig i ndiaidh an 1993 Clinton easnamh bhille cánach laghdaithe ), an chéad cheann eile 0.09 faoin gcéad ag titim ó 59.1% go dtí 34.1%, sula leibhéalta amach le titim réasúnta measartha de 41.4-33.0% don ghrúpa 99.5-99.9 faoin gcéad. Cé gur thit an ráta cánach do shaothróirí ar ioncam íseal chomh maith (cé nach bhfuil oiread), na laghduithe cánach i gcomparáid le beagnach aon ráta cánach athrú-23.3% i 1970, 23.4% i 2004-an daonra SAM iomlán. [210]

Fuair ​​an staidéar amach go raibh an meath i progressivity ó 1960 mar gheall ar an athrú ó leithdháileadh cánacha ioncaim chorparáideach i measc saothair agus caipitil leis na héifeachtaí na cánach ioncaim aonair. [210] [211] Paul Krugman Tacaíonn an t-éileamh ag rá, "An foriomlán Thit an ráta cánach ar na teaghlaigh ar ioncam ard ó 36.5% i 1980 go 26.7% i 1989. " [212]

Ón anailís ar an Teach Bán féin, thit an t-ualach cánach dóibh siúd atá ag níos mó ná $ 250,000 go mór le linn an déanach 1980í, 1990í agus na 2000í, ó cháin éifeachtach de 35% i 1980, síos go dtí faoi 30% ó na 1980í déanacha a chur i láthair. [ 213]

Áitíonn staidéir go leor go athruithe cánach de Corparáidí S-cineál confound na staitisticí roimh 1990. Mar sin féin, fiú tar éis d'fhás na hathruithe boilsciú-coigeartaithe meán ioncam ina dhiaidh cánach de 25% idir 1996 agus 2006 (an bhliain seo caite a bhfuil sonraí cánach ioncaim aonair ar fáil go poiblí). An méadú ar an meán, áfach obscures, go leor éagsúlacht. Taithí ag an 20% is boichte de filers cánach laghdú 6% ar ioncam agus tugadh an barr 0.1 faoin gcéad de na filers cánach a n-ioncam beagnach dúbailte. Filers cánach i lár an dáilte ioncaim taithí faoi méadú 10% ar ioncam. Chomh maith leis sin le linn na tréimhse seo, mhéadaigh an céatadán den ioncam ó chaipiteal le haghaidh an barr 0.1 faoin gcéad ó 64% go 70%. [214]

Éifeachtaí ar chine agus na hinscne

Is é an bhearna dubh / bán i ioncam teaghlaigh meánach thart ar 3% níos lú lá atá inniu ann ná mar a bhí sé i 1979, easpa dul chun cinn a d'fhéadfadh a bheith dismaying ach ní áirítear ann an difríocht ó míniú aon chuid den fhás 30-bliain d'éagothroime. [24]

Tá difríocht Inscne in ioncam feabhsaithe i rith na tríocha bliain anuas. Tá an bhearna in ioncam bliantúil meánach idir fir agus mná ag obair go lánaimseartha laghdú ó 40% go 23%. [24]

Ioncam meánach d'oibrithe fireann agus baineann 1953-2005 i ndollair leanúnach. [111]

Bliain nó athrú Innéacs Gini, Daoine, aois 25 +, fostaithe go lánaimseartha [59] Innéacs Gini,
Teaghlaigh [58]
Fir Mná Dá sexes
1967 31.4 29.8 34.0 39.7
2005 42.4 35.7 40.9 46.9
Méadú 35.0% 19.8% 20.3% 18.1%
FOINSE: US Biúró Daonáireamh, 2006 [215]

Ó 1967 tá méadú tagtha ar éagothroime do theaghlaigh agus d'oibrithe lánaimseartha den dá ghnéas, ach go háirithe le haghaidh oibrithe fireann. (Féach an tábla thuas) go bhfuil méadú tagtha ar ioncam pearsanta go mór d'oibrithe ban ó 1953, níos lú mar sin d'oibrithe fireann, a n-ioncam marbhánta le linn na 1970í 1980í, agus na 1990í. [111]

Níl sé soiléir cé acu an bhfuil an méadú drámatúil na mban sa lucht oibre agus ioncam mban chúis le éagothroime níos mó (m.sh. teaghlaigh saothraí dé cúis éagothroime níos mó). Dar leis an Biúró Daonáireamh, mar de 2005, bhí 42% de na teaghlaigh sna Stáit Aontaithe agus 76% díobh siúd sa chúigiú barr beirt nó níos mó saothraithe ioncaim . [132] [136] Ach ag breathnú ar staidéir eimpíreacha, an staidéar CBO "Treochtaí i an Dáileadh Ioncaim Teaghlaigh ", fuair" torthaí measctha "an éifeacht na dteaghlach dé shaothraí" le meastacháin ag brath ar an tréimhse staidéar agus an mhodheolaíocht a úsáid. "Fuair ​​an staidéar amach freisin go bhfuil an leibhéal éagothroime do teaghlaigh le leanaí agus (nonelderly) teaghlaigh gan leanaí a bhí "beagnach mar an gcéanna". [216] Is féidir an fás de theaghlaigh le tuismitheoirí singil agus ba bhun le hioncaim níos ísle ach an chuid is mó de na sé a tharla roimh 1980 agus le blianta beaga anuas tá méadú ar chéatadán na mban atá ag obair i ndáiríre atá ina dtuismitheoirí aonair. [85]

Tábhacht an éagothroime

Thug tráchtairí, eacnamaithe, polaiteoirí nach n-aontaíonn ar cheist na méadú ar éagothroime i Meiriceá nó a thábhacht. I measc eacnamaithe agus saineolaithe eile a chomhaontú is mó go bhfuil Meiriceá ag fás éagothroime ioncaim "go domhain imní", [24] éagórach, [157] contúirt don daonlathas / cobhsaíocht sóisialta, [217] [218] [219] agus / nó fiú comhartha de meath náisiúnta. [195] Síneann Concern fiú a lucht tacaíochta den sórt sin (nó iar-lucht tacaíochta) den laissez-faire eacnamaíocht agus airgeadaithe earnáil phríobháideach.

Iar- Cúlchiste Feidearálach cathaoirleach an Bhoird Alan Greenspan , tá thagartha atá luaite éagothroime atá ag fás: ". Ní hé seo an cineál ruda a sochaí dhaonlathach - sochaí dhaonlathach caipitlí - is féidir glacadh leis i ndáiríre gan dul i ngleic" [24] Roinnt eacnamaithe (David Moss, Paul Krugman) Creidim féadfaidh an dibhéirseacht Breataine bheith ceangailte leis an ngéarchéim airgeadais na bliana 2008. [220] [221] bainisteoir Airgead William H. Comhlán , stiúrthóir bainistíochta PIMCO , cháin an t-athrú i dáileadh ioncaim ó saothair le caipiteal taobh thiar de roinnt de na fás i éagothroime mar neamh-inbhuanaithe, ag rá:

“even conservatives must acknowledge that return on capital investment, and the liquid stocks and bonds that mimic it, are ultimately dependent on returns to labor in the form of jobs and real wage gains. If Main Street is unemployed and undercompensated, capital can only travel so far down Prosperity Road.”

He concluded: “Investors/policymakers of the world wake up – you're killing the proletariat goose that lays your golden eggs.” [222] [223]

On the other side of the issue are those who have claimed that the increase is not significant, [224] that it doesn't matter [219] because America's economic growth and/or equality of opportunity are what's important, [21] that it is a global phenomenon which would be foolish to try to change through US domestic policy, [225] that it “has many economic benefits and is the result of … a well-functioning economy”, [220] [226] and has or may become an excuse for “class-warfare rhetoric”, [224] and may lead to policies that “reduce the well-being of wealthier individuals”. [71] [220]

Consumption and debt

Arguing that income inequality is not significant because inequality of consumption is less are Will Wilkinson of the libertarian Cato Institute and other conservatives. Wilkinson states that “the weight of the evidence shows that the run-up in consumption inequality has been considerably less dramatic than the rise in income inequality,” and consumption is more important than income. [227] According to Johnson, Smeeding, and Tory, consumption inequality was actually lower in 2001 than it was in 1986. [228] [229]

The CBO agrees that household consumption numbers show more equal distribution than household income but finds the data do not “adequately capture consumption by high-income households” as it does their income. [230] Other studies have not found consumption inequality less dramatic than household income inequality. [73] [231]

Others have disputed the importance of consumption over income, as consumption in excess of income usually means debt, [220] and a “growing body of work” suggests that income inequality has been the driving factor in the growing household debt [73] [232] as middle income earners go deeper into debt trying to maintain what once was a middle class lifestyle. Between 1983 and 2007, the top 5 percent saw their debt fall from 80 cents for every dollar of income to 65 cents, while the bottom 95 percent saw their debt rise from 60 cents for every dollar of income to $1.40. [73] Economist Krugman has found a strong correlation between inequality and household debt in America over the last hundred years. [233]

Deep debt may lead to bankruptcy and researchers Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi found a fivefold increase in the number of families filing for bankruptcy between 1980 and 2005. [234] The bankruptcies came not from increased spending “on luxuries”, but from an “increased spending on housing, largely driven by competition to get into good school districts.” Intensifying inequality may mean a dwindling number of ever more expensive school districts that compel middle class—or would-be middle class—to “buy houses they can't really afford, taking on more mortgage debt than they can safely handle”. [235]

Public attitudes

The growth of inequality has provoked a political protest movement—the Occupy movement —starting in Wall Street and spreading to 600 communities across the United States in 2011. Its main political slogan — “ We are the 99% ” — references its dissatisfaction with the concentration of income in the top 1%.

A 16 December 2011 Gallup poll found a decline in the number of Americans who felt reducing the gap in income and wealth between the rich and the poor was extremely or very important (21 percent of Republicans, 43 percent of independents, and 72 percent of Democrats). [236] In 2012, several surveys of voters attitudes toward growing income inequality found the issue ranked less important than other economic issues such as growth and equality of opportunity, and relatively low in affecting voters “personally”. [237] [238] In 1998 a Gallup poll found 52% of Americans agreeing that the gap between rich and the poor was a problem that needed to be fixed, while 45% regarded it as “an acceptable part of the economic system”. In 2011, those numbers are reversed: Only 45% see the gap as in need of fixing, while 52% do not. However, there was a large difference between Democrats and Republicans, with 71% of Democrats calling for a fix. [236]

In contrast, a national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, [239] found that respondents' sense of unfairness about taxes centered on the perception that wealthy Americans were not paying their fair share of taxes; 57% say this is what bothers them most about the tax system, an increase of 6% over a poll taken in March 2003. [240] A more recent poll found about two-thirds of Americans now believe there are “strong conflicts” between rich and poor in the United States. [241] [242]

Opinion surveys of what respondents thought was the right level of inequality have found Americans no more accepting of income inequality than other citizens of other nations, but more accepting of what they thought the level of inequality was in their country, being under the impression that there was less inequality than there actually was. [243] Dan Ariely and Michael Norton show in a study (2011) that US citizens across the political spectrum significantly underestimate the current US wealth inequality and would prefer a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. [244] Joseph Stiglitz in “The Price of Inequality” has argued that this sense of unfairness has led to distrust in government and business. [245]

Impact on democracy and society

A study by Larry Bartels found that Senate votes were more responsive to the opinions of high income groups and were less and even negatively responsive to the opinions of middle and lower class groups. [246]

Economists Jared Bernstein and Paul Krugman have attacked the concentration of income as variously “unsustainable” [218] and “incompatible” [219] with real democracy. American political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson quote a warning by Greek/Roman historian Plutarch : `An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics.` [217]

Two journalists concerned about social separation in the US are Robert Frank who notes that:

Today's rich had formed their own virtual country .. [T]hey had built a self-contained world unto themselves, complete with their own health-care system (concierge doctors), travel network (Net jets, destination clubs), separate economy. …. The rich weren't just getting richer; they were becoming financial foreigners, creating their own country within a country, their own society within a society, and their economy within an economy. [247]

and George Packer ,

Inequality hardens society into a class system … Inequality divides us from one another in schools, in neighborhoods, at work, on airplanes, in hospitals, in what we eat, in the condition of our bodies, in what we think, in our children's futures, in how we die. Inequality makes it harder to imagine the lives of others. [195]

Economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that hyper-inequality may explain political questions such as why America's infrastructure is deteriorating,as a result of the reduction in broadly beneficial public investment and support for public education, [248] or its recent relative lack of reluctance to engage in military conflicts such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Top earning families wealthy enough to buy their own education, medical care, personal security, and parks, have little interest in helping pay for such things for the rest of society, and the political influence to make sure they don't have to. So too, the lack of personal or family sacrifice involved for top earners in the military intervention of their country — their children being few and far between in the relatively low-paying all-volunteer military — may mean more willingness by the American government to wage war. [249]

The relatively high rates of health and social problems ( obesity , mental illness , homicides , teenage births , Incarceration , child conflict, drug use) and lower rates of social goods ( life expectancy , educational performance, trust among strangers , women's status , social mobility , even numbers of patents issued per capita), in the US compared to other developed countries may be related to its high income inequality. Using statistics from 23 developed countries and the 50 states of the US, British researchers Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have found such a correlation which remains after accounting for ethnicity, [250] national culture [251] ), and occupational classes or education levels. [252] Their findings, based on UN Human Development Reports and other sources, locate the United States at the top of the list in regards to inequality and various social and health problems among developed countries. [253] The authors argue inequality leads to the social ills through the psychosocial stress , status anxiety it creates. [254]

Disagreeing with this focus on the top earning 1% and urging attention to the economic and social pathologies of lower income/lower education Americans, is conservative journalist David Brooks . Whereas in the 1970s, high school and college graduates had “very similar family structures”, today, high school grads are much less likely to get married and be active in their communities, and much more likely to smoke, be obese, get divorced, or have “a child out of wedlock.” [255]

The zooming wealth of the top one percent is a problem, but it's not nearly as big a problem as the tens of millions of Americans who have dropped out of high school or college. It's not nearly as big a problem as the 40 percent of children who are born out of wedlock. It's not nearly as big a problem as the nation's stagnant human capital, its stagnant social mobility and the disorganized social fabric for the bottom 50 percent. [255] [256]

Contradicting most of these arguments, classical liberals such as Friedrich Hayek have maintained that because individuals are diverse and different, state intervention to redistribute income is inevitably arbitrary and incompatible with the concept of general rules of law, and that “what is called 'social' or distributive' justice is indeed meaningless within a spontaneous order”. Those who would use the state to redistribute, “take freedom for granted and ignore the preconditions necessary for its survival.” It is not great wealth but government and that gives power to control others in liberal democracies such as the United States. [257] [258] [258]

Opportunity, growth and equality

Conservatives and libertarians such as economist Thomas Sowell , and Congressman Paul Ryan (R., Wisc.) [259] argue that more important than the level of equality of results is America's equality of opportunity, especially relative to other developed countries such as western Europe.

Economic growth and inequality

In response to the Occupy movement Richard A. Epstein defended inequality in a free market society, maintaining that “taxing the top one percent even more means less wealth and fewer jobs for the rest of us.” According to Epstein, “the inequalities in wealth … pay for themselves by the vast increases in wealth”, while “forced transfers of wealth through taxation … will destroy the pools of wealth that are needed to generate new ventures. [260] Stiglitz on the other hand concludes that moving money from the bottom to the top through income inequality lowers consumption because higher-income individuals consume a smaller proportion of their income than do lower-income individuals (those at the top save 15 to 25 percent of their income, those at the bottom spend all of their income). [261]

Some (while specifically advocating redistribution of income through taxation) have not found a “tradeoff” between greater equality and economic growth; but according to economist Branko Milanovic , while traditionally economists thought inequality was good for growth

“The view that income inequality harms growth—or that improved equality can help sustain growth—has become more widely held in recent years. … The main reason for this shift is the increasing importance of human capital in development. When physical capital mattered most, savings and investments were key. Then it was important to have a large contingent of rich people who could save a greater proportion of their income than the poor and invest it in physical capital. But now that human capital is scarcer than machines, widespread education has become the secret to growth.” [262]

“Broadly accessible education” is both difficult to achieve when income distribution is uneven and tends to reduce “income gaps between skilled and unskilled labor.”

Economic sociologist Lane Kenworthy has found no correlation between levels of inequality and economic growth among developed countries, among states of the US, or in the US over the years from 1947 to 2005. [263] Jared Bernstein found a nuanced relation he summed up as follows: “In sum, I'd consider the question of the extent to which higher inequality lowers growth to be an open one, worthy of much deeper research, perhaps along some of the lines noted above. [264]

Some researchers have found a connection between “leveling” higher marginal tax rates on high income earners, and higher rates of employment growth. [265] [266] [267]

Mobility during a lifetime

Strong “ intra-generational ” or individual economic mobility between the strata of rich, middle class and poor means both that (1) a high level of inequality of annual income is made irrelevant by a more even distribution of lifetime income, and (2) however extreme the earnings at the top, they are not out of reach for the poor (or middle income) but ambitious. [20]

Sowell claims mobility is robust.

An absolute majority of the people who were in the bottom 20 percent [of income] in 1975 have also been in the top 20 percent at some time since then. Most Americans don't stay put in any income bracket. At different times, they are both “rich” and “poor” — as these terms are recklessly thrown around in the media. [...] There are of course some people who remain permanently in the bottom 20 percent. But such people constitute less than one percent of the American population, according to data published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in its 1995 annual report. Perhaps the intelligentsia and the politicians have been too busy waxing indignant to be bothered by anything so mundane as facts. [21]

According to Thomas A. Garrett, studies examining quintiles of wealth levels may provide a misleading picture. [71] For example, a US Treasury study of the period from 1996 to 2005 found that “[l]ess than half (40% or 43% depending on the measure) of those in the top 1 percent in 1996 were still in the top 1 percent in 2005. Only about 25 percent of the individuals in the top 1/100th percent in 1996 remained in the top 1/100th percent in 2005.” [268]

Other have not found individual mobility so fluid. A 2007 study (by Kopczuk, Saez and Song in 2007) found the top population in America “very stable” and “not mitigated the dramatic increase in annual earnings concentration since the 1970s.” [269]

Economist Paul Krugman , attacks conservatives for resorting to “extraordinary series of attempts at statistical distortion”. He argues that while in any given year, some of the people with low incomes will be “workers on temporary layoff, small businessmen taking writeoffs, farmers hit by bad weather”—the rise in their income in succeeding years is not the same 'mobility' as poor people rising to middle class or middle income rising to wealth. It's the mobility of “the guy who works in the college bookstore and has a real job by his early thirties.”

Studies by the Urban Institute and the US Treasury have both found that about half of the families who start in either the top or the bottom quintile of the income distribution are still there after a decade, and that only 3 to 6% rise from bottom to top or fall from top to bottom. [20]

On the issue of whether most Americans do not stay put in any one income bracket, Krugman quotes from 2011 CBO distribution of income study

Household income measured over a multi-year period is more equally distributed than income measured over one year, although only modestly so. Given the fairly substantial movement of households across income groups over time, it might seem that income measured over a number of years should be significantly more equally distributed than income measured over one year. However, much of the movement of households involves changes in income that are large enough to push households into different income groups but not large enough to greatly affect the overall distribution of income. Multi-year income measures also show the same pattern of increasing inequality over time as is observed in annual measures. [16]

In other words, “many people who have incomes greater than $1 million one year fall out of the category the next year — but that's typically because their income fell from, say, $1.05 million to 0.95 million, not because they went back to being middle class.” [16] [270]

Mobility between generations

Several studies have found the ability of children from poor or middle-class families to rise to upper income — known as “upward relative intergenerational mobility” — is lower in the US than in other developed countries [271] — and at least two economist have found lower mobility linked to income inequality. [23] [24]

The Great Gatsby Curve.png

In their “Great Gatsby” curve, [23] White House Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Alan B. Krueger and labor economist Miles Corak show a negative correlation between inequality and social mobility. The curve plotted “intergenerational income elasticity”—ie the likelihood that someone will inherit their parents' relative position of income level—and inequality for a number of countries. [24] [272]

In the words of journalist Timothy Noah

you can't really experience ever-growing income inequality without experiencing a decline in Horatio Alger -style upward mobility because (to use a frequently-employed metaphor) it's harder to climb a ladder when the rungs are farther apart. [24]

Aside from the proverbial distant rungs, the connection between income inequality and low mobility can be explained by the lack of access for un-affluent children to better (more expensive) schools and preparation for schools crucial to finding high-paying jobs; the lack of health care that may lead to obesity and diabetes and limit education and employment. [271]

Krueger estimates that “the persistence in the advantages and disadvantages of income passed from parents to the children” will “rise by about a quarter for the next generation as a result of the rise in inequality that the US has seen in the last 25 years.” [24]

Income at a glance

Median income levels
Households Persons, age 25 or older with earnings Household income by race
All households Dual earner
households
Per household
member
Males Females Both sexes Na hÁise White,
non-hispanic
Hispanic Dubh
$46,326 $67,348 $23,535 $39,403 $26,507 $32,140 $57,518 $48,977 $34,241 $30,134
Median personal income by educational attainment
Measure Some High School High school graduate Some college Associate's degree Bachelor's degree or higher Bachelor's degree Master's degree Professional degree Doctorate degree
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings $20,321 $26,505 $31,054 $35,009 $49,303 $43,143 $52,390 $82,473 $70,853
Male, age 25+ w/ earnings $24,192 $32,085 $39,150 $42,382 $60,493 $52,265 $67,123 $ 100,000 $78,324
Female, age 25+ w/ earnings $15,073 $21,117 $25,185 $29,510 $40,483 $36,532 $45,730 $66,055 $54,666
Persons, age 25+, employed full-time $25,039 $31,539 $37,135 $40,588 $56,078 $50,944 $61,273 $ 100,000 $79,401
Household $22,718 $36,835 $45,854 $51,970 $73,446 $68,728 $78,541 $ 100,000 $96,830
Household income distribution
Bottom 10% Bottom 20% Bottom 25% Middle 33% Middle 20% Top 25% Top 20% Top 5% Top 1.5% Top 1%
$0 to $10,500 $0 to $18,500 $0 to $22,500 $30,000 to $62,500 $35,000 to $55,000 $77,500 and up $92,000 and up $167,000 and up $250,000 and up $350,000 and up
Source: US Census Bureau, 2006; income statistics for the year 2005

Féach freisin

Nótaí

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  147. ^ Growing Unequal?: Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries , OECD Publishing, ISBN 978-92-64-04418-0 , 2008, pgs. 103, 104.
  148. ^ Cathrine Dodge; Mike Dorning (12 September 2012). “Rich-Poor Gap Widens to Most Since 1967 as Income Falls” . Bloomberg . Retrieved 6 November 2012.
  149. ^ 33% increase in gini index rating
  150. ^ a b Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.20 and figure 12. “Between 1979 and 2007, the Gini index for market income increased by 23 percent, the index for market income after transfers increased by 29 percent, and the index for income measured after transfers and federal taxes increased by 33 percent.”
  151. ^ a b c Paul Ryan: Inequality, Take Two | Timothy Noah |tnr.com| November 18, 2011
  152. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.12-13 and table 1
  153. ^ written in in a clients-only July 2011 JPMorgan Chase newsletter obtained by Washington Post columnist Harold Meyerson An economic recovery that leaves workers further behind Harold Meyerson| April 10, 2012
  154. ^ Brooks Brothers Bolshevism Timothy Noah| tnr.com September 14, 2011
  155. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.13
  156. ^ Inequality in America. The rich, the poor and the growing gap between them June 15, 2006
  157. ^ a b c d e f Krugman, Paul (October 20, 2002). “For Richer” . The New York Times .
  158. ^ the superstar hypothesis was coined by the Chicago economist Sherwin Rosen ) used the example of the passing of the hundreds of comedians that made a modest living at live shows in the borscht belt and other places in bygone days that have been replaced by a handful of superstar TV comedians.
  159. ^ estimate by economist George Borjas , quoted in Conscience of a Liberal , p.34
  160. ^ The United States of Inequality. Entry 3 : By Timothy Noah| 7 September 2010, Did the post-1965 immigration surge cause the Great Divergence?
  161. ^ such as political scientists Jacob S. Hacker , Paul Pierson , Larry Bartels and Nathan Kelly, and economist Timothy Smeeding
  162. ^ American politics, Democracy in America Winner-Take-All Politics . It's a pretty good book. economist.com Democracy in America. 21 September 2010]
  163. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.39, Figure 3
  164. ^ a b Bartels, LM (2008). Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  165. ^ Krugman, P. (2007). The conscience of a liberal . New York: WW Norton.
  166. ^ Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson (2011) Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington made the rich richer — and turned its back on the middle class.
  167. ^ Dictionary of economics online
  168. ^ Economic Report of the President 1997 mentions “colloquium on this topic at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York” (1995?)
  169. ^ Experts' Consensus on Earnings Inequality . Economic Report of the President 1997
  170. ^ a b “New York Times. (June 7, 2007). The Rewards of Education” . The New York Times . 2007-06-09. Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  171. ^ CNN-Travis Waldon-Only Advanced Degree Holders Saw Wage Gains in the Past Decade
  172. ^ a b The United States of Inequality Entry 4: Did Computers Create Inequality?| By Timothy Noah| 8 September 2010
  173. ^ a b c d e f g The United States of Inequality. Entry 9: How the Decline in K-12 Education Enriches College Graduates| By: Timothy Noah Slate.com | 15 September 2010
  174. ^ a b The United States of Inequality Entry 7: Trade Didn't Create Inequality, and Then It Did| By Timothy Noah| 14 September 2010
  175. ^ TRADE AND WAGES, RECONSIDERED | Paul Krugman| February 2008]
  176. ^ Tax Rates, Inequality and the 1% By ALAN REYNOLDS 6 December 2011
  177. ^ Alan Reynolds Vs. Inequality | Timothy Noah | December 6, 2011
  178. ^ Intellectual Garbage Collection: The Unreliability of Alan Reynolds
  179. ^ Reynolds, Alan. Income and Wealth. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006. 108. Print.
  180. ^ Alan J Auerbach, “Who Bears the Corporate Tax?” NBER Working Paper 11686 (October 2005), p. 4
  181. ^ Arthur B. Kennickell, “A Rolling Tide: changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the US, 1989-2001” (Federal Reserve Board, September 2003), tables 10 and 11.
  182. ^ Economic Report of the President (2005), table B-29.
  183. ^ a b c d e Noah, Timothy. “Can We Blame Income Inequality on Republicans” in the multi-part series “The United States of Inequality.” Slate , Sept. 9, 2010.
  184. ^ Kelly, NJ (2009). The Politics of Income Inequality in the United States . New York: Cambridge University Press.
  185. ^ which encompassed most of the egalitarian Great Compression and the entire inegalitarian Great Divergence (up until the time he did his research) and published his findings in the book Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton University Press: 2008)
  186. ^ chart of Income Growth Rates 1948-2005 under Democratic presidents and under Republican presidents. Graphics by Catherine Mulbrandon
  187. ^ More compensation heading to the very top: 1965-2009 . May 16, 2011.
  188. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.7
  189. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.115, 219, 228
  190. ^ Winner-Take-All Politics , p.66
  191. ^ More compensation heading for the very top EPI 2010
  192. ^ Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal , WW Norton & Company, 2007, p.143-44
  193. ^ Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation By Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried]
  194. ^ Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal , 2007, p.145
  195. ^ a b c “The Broken Contract”, By George Packer, Foreign Affairs , November/December 2011
  196. ^ UNION MEMBERS IN 2007 US Bureau of Labor Statistics. January 25, 2008
  197. ^ Unions and wage inequality | David Card, Thomas Lemieux and W. Craig Riddell| Journal of Labor Research Volume 25, Number 4, 519-559, doi : 10.1007/s12122-004-1011-z
  198. ^ a b c d The United States of Inequality, Entry 6: The Great Divergence and the death of organized labor. By Timothy Noah| slate.com| 12 September 2010
  199. ^ UNIONISM AND THE DISPERSION OF WAGES by RICHARD B. FREEMAN, National Bureau of Economic Research 1980
  200. ^ The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the US Labor Market | David Card| Industrial and Labor Relations Review , Vol. 54, No. 2. (Jan., 2001), pp. 296-315.
  201. ^ Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America Frank Levy and Peter Temin] Revised June 27, 2007
  202. ^ New CBO Data Show Income Inequality Continues to Widen After-Tax-Income for Top 1 Percent Rose by $146,000 in 2004 | By Aviva Aron-Dine and Arloc Sherman| cbpp.org| January 23, 2007
  203. ^ How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, p.23
  204. ^ Silliman, BR (2008). Will the next president reform the tax code? A historical examination. The CPA Journal, 78(11), 23-27. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com
  205. ^ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec11/makingsense_12-12.html
  206. ^ “The Hidden Entitlements” . CTJ .
  207. ^ Kocieniewski, David (2012-01-18). “Since 1980s, the Kindest of Tax Cuts for the Rich” . New York Times . Retrieved 2012-01-21.
  208. ^ Dickinson, Tom (2011-11-09). “How the GOP Became the Party of the Rich” . Rolling Stone . Retrieved 2012-01-02.
  209. ^ “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007 (p.13) Table 2. Federal Tax Rates by Income Group from 1960
  210. ^ a b c Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective” . Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 21, Number 1 — Winter 2007
  211. ^ “Even after exploiting all possible deductions and credits, the typical high-income taxpayer during the Great Prosperity paid a federal tax of well over 50 percent of his earnings.” Clinton Administration Secretary of labor Robert Reich In his book Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future
  212. ^ Krugman, Paul (1995). Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations . New York: WW Norton & Company. p. 155. ISBN 978-0-393-31292-8 . Retrieved 2-03-12.
  213. ^ “FactChecking Obama's Budget Speech” . FactCheck.org . 2011-04-15. Retrieved 2011-01-04.
  214. ^ Thomas L. Hungerford “Changes in the Distribution of Income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy.” Congressional Research Service, Dec. 29, 2011. http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/crs-1.pdf
  215. ^ As an alternative to the Census Bureau's estimate of the Gini index, a Gini index based on Adjusted Gross Income from IRS Tax Returns can be computed. In 1990, the IRS AGI Gini was 0.529 and increased to 0.584 by 2008.
  216. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.15 and figure 8
  217. ^ a b Winner-Take-All Politics (book) by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson p.75
  218. ^ a b “CBO Report Shows Rich Got Richer, As Did Most Americans: View” . businessweek.com. October 31, 2011.
  219. ^ a b c Oligarchy, American Style By PAUL KRUGMAN . 3 November 2011
  220. ^ a b c d The United States of Inequality, Entry 10: Why We Can't Ignore Growing Income Inequality By: Timothy Noah. slate.com| 16 September 2010
  221. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman
  222. ^ Investment Outlook | October 2011 |Six Pac(k)in'
  223. ^ Wall Street Bolshies Watch Timothy Noah| tnr.com| October 3, 2011
  224. ^ a b Two Americas: One Rich, One Poor? Understanding Income Inequality in the United States By Rea Hederman, Jr. and Robert Rector| Heritage Foundation. August 24, 2004]
  225. ^ A Look at the Global One Percent By ALLAN H. MELTZER| wsj.com| 9 March 2012
  226. ^ US Income Inequality: It's Not So Bad By Thomas A. Garrett| Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis| Spring 2010
  227. ^ “Thinking Clearly About Economic Inequality” , Will Wilkinson, Cato Institute 2009
  228. ^ Johnson, Smeeding, Tory, “Economic Inequality” in Monthly Labor review of April 2005, table 3.
  229. ^ see also Hassett and Mathur: Consumption and the Myths of Inequality | BY KEVIN A. HASSETT AND APARNA MATHUR| online.wsj.com| October 24, 2012
  230. ^ Congressional Budget Office: Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007 . October 2011. p.5
  231. ^ The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in The US, 1980-2010 |Orazio Attanasio| Erik Hurst| Luigi Pistaferri| National Bureau of Economic Research| NBER Working Papers #17982| Apr 2012
  232. ^ The Way Forward | By Daniel Alpert, Westwood Capital; Robert Hockett, Professor of Law, Cornell University; and Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics, New York University| New America Foundation| October 10, 2011
  233. ^ Inequality and crises: coincidence or causation? Paul Krugman (see last chart: Inequality and household debt)
  234. ^ Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience Elizabeth Warren*
  235. ^ Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal , WW Norton & Company, 2007, (p.246-7)
  236. ^ a b Why Obama's New Populism May Sink His Campaign William Galston | tnr.com| 17 December 2011]
  237. ^ Why the President's Campaign Shouldn't Focus on Inequality William Galston| tnr.com| 3 May 2012| accessed 5 May 2012
  238. ^ NBC/WSJ: Americans prefer message focused on fairness over anti-government or inequality argument by Jed Lewison dailykos.com 20 April 2012
  239. ^ conducted Dec. 7-11 among 1,521 adults
  240. ^ Tax System Seen as Unfair, in Need of Overhaul, Wealthy Not Paying Fair Share Top Complaint pewresearch.org 20 December 2011]
  241. ^ Survey Finds Rising Perception of Class Tension | By SABRINA TAVERNISE| 11 January 2012
  242. ^ Rising Share of Americans See Conflict Between Rich and Poor by Rich Morin| 11 January 2012
  243. ^ Lars Osberg and Timothy Smeeding. “Fair Inequality? Attitudes Toward Pay Dfferentials: The United States in Comparative Perspective, ” American Sociological Review, 71, 2006, pp. 450 – 473.
  244. ^ Norton, MI, & Ariely , D., “Building a Better America – One Wealth Quintile at a Time” , Perspectives on Psychological Science , January 2011 6: 9-12
  245. ^ Joseph E. Stiglitz (2012) The Price of Inequality. New York: WWNorton
  246. ^ Based on Larry Bartels's study Economic Inequality and Political Representation , Table 1: Differential Responsiveness of Senators to Constituency Opinion.
  247. ^ Richistan: A Journey Through the American Wealth Boom and the Lives of the New Rich … By Robert Frank
  248. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 92). Norton. Kindle Edition.
  249. ^ Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1% | vanityfair.com| May 2010
  250. ^ A study confined to non-Hispanic whites in US and England also showed the effect. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.177)
  251. ^ Countries of similar cultures and different levels of equality — Spain and Portugal — showed difference in the index, while countries with very different cultures and ways of achieving equality — Nordic countries and Japan — charted closer to each other. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.183)
  252. ^ The effect was worse among low class/education level in high inequality countries, but continued through all occupational classes and was still significant among the highest. (Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level , 2011, p.178-9)
  253. ^ Statistics and graphs from Wilkinson and Pickett research.
  254. ^ The Spirit Level: how 'ideas wreckers' turned book into political punchbag | Robert Booth| The Guardian| 13 August 2010
  255. ^ a b The Wrong Inequality By David Brooks | nyt.com |31 October 2011.
  256. ^ see also The White Underclass By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF| 8 February 2012
  257. ^ Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976. 33. Print.
  258. ^ a b Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960. 231. Print.
  259. ^ Paul Ryan on Income Inequality and Upward Mobility Diane Ellis, Ed. · 28 November 2011
  260. ^ Three Cheers for Income Inequality
  261. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012-06-04). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future (p. 85). Norton. Kindle Edition. See also: Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes, “Do the Rich Save More?,” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 2 (2004): 397– 444.
  262. ^ More or Less | Branko Milanovic| Finance & Development | September 2011| Vol. 48, No. 3
  263. ^ Kenworthy, Lane (December 3, 2007). “Does More Equality Mean Less Economic Growth?” .
  264. ^ Does inequality prevent economic growth? | By Jared Bernstein, On the Economy| 1 October 2012
  265. ^ Corley-Coulibaly, Marva; Prasadm, Naren ; Sekerler Richiardi, Pelin (October 2011). “Tax reform for improving job recovery and equity” . World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 97–120. doi : 10.1002/wow3.28 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  266. ^ Escudero, Verónica; López Mourelo, Elva (2012). “Chapter 3, Fiscal consolidation and employment growth” . In Torres, Raymond (ed.). World of Work Report . International Institute for Labour Studies. pp. 59–80. ISBN 978-92-9251-010-7 . Retrieved September 10, 2012.
  267. ^ Stiglitz, Joseph (July 2, 2012). Interview with Ben Chu. “Stiglitz: the full transcript” . The Independent . Retrieved September 8, 2012.
  268. ^ Income Mobility in the US from 1996 to 2005. Report of the DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. November 13, 2007. p.4. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/incomemobilitystudy03-08revise.pdf
  269. ^ Uncovering the American Dream: Inequality and Mobility in Social Security Earnings Data since 1937 Wojciech Kopczuk, Emmanuel Saez, Jae Song, September 15, 2007, Figure 4B
  270. ^ Millionaire For A Day Paul Krugman. 3 November 2011,
  271. ^ a b Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs | By JASON DePARLE | January 4, 2012 ]
  272. ^ Corak graphs 25 countries, Krueger limits his to developed countries and lists 10

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